Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

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shakuntala
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Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by shakuntala »

Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism
1)How logic is used in Madhayamika Buddhism to reach insight/prajna
The relationship between analysis and insight in Madhyamika Buddhism
http://gamahucherpress.yellowgum.com/wp ... ukba21.pdf

2)How logic is used to demonstrate emptiness/sunyata or the meaninglessness of all views
Contentless Thought: case study in the meaninglessness of all views
http://gamahucherpress.yellowgum.com/bo ... hought.pdf
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by Schrödinger’s Yidam »

shakuntala wrote:Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism
1)How logic is used in Madhayamika Buddhism to reach insight/prajna
The relationship between analysis and insight in Madhyamika Buddhism
The title alone discredits the thesis. It's Madhyamaka Buddhism. A Madhyamika is a person that embraces Madhyamaka philosophy.
1.The problem isn’t ‘ignorance’. The problem is the mind you have right now. (H.H. Karmapa XVII @NYC 2/4/18)
2. I support Mingyur R and HHDL in their positions against lama abuse.
3. Student: Lama, I thought I might die but then I realized that the 3 Jewels would protect me.
Lama: Even If you had died the 3 Jewels would still have protected you. (DW post by Fortyeightvows)
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Tenzin Dorje
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by Tenzin Dorje »

smcj wrote:
shakuntala wrote:Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism
1)How logic is used in Madhayamika Buddhism to reach insight/prajna
The relationship between analysis and insight in Madhyamika Buddhism
The title alone discredits the thesis. It's Madhyamaka Buddhism. A Madhyamika is a person that embraces Madhyamaka philosophy.
True.

Also, I read a bit of the chapter on Geluk accounts and it sounds like the author of the thesis is guilty of the fault of fabrication. For instance, in relation to his explanation of the meaning of a "rational consciousness".
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by shakuntala »

The title alone discredits the thesis. It's Madhyamaka Buddhism. A Madhyamika is a person that embraces Madhyamaka philosoph
then you are saying these works are discredited

Dependent-Arising and Emptiness: A Tibetan Buddhist Interpretation of Madhyamika Philosophy Paperback
by Elizabeth Napper (Author)

Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of Madhyamika System
by T. R. V. Murti (Author)

Huntington, C. W., Jr and Geshe Namgyal Wangchen. 1989. The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Mādhyamika, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press

Eckel, Malcom David. 1978. Bhāvaviveka and the early Mādhyamika theories of language. Philosophy East and West, 28 (3): 323–337.

Garfield, Jay L. 1996. Emptiness and Positionlessness: Do the Mādhyamika Relinquish All Views? Journal of Indian Philosophy, 24: 1–34.

i suggest you read the works
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Tenzin Dorje
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by Tenzin Dorje »

Hi,

As I said, I read a few pages from Chapter 3, Insight for the Geluk-pa. So, I got a few remarks in relation to this.
The Geluk-ba Dzong-ka-ba argues that the conceptuality spoken of by Candrakirti has to be qualified. This qualification, as E. Napper points out, is that "conceptions of inherent existence are being refuted, not all conceptions".
[Candrakirti] glosses conceptuality as "that which superimposes a meaning of inherent existence which is not correct"".
This is contradictory.

This is because if conceptuality is 'that which superimposes a meaning of inherent existence', then it is not feasible that 'there be a conceptuality that is not being refuted, for not being a conception of true existence'. Rather, the meaning of 'conceptuality' spoken of by Chandrakirti is not 'conception of true existence', it is 'conceptual consciousness'.

As to the relationship between conceptuality and conception of true existence, there are three possibilities:
  • 1. Something that is a conceptual consciousness but is not a conception of true existence. For instance, the rational consciousness in the continuum of a Learner Superior in subsequent attainment inferentially realizing emptiness. This is because it is a conceptual consciousness that is mistaken with regard to its appearing object, a meaning-generality of emptiness.

    2. Something that is both a conceptual consciousness and conception of true existence. For instance, afflictive ignorance.

    3. Something that is neither, for instance a pot.

All in all, what do you mean when you say the following?
It is argued that when Dzong-ka-ba talks about a rational cognition he means logical, or inferential.
Do you mean a rational cognition is an inferential cognizer, or do you mean the opposite?
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by shakuntala »

As I said, I read a few pages from Chapter 3, Insight for the Geluk-pa. So, I got a few remarks in relation to this.


Quote:
The Geluk-ba Dzong-ka-ba argues that the conceptuality spoken of by Candrakirti has to be qualified. This qualification, as E. Napper points out, is that "conceptions of inherent existence are being refuted, not all conceptions".


Quote:
[Candrakirti] glosses conceptuality as "that which superimposes a meaning of inherent existence which is not correct"".

This is contradictory.

This is because if conceptuality is 'that which superimposes a meaning of inherent existence', then it is not feasible that 'there be a conceptuality that is not being refuted, for not being a conception of true existence'. Rather, the meaning of 'conceptuality' spoken of by Chandrakirti is not 'conception of true existence', it is 'conceptual consciousness'.

I think you are trying to discredit the thesis with your comments but all you are doing is pointing out perhaps the different views in regard to prajna and conceptuality amongst the prasangika Madhyamika-which is exactly what this thesis is doing but then I dont think you have read it or understood it perhaps you are to busy trying to discredit it we can only wonder why


please address all points
first
so who has got it wrong The Geluk-ba Dzong-ka-ba or Candrakirti please tell us

note E. Napper says
the conceptuality spoken of by Candrakirti has to be qualified
as the thesis is about a model of insight generation for the Geluk-ba then it would be very interesting to know how logic works for them and what prajna amounts to -dont you think-which is what the thesis shows[but then I dont think you have read it or understood it]

as the thesis is about logic being used to generate insight for the prasangika Madhyamika then it would be very interesting to know how logic works for them and what prajna amounts to -dont you think which is what the thesis shows[but then I dont think you have read it or understood it]

on the following points you seem completely confused

second
do you know what "inherent existence" is-please tell us
third
on the one hand you use interchangeably "true existence" and "inherent existence" please explain
you say
conceptuality that is not being refuted, for not being a conception of true existence
where does true existence come from I thought Geluk-ba Dzong-ka-ba and Chandrakirti are talking about "inherent existence"

fourth
you say
conceptuality' spoken of by Chandrakirti is not 'conception of true existence', it is 'conceptual consciousness'.
as far as I know "conceptual consciousness" is of "inherent existence"
but again you seem to be talking about different things when you say
conception of true existence


in summary

I dont think you know what "inherent existence" is
and
I dont think you have read it or understood the thesis-perhaps you are to busy trying to discredit it we can only wonder why
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by Tenzin Dorje »

shakuntala wrote:I think you are trying to discredit the thesis with your comments but all you are doing is pointing out perhaps the different views in regard to prajna and conceptuality amongst the prasangika Madhyamika-which is exactly what this thesis is doing but then I dont think you have read it or understood it perhaps you are to busy trying to discredit it we can only wonder why.
I am not trying. Rather, I am merely showing the faults to the position that conceptuality is conception of inherent existence.

shakuntala wrote:so who has got it wrong The Geluk-ba Dzong-ka-ba or Candrakirti please tell us
Both are authoritative and unmistaken. Neither Chandrakirti nor Tsongkhapa identify conceptuality with conception of inherent existence. I have already stated the reason and example previously [of something being conceptuality but not being a conception of inherent existence].
shakuntala wrote:do you know what "inherent existence" is-please tell us.

on the one hand you use interchangeably "true existence" and "inherent existence" please explain
you say
conceptuality that is not being refuted, for not being a conception of true existence
where does true existence come from I thought Geluk-ba Dzong-ka-ba and Chandrakirti are talking about "inherent existence"
The meaning of a phenomenon being inherently existent is that if you look for it (with a mind of ultimate analysis), you can find it. It is that it can withstand analysis.

According to Svatantrika, a phenomena can be inherently existent even when it is not truly existent. This is because their meaning of 'true existence' is 'non-deceptive'. For instance, an illusory horse is not truly existent because it doesn't appear [to ignorance] as it exists, but the basis on which the illusory horse is wrongly imputed exists inherently [and thus can be found].

According to Prasangika, true existence and inherent existence have the same meaning. This is because Tsongkhapa said so:
  • Tsongkhapa, Middle-Length Lam Rim, Illusory-like appearances section wrote: if an object is truly established, it is not suitable for it to appear to a mind in any way other than just what its mode of subsistence is.
Do not mistake Prasangika for Svatantrika.

Your not understanding that there is no difference between inherent existence and true existence according to Prasangika clearly shows that you are not able to identify even the object of negation. Thus, what need is there to mention [asserting] the means of refutation of it?

shakuntala wrote:you say
conceptuality' spoken of by Chandrakirti is not 'conception of true existence', it is 'conceptual consciousness'.
as far as I know "conceptual consciousness" is of "inherent existence"
but again you seem to be talking about different things when you say
conception of true existence
You do not know far then, because I have already mentioned a rational cognizer in the continuum of a Learner Superior in subsequent attainment inferentially realizing emptiness. Although it is a conceptual consciousness (as all inferential cognizers), it is not a conception of true existence.

I suggest that you attend teachings from a qualified Geshe on the topic.

In summary,

I dont think you know what the objective aspect of the object of negation is
and
I dont think you have read or understood Lama Je Tsongkhapa.
Last edited by Tenzin Dorje on Tue Dec 23, 2014 11:12 am, edited 1 time in total.
shakuntala
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by shakuntala »

According to Svatantrika, true existence and inherent existence have the same meaning. This is because Tsongkhapa said so
sorry Tsongkhapa is not Svatantrika he is Prasangika

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prasa%E1%B9%85gika
By using this type of reductio ad absurdum, Nagarjuna, Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, and later Je Tsongkhapa, refuted incorrect/opposing viewpoints and established the position of Prasaṅgika.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tsongkhapa/
Further, he says his philosophy is based on Nāgārjuna's and Nāgārjuna's follower Ārya-deva's (third-fourth century) explanation of what the Buddha said. His philosophy gets its name Prāsaṅgika
Tsongkhapa has been the subject of poor, misleading scholarship ..... Tsongkhapa says *Prāsaṅgika-madhyamakas
The meaning of a phenomenon being inherently existent is that if you look for it (with a mind of ultimate analysis), you can find it. It is that it can withstand analysis.
wrong
according to Prasangika and Chandrakirti and Tsongkhapa are Prasangika
under analysis/prasanga you cant find "inherent existence"

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prasa%E1%B9%85gika
Prasaṅgika is the theory that all things and phenomena lack (or are empty of) any type of inherent identity or self-characterizing essence
now you have it
Prasangika clearly shows that you are not able to identify even the object of negation.
According to Svatantrika, a phenomena can be inherently existent even when it is not truly existent
Chandrakirti and Tsongkhapa are Prasangika
the thesis is about Prasangika not Svatantrika
you are completely confused


As this thread is about
ALTERING CONSCIOUSNESS
FROM WESTERN
PSYCHOLOGY AND
PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKA
BUDDHIST THEORIES OF
INSIGHT GENERATION
I suggest you go read the thesis rather than just cheery pick what you think will discredite it
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Tenzin Dorje
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by Tenzin Dorje »

shakuntala wrote:
According to Svatantrika, true existence and inherent existence have the same meaning. This is because Tsongkhapa said so
sorry Tsongkhapa is not Svatantrika he is Prasangika
Indeed, I meant Prasangika, because I just explained about Svatantrika before that and it was by contrast. You can therefore re-read my message, with a beautiful green word in that conveys the meaning I wanted to convey.

The point being, again (because you didn't get it) that according to Prasangika, true existence, true establishment, inherent existence are synonymous. This being so, there is not fault in using them interchangeably. On the other hand, they are not synonymous according to Svatantrika. Therefore, when you do not agree with me using them 'interchangeably', you are not propounding Prasangika tenets, but at best Svatantrika.
Tenzin Dorje wrote:The meaning of a phenomenon being inherently existent is that if you look for it (with a mind of ultimate analysis), you can find it. It is that it can withstand analysis.
wrong
according to Prasangika and Chandrakirti and Tsongkhapa are Prasangika
under analysis/prasanga you cant find "inherent existence"
Not wrong.

The meaning of a phenomenon being inherently existent is that if you look for it (with a mind of ultimate analysis), you can find it. It is that it can withstand analysis.

I never said that phenomena are inherently existent. I explained the meaning of inherent existence, the objective aspect of the object of negation [that which has to be refuted through logic, which is what your thesis is all about]. Then again, if you didn't identify the object of negation, what need is there to mention its refutation? I explained the meaning of inherent existence (which is a non-existent) because you said:
do you know what "inherent existence" is-please tell us
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by shakuntala »

Quote:
Tenzin Dorje wrote:
The meaning of a phenomenon being inherently existent is that if you look for it (with a mind of ultimate analysis), you can find it. It is that it can withstand analysis.


wrong
according to Prasangika and Chandrakirti and Tsongkhapa are Prasangika
under analysis/prasanga you cant find "inherent existence"

Not wrong.

The meaning of a phenomenon being inherently existent is that if you look for it (with a mind of ultimate analysis), you can find it. It is that it can withstand analysis.
wrong
cant you read
for Prasangika say inherent existence CANT be found

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prasa%E1%B9%85gika
Prasaṅgika is the theory that all things and phenomena lack (or are empty of) any type of inherent identity or self-characterizing essence
again
https://books.google.com.au/books?id=iG ... ka&f=false
For the Prasangika, emptiness can only be realised if approached by negating all that it is not, i.e. inherent existence

again
https://books.google.com.au/books?id=EZ ... ka&f=false
n his view, the nonexistent [i.e. inherent existence] exists; the actual Prasangika system does not say this, but maintains that inherent existence does not exist.
go read the thesis it looks like you might expand your consciousness by doing so
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Tenzin Dorje
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by Tenzin Dorje »

shakuntala wrote: wrong
cant you read
for Prasangika say inherent existence CANT be found
Can't you read ?

I never said phenomena can be found. I said if they were inherently existent, they could be found. I gave the definition of 'inherently existent'.

Such is the meaning of the following statement: "The meaning of a phenomenon being inherently existent is that if you look for it (with a mind of ultimate analysis), you can find it. It is that it can withstand analysis." It does not mean at all that phenomena are inherently existent, it means that if there were so, they would be found [by a rational consciousness, that is a mind of ultimate analysis].

Svatantrika, by the way, say that phenomena are deceptive but are inherently existent conventionally - as already mentioned in relation to the example of the illusory horse - which is of course not asserted by Prasangika, as nothing can withstand analysis.


Still, you didn't object to the main point that was there are conceptual consciousness that are not conception of true existence [example: such as the inferential cogizer in the continuum of an Arya in subsequent attainment inferentially realizing emptiness]. You asserted wrongly that all conceptual consciousnesses are conception of true existence.

Is such an inferential cognizer a conceptual consciousness ? Yes. Is it a conception of true existence ? No.


Maybe you ought to acquaint your mind to Lo-Rig in addition to Lam Rim.
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by Ayu »

This could be quite an interesting discussion, if you could keep off from distributing ad homs. Please debate on topic, not on persons. Thank you.
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by shakuntala »

I never said phenomena can be found. I said if they were inherently existent, they could be found. I gave the definition of 'inherently existent'
wrong the quote in full was in regard to Svatantrika
The meaning of a phenomenon being inherently existent is that if you look for it (with a mind of ultimate analysis), you can find it. It is that it can withstand analysis

According to Svatantrika, a phenomena can be inherently existent even when it is not truly existent
and the Prasangikas say it cant stand analysis/prasanga ie nothing is inherently existent

as I have noted this thesis is about Prasangika-this seems to be giving us a Svatantrika perspective

confusion
admition
Indeed, I meant Prasangika
but stated
You asserted wrongly that all conceptual consciousnesses are conception of true existence.


for Prasangika conceptual consciousness/conceptualization is about applying falsely/ignorantly "intrinsic existence" to phenomena
for which the only thing to do is have a non-conceptual realization of emptiness/sunyata
further

http://www.lamayeshe.com/index.php?sect ... &chid=1019
It is only by transcending the deluded perspective of ignorance and generating its opposite, the perspective of emptiness, that we can eliminate it.
Lama Tsongkhapa also describes the wisdom realizing emptiness as a lamp dispelling the darkness of ignorance

By His Holiness the Dalai Lama
http://www.lamayeshe.com/index.php?sect ... 3&chid=510
Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti argue that one can apply the same kind of deconstructive analysis to even mental events such as consciousness. -......Similarly they differ from people like Bhavaviveka by arguing that he ultimately believes in some kind of intrinsic nature that can be validly established by consciousness. -Whereas people like Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti reject this arguing that there is nothing in an ordinary perception that is not tainted by the perception of intrinsic reality. It is only when one attains the non-conceptual, intuitive realization of emptiness that one can gain a state of mind totally free of such contamination or delusion -



it is noted there is a contradiction between Dzong-ka-ba and Chandrakirti

The Geluk-ba Dzong-ka-ba argues that the conceptuality spoken of by Candrakirti has to be qualified. This qualification, as E. Napper points out, is that "conceptions of inherent existence are being refuted, not all conceptions".

Quote:
[Candrakirti] glosses conceptuality as "that which superimposes a meaning of inherent existence which is not correct"".

This is contradictory.
but it is said
Both are authoritative and unmistaken
by the law of non-contradiction both cant be correct

so which is it


again I suggest go read the thesis
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by Ayu »

[as user] Please note, that there are differences in the various schools of philosophy and that contradictions are a normal thing in this matter.
It is very interesting to discuss about them, but one has to make sure, what school s/he is talking about exactly.
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by Tenzin Dorje »

shakuntala wrote:and the Prasangikas say it cant stand analysis/prasanga ie nothing is inherently existent
Correct. Prasangikas say no phenomena can withstand analysis.
shakuntala wrote:
I never said phenomena can be found. I said if they were inherently existent, they could be found. I gave the definition of 'inherently existent'
wrong the quote in full was in regard to Svatantrika
The meaning of a phenomenon being inherently existent is that if you look for it (with a mind of ultimate analysis), you can find it. It is that it can withstand analysis

According to Svatantrika, a phenomena can be inherently existent even when it is not truly existent.
No, the quote in full is not in regard to Svatantrika. As I have explained before, the meaning of inherent existence is the same with respect to Svatantrika and Prasangika. 'Something withstand analysis' is the meaning of 'something being inherently existent', for both Svatantrika and Prasangika. Then, as I have explained, Svatantrika posit that phenomena can withstand analysis, when Prasangika do not.

for Prasangika conceptual consciousness/conceptualization is about applying falsely/ignorantly "intrinsic existence" to phenomena for which the only thing to do is have a non-conceptual realization of emptiness/sunyata
No. It is true that afflictive ignorance, the conception of inherent existence, is a conceptual consciousness. It is not true that all conceptual consciousnesses are conceptions of inherent existence.

Let's explain it the following way, this time: conventional truths are illusory-like appearances to an Arya to which the appear (in subsequent attainment, that is) because they are not conceived as inherently existent even though they appear as such. A meaning-generality (or 'mental image'), which is the object of a conceptual consciousness, is thus an illusory-like appearance in relation to the mind of an Arya to which it appears. This is because a meaning-genrality is a conventional truth. Thus, this conceptual consciousness has, as its appearing object, a mental image, but does not conceives inherent existence.
shakuntala wrote:By His Holiness the Dalai Lama
Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti argue that one can apply the same kind of deconstructive analysis to even mental events such as consciousness. -......Similarly they differ from people like Bhavaviveka by arguing that he ultimately believes in some kind of intrinsic nature that can be validly established by consciousness. -Whereas people like Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti reject this arguing that there is nothing in an ordinary perception that is not tainted by the perception of intrinsic reality. It is only when one attains the non-conceptual, intuitive realization of emptiness that one can gain a state of mind totally free of such contamination or delusion -
In the very quote you posted, it is said "there is nothing in an ordinary perception that is not tainted by the perception of intrinsic reality", that is precisely why I spoke of a conceptual consciousness in the continuum of an Arya being, that is a being that is not a common being.

As Ayu reminds us, it is most appropriate to specify the Tenets we speak of. We speak indeed mainly of Prasangika, but we have to mention Svatantrika every so often because they are being refuted by Prasangika, which was established through refutation.

This being said, I'm afraid specifying Tenets is not sufficient. Even within the same Tenets, such as Prasangika, there are different claims depending on the college. For instance, Lati Rinpoche, Jeffrey Hopkins, and his students (E. Napper, Leah Zahler, etc.) expound the Dharma according to Ganden College's textbook. Gomang College's textbook expounds certain points differently. For instance, their answer to "what makes a phenomena real in relation to just the world?" is very different. Hopkins's translation of Tsongkhapa's Final Exposition of Wisdom is full of brakets [...] and these brakets are mostly "Ganden stamps". With regard to this issue, it is not rare to read an English text and find it very clear thanks to the translation and the brakets, and then... atteend a teaching from a qualified Geshe who says "this passage is vague and complicated, I didn't not fully grasp it - or there's debate about the meaning of this".

The most stunning contrast is that [a general] Nyingma's interpretation of Prasangika posit emptiness as an affirming negative. As far as I know, no Geluk would ever say that. And it's a fundamental point because it is very much related to the subject-matter of your thesis.
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by Schrödinger’s Yidam »

The most stunning contrast is that [a general] Nyingma's interpretation of Prasangika posit emptiness as an affirming negative.
:smile:
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2. I support Mingyur R and HHDL in their positions against lama abuse.
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Lama: Even If you had died the 3 Jewels would still have protected you. (DW post by Fortyeightvows)
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by shakuntala »

No, the quote in full is not in regard to Svatantrika
it is said
I never said phenomena can be found. I said if they were inherently existent, they could be found. I gave the definition of 'inherently existent'.
wrong
it is said
here it is stated in your definition of 'inherently existent
if you look for it and not if they were inherently existent
definition given
The meaning of a phenomenon being inherently existent is that if you look for it (with a mind of ultimate analysis), you can find it. It is that it can withstand analysis
It is not true that all conceptual consciousnesses are conceptions of inherent existence.
for Prasangika conceptual consciousness/conceptualization is about applying falsely/ignorantly "intrinsic existence" to phenomena for which the only thing to do is have a non-conceptual realization of emptiness/sunyata
as By His Holiness the Dalai Lama agrees

By His Holiness the Dalai Lama
[quote]there is nothing in an ordinary perception that is not tainted by the perception of intrinsic reality. It is only when one attains the non-conceptual, intuitive realization of emptiness that one can gain a state of mind totally free of such contamination or delusion -[/quote]
that is precisely why I spoke of a conceptual consciousness in the continuum of an Arya being, that is a being that is not a common being.
so the discussion has been shifted to talking about what a Buddha or
an Arya being, that is a being that is not a common being
this is very disingenuous for it is assumed that this discussion is about ordinary people and for ordinary people as His Holiness the Dalai Lama states
[quote]there is nothing in an ordinary perception that is not tainted by the perception of intrinsic reality. It is only when one attains the non-conceptual, intuitive realization of emptiness that one can gain a state of mind totally free of such contamination or delusion -
[/quote]

Chanradkirit etc when they talk about conceptuality
[Candrakirti] glosses conceptuality as "that which superimposes a meaning of inherent existence which is not correct
are referring to common beings in the main I thought this was realized at the beginning of this discussion

please tell us who Geluk-ba Dzong-ka-ba and Chandrakirti are talking about ie common or uncommon beings when thy talk about conceptuality being about intrinsic existence

when they argue
the conceptuality spoken of by Candrakirti has to be qualified. This qualification, as E. Napper points out, is that "conceptions of inherent existence are being refuted
[Candrakirti] glosses conceptuality as "that which superimposes a meaning of inherent existence which is not correct""
The Geluk-ba Dzong-ka-ba argues that the conceptuality spoken of by Candrakirti has to be qualified. This qualification, as E. Napper points out, is that "conceptions of inherent existence are being refuted, not all conceptions".

Quote:
[Candrakirti] glosses conceptuality as "that which superimposes a meaning of inherent existence which is not correct"".

This is contradictory.
we have not been told who is correct Chandrakirti or Dzong-ka-ba
please tell us as by the law of non-contradiction both cant be correct
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by conebeckham »

In my opinion, Chandra is correct.
All concepts are nonexistent, nonarising, empty.

There is no need to qualify the statement--Chandra clearly points out that conceptions, all conceptions, are by nature delusory.
དམ་པའི་དོན་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ཆེ་བ་དང་།
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།


"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")
shakuntala
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Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by shakuntala »

There is no need to qualify the statement--Chandra clearly points out that conceptions, all conceptions, are by nature delusory.
but Tenzin Dorje tellus us this only for ordinary beings as unordinary beings
In the very quote you posted, it is said "there is nothing in an ordinary perception that is not tainted by the perception of intrinsic reality", that is precisely why I spoke of a conceptual consciousness in the continuum of an Arya being, that is a being that is not a common being.
so when Dzong-ka-ba gives a qualification on Chandra "not all conceptions: these not all conceptions could refer to the "Arya being conceptions
The Geluk-ba Dzong-ka-ba argues that the conceptuality spoken of by Candrakirti has to be qualified. This qualification, as E. Napper points out, is that "conceptions of inherent existence are being refuted, not all conceptions".
if Tenzin Dorjeis correct ie the unordinary conceptions of an Aya then Chandra is wrong

but then Tenzin Dorje does not tell us who ie ordinary or unordinary being Chandra is talking about when it comes to conceptuality or for the matter who Dzong-ka-ba is talking about
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conebeckham
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Location: Bay Area, CA, USA

Re: Here are two MA thesis on Buddhism

Post by conebeckham »

It is my understanding that Chandrakirti feels the Ultimate is not able to be encompassed conceptually, by the inellect, but only experientially, in meditation.

I think any sort of "unordinary conceptuality" or "pure/unstained conceptuality" is a later fabrication. As for whether Aryas have conceptual consciousness, I think they may in post-meditation, but it's been a while since I've read Chandra (or Nagarjuna) so I'd have to go look.....
དམ་པའི་དོན་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ཆེ་བ་དང་།
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།


"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")
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