shakuntala wrote:and the Prasangikas say it cant stand analysis/prasanga ie nothing is inherently existent
Correct. Prasangikas say no phenomena can withstand analysis.
shakuntala wrote:I never said phenomena can be found. I said if they were inherently existent, they could be found. I gave the definition of 'inherently existent'
wrong the quote in full was in regard to Svatantrika
The meaning of a phenomenon being inherently existent is that if you look for it (with a mind of ultimate analysis), you can find it. It is that it can withstand analysis
According to Svatantrika, a phenomena can be inherently existent even when it is not truly existent.
No, the quote in full is not in regard to Svatantrika. As I have explained before, the meaning of inherent existence is the same with respect to Svatantrika
and Prasangika. 'Something withstand analysis' is the meaning of 'something being inherently existent', for both Svatantrika and Prasangika. Then, as I have explained, Svatantrika posit that phenomena can withstand analysis, when Prasangika do not.
for Prasangika conceptual consciousness/conceptualization is about applying falsely/ignorantly "intrinsic existence" to phenomena for which the only thing to do is have a non-conceptual realization of emptiness/sunyata
No. It is true that afflictive ignorance, the conception of inherent existence, is a conceptual consciousness. It is not true that all conceptual consciousnesses are conceptions of inherent existence.
Let's explain it the following way, this time: conventional truths are illusory-like appearances to an Arya to which the appear (in subsequent attainment, that is) because
they are not conceived as inherently existent even though they appear as such. A meaning-generality (or 'mental image'), which is the object of a conceptual consciousness, is thus an illusory-like appearance in relation to the mind of an Arya to which it appears. This is because a meaning-genrality is a conventional truth. Thus, this conceptual consciousness has, as its appearing object, a mental image, but
does not conceives inherent existence.
shakuntala wrote:By His Holiness the Dalai Lama
Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti argue that one can apply the same kind of deconstructive analysis to even mental events such as consciousness. -......Similarly they differ from people like Bhavaviveka by arguing that he ultimately believes in some kind of intrinsic nature that can be validly established by consciousness. -Whereas people like Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti reject this arguing that there is nothing in an ordinary perception that is not tainted by the perception of intrinsic reality. It is only when one attains the non-conceptual, intuitive realization of emptiness that one can gain a state of mind totally free of such contamination or delusion -
In the very quote you posted, it is said "there is nothing in an ordinary perception that is not tainted by the perception of intrinsic reality", that is precisely why I spoke of a conceptual consciousness in the continuum of an Arya being, that is a being that is not a common being.
As Ayu reminds us, it is most appropriate to specify the Tenets we speak of. We speak indeed mainly of Prasangika, but we have to mention Svatantrika every so often because they are being refuted by Prasangika, which was established through refutation.
This being said, I'm afraid specifying Tenets is not sufficient. Even within the same Tenets, such as Prasangika, there are different claims depending on the college. For instance, Lati Rinpoche, Jeffrey Hopkins, and his students (E. Napper, Leah Zahler, etc.) expound the Dharma according to Ganden College's textbook. Gomang College's textbook expounds certain points differently. For instance, their answer to
"what makes a phenomena real in relation to just the world?" is very different. Hopkins's translation of Tsongkhapa's Final Exposition of Wisdom is full of brakets [...] and these brakets are mostly "Ganden stamps". With regard to this issue, it is not rare to read an English text and find it very clear thanks to the translation and the brakets, and then... atteend a teaching from a qualified Geshe who says
"this passage is vague and complicated, I didn't not fully grasp it - or there's debate about the meaning of this".
The most stunning contrast is that [a general] Nyingma's interpretation of Prasangika posit emptiness as an affirming negative. As far as I know, no Geluk would ever say that. And it's a fundamental point because it is very much related to the subject-matter of your thesis.