Malcolm wrote:For example, there is a way of understanding tathāgatagarbha that does not conflict with the main body of Buddhist thinking, and there is a way of understanding it that causes one to have wrong view.
What does it matter if you believe in tathāgatagarbha which is described in so many tathāgatagarbha texts as a self (though, perish the thought, not the SAME self as advocated by the Hindus -- actually, if someone is reallty, really honest with themselvs , they will admit it is impossible to differentiate the sat cit ananda of the Hindus from the atman, sukha, nitya, śuddha of the uttaratantra)?
?
There is not only nothingness because there is always, and always can manifest. - Thinley Norbu Rinpoche
Wow. Do you, like, memorize these threads--or what?
1.The problem isn’t ‘ignorance’. The problem is the mind you have right now. (H.H. Karmapa XVII @NYC 2/4/18) 2. I support Mingyur R and HHDL in their positions against lama abuse. 3. Student: Lama, I thought I might die but then I realized that the 3 Jewels would protect me. Lama: Even If you had died the 3 Jewels would still have protected you. (DW post by Fortyeightvows)
Malcolm wrote:For example, there is a way of understanding tathāgatagarbha that does not conflict with the main body of Buddhist thinking, and there is a way of understanding it that causes one to have wrong view.
What does it matter if you believe in tathāgatagarbha which is described in so many tathāgatagarbha texts as a self (though, perish the thought, not the SAME self as advocated by the Hindus -- actually, if someone is reallty, really honest with themselvs , they will admit it is impossible to differentiate the sat cit ananda of the Hindus from the atman, sukha, nitya, śuddha of the uttaratantra)?
?
In the context of sutrayāna, which is under discussion here, one's intellectual view must be in accordance with one's in meditation.
In Vajrayāna, the view is experientially introduced, and having a correct intellectual view is less important. In that post I was speaking from the perspective of Vajrayāna. In this post, I am speaking from the perspective of sūtra.
Malcolm wrote:In the context of sutrayāna, which is under discussion here, one's intellectual view must be in accordance with one's in meditation.
In Vajrayāna, the view is experientially introduced, and having a correct intellectual view is less important. In that post I was speaking from the perspective of Vajrayāna. In this post, I am speaking from the perspective of sūtra.
OK, now it all makes sense.
There is not only nothingness because there is always, and always can manifest. - Thinley Norbu Rinpoche
Malcolm wrote:We have a body of work, recognized by everyone, east and west, as being Nāgārjuna's authentic work. There are other texts which are under dispute and have been for centuries. Irrespective of the merits of Dharmadhātustava on its own, we really cannot accept it as representative of Nāgārjuna I's oeuvre or of his thought even if generations of Indians and Tibetans have accepted it as such.
These sweaters are just so unravelly, aren't they?
There is not only nothingness because there is always, and always can manifest. - Thinley Norbu Rinpoche
Malcolm wrote:We have a body of work, recognized by everyone, east and west, as being Nāgārjuna's authentic work. There are other texts which are under dispute and have been for centuries. Irrespective of the merits of Dharmadhātustava on its own, we really cannot accept it as representative of Nāgārjuna I's oeuvre or of his thought even if generations of Indians and Tibetans have accepted it as such.
These sweaters are just so unravelly, aren't they?
Can't unravel a cake in a state of quantum indeterminacy, though.
"And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting oneself one protects others? By the pursuit, development, and cultivation of the four establishments of mindfulness. It is in such a way that by protecting oneself one protects others.
"And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting others one protects oneself? By patience, harmlessness, goodwill, and sympathy. It is in such a way that by protecting others one protects oneself.
Malcolm wrote:We have a body of work, recognized by everyone, east and west, as being Nāgārjuna's authentic work. There are other texts which are under dispute and have been for centuries. Irrespective of the merits of Dharmadhātustava on its own, we really cannot accept it as representative of Nāgārjuna I's oeuvre or of his thought even if generations of Indians and Tibetans have accepted it as such.
These sweaters are just so unravelly, aren't they?
Malcolm wrote:In the context of sutrayāna, which is under discussion here, one's intellectual view must be in accordance with one's in meditation.
In Vajrayāna, the view is experientially introduced, and having a correct intellectual view is less important. In that post I was speaking from the perspective of Vajrayāna. In this post, I am speaking from the perspective of sūtra.
OK, now it all makes sense.
Sūtra is based on analysis, whereas Vajrayāna is based on empowerment, that is where the differences lay.
Malcolm wrote:We have a body of work, recognized by everyone, east and west, as being Nāgārjuna's authentic work. There are other texts which are under dispute and have been for centuries. Irrespective of the merits of Dharmadhātustava on its own, we really cannot accept it as representative of Nāgārjuna I's oeuvre or of his thought even if generations of Indians and Tibetans have accepted it as such.
These sweaters are just so unravelly, aren't they?
Yes, but the point of a sweater is to wear it, not to pull it apart on purpose.
Malcolm wrote:We have a body of work, recognized by everyone, east and west, as being Nāgārjuna's authentic work. There are other texts which are under dispute and have been for centuries. Irrespective of the merits of Dharmadhātustava on its own, we really cannot accept it as representative of Nāgārjuna I's oeuvre or of his thought even if generations of Indians and Tibetans have accepted it as such.
These sweaters are just so unravelly, aren't they?
Yes, but the point of a sweater is to wear it, not to pull it apart on purpose.
Yes, I already mentioned this, to no avail apparently.
Malcolm wrote:We have a body of work, recognized by everyone, east and west, as being Nāgārjuna's authentic work. There are other texts which are under dispute and have been for centuries. Irrespective of the merits of Dharmadhātustava on its own, we really cannot accept it as representative of Nāgārjuna I's oeuvre or of his thought even if generations of Indians and Tibetans have accepted it as such.
These sweaters are just so unravelly, aren't they?
Yes, but the point of a sweater is to wear it, not to pull it apart on purpose.
I'm not the one doing the pulling, I don't have a sweater in this fight.
There is not only nothingness because there is always, and always can manifest. - Thinley Norbu Rinpoche
Malcolm wrote:For example, there is a way of understanding tathāgatagarbha that does not conflict with the main body of Buddhist thinking, and there is a way of understanding it that causes one to have wrong view.
What does it matter if you believe in tathāgatagarbha which is described in so many tathāgatagarbha texts as a self (though, perish the thought, not the SAME self as advocated by the Hindus -- actually, if someone is reallty, really honest with themselvs , they will admit it is impossible to differentiate the sat cit ananda of the Hindus from the atman, sukha, nitya, śuddha of the uttaratantra)?
?
In the context of sutrayāna, which is under discussion here, one's intellectual view must be in accordance with one's in meditation.
In Vajrayāna, the view is experientially introduced, and having a correct intellectual view is less important. In that post I was speaking from the perspective of Vajrayāna. In this post, I am speaking from the perspective of sūtra.
Forgive my gross ignorance, but is this the idea of an enduring, unchanging ego of some kind in Buddhism?
"Meditation is a spiritual exercise, not a therapeutic regime... Our intention is to enter Nirvana, not to make life in Samsara more tolerable." Chan Master Hsu Yun
Let me just say that I very much appreciated the discussion about Nāgārjuna. I myself wasn't sure if Nāgārjuna authored all the authored all the texts that are attributed to him and now I now I'm not alone in my skepticism.
TheSynergist wrote:Let me just say that I very much appreciated the discussion about Nāgārjuna. I myself wasn't sure if Nāgārjuna authored all the authored all the texts that are attributed to him and now I now I'm not alone in my skepticism.
There is a core body of texts called the collection of reasonings, another collection called the four praises, and then the Ratnavali and the Suhrllekha, which all generally accept are composed by Nāgārjuna I.
Then there are the texts authored by the siddhi Nāgārjuna who likely lived in the early 8th century, the disciple of Saraha senior.
I'm putting $5 in a bank account and offering it with all the interest it has accrued to whoever sends me a time machine so I can assess history objectively.
I am combing it right now for references to the Mahayana sutras. This is interesting:
Even the Mahāyāna Sūtras, which were composed in writing and which frequently refer to writing retain some oral features such as repetition. This shows that the oral tradition was firmly established and must have flourished for a considerable period before the texts were put in writing. http://dhammaloka.org.au/files/pdf/authenticity.pdf
Though there are other passages in the paper which suggest that the Mahayana sutras aren't as authentic as the Pali sutras, it seems kind of arbitrary to choose one and not the other, since they were both based on an earlier oral tradition.
Even the Mahāyāna Sūtras, which were composed in writing and which frequently refer to writing retain some oral features such as repetition. This shows that the oral tradition was firmly established and must have flourished for a considerable period before the texts were put in writing. http://dhammaloka.org.au/files/pdf/authenticity.pdf
Though there are other passages in the paper which suggest that the Mahayana sutras aren't as authentic as the Pali sutras, it seems kind of arbitrary to choose one and not the other, since they were both based on an earlier oral tradition.
Or the repetition was characteristic of literature and not necessarily reflective of an existing oral tradition.
Even the Mahāyāna Sūtras, which were composed in writing and which frequently refer to writing retain some oral features such as repetition. This shows that the oral tradition was firmly established and must have flourished for a considerable period before the texts were put in writing. http://dhammaloka.org.au/files/pdf/authenticity.pdf
Though there are other passages in the paper which suggest that the Mahayana sutras aren't as authentic as the Pali sutras, it seems kind of arbitrary to choose one and not the other, since they were both based on an earlier oral tradition.
Or the repetition was characteristic of literature and not necessarily reflective of an existing oral tradition.
How can we know for certain that the Pali scriptures were based on an existing oral tradition but the Mahayana scriptures were not? That's all I'm asking.
