Gorampa untenable according to Karmapa

[Mariusz]

IX Karmapa wrote in "The Feast for the Fortunate. A Commentary on the Entrance to the Middle Way
That Easily Pulls Along the Chariot of the Takpo Kagyü Siddhas (of the VIII Karmapa)":

There are some, such as Gorampa and Shākya Chokden, who
say that this verse [verse 6.75 of the Entrance] proves that
Chandrakīrti holds, from his own perspective, that self-aware-
ness exists conventionally. They also say that in Chandrakīrti’s
tradition the all-base, self-awareness, outer objects, and the per-
son all exist conventionally, but they do not exist as “conven-
tional phenomena that can withstand analysis.”
These positions are untenable. The master Chandrakīrti does
not, as his own position, accept any phenomenon as existent
or nonexistent in either ultimate or conventional truth. What
need is there to mention his position on the “existence” of self-
awareness? Since the earlier and later consciousnesses are not
[inherently] different substances, it is possible to say, [repeating
after worldly people], that what is experienced initially is also
experienced by memory and that what is unique to that experi-
ence is also unique to its memory.
Thus a later consciousness can remember something by
thinking, “I saw it before.” Yet this relation between experience
and memory is simply the way conventions work in the world.
It is not to be thoroughly analyzed: worldly conventions are by
nature false.

There are also more "implications" from Gorampa which are refuted by the Karmapa.
Please read "The Karmapa’s Middle Way. Feast for the Fortunate.The Ninth Karmapa, Wangchuk Dorje" by Tyler Dewar. Snow Lion Publications

[Josef]

There are also more "implications" from Gorampa which are refuted by the Karmapa.
Please read "The Karmapa’s Middle Way. Feast for the Fortunate.The Ninth Karmapa, Wangchuk Dorje" by Tyler Dewar. Snow Lion Publications

I've read this text. It's pretty good but I am still solidly on Team Gorampa.

[conebeckham]

Nangwa-

Why?


Sincerely,
Cone

[Josef]

Nangwa-

Why?


Sincerely,
Cone

Just a matter of preference really for me.
I just prefer the way Gorampa forms his arguments etc.
Also I just think he is cool.

I don't really get in to the polemics much anymore. I think they all make great points.

[Mariusz]

I don't really get in to the polemics much anymore. I think they all make great points.

Sure they make great points, but it is crucial not take them for granted, but investigate for yourself. In the end you have to rely on your investigation only, not on blind belief. According to the Karmapa for Gorampa "outer objects exist conventionally" somewhere "out there" although can not withstand analysis. Don't you think so?

[Mariusz]

I don't really get in to the polemics much anymore. I think they all make great points.

Sure they make great points, but it is crucial not take them for granted, but investigate for yourself. In the end you have to rely on your investigation only, not on blind belief. According to the Karmapa for Gorampa "outer objects exist conventionally" somewhere "out there" although can not withstand analysis. Don't you think so they are not?

[Malcolm]

ccording to the Karmapa for Gorampa "outer objects exist conventionally" somewhere "out there" although can not withstand analysis.

This is a misrepresentation of Gorampa' view, thus it is worthy of no further consideration.

[Mariusz]

ccording to the Karmapa for Gorampa "outer objects exist conventionally" somewhere "out there" although can not withstand analysis.

This is a misrepresentation of Gorampa' view, thus it is worthy of no further consideration.

Why do you think it is a misrepresentation? Can you quote please?

[Malcolm]

ccording to the Karmapa for Gorampa "outer objects exist conventionally" somewhere "out there" although can not withstand analysis.

This is a misrepresentation of Gorampa' view, thus it is worthy of no further consideration.

Why do you think it is a misrepresentation? Can you quote please?

The suffering of chasing mirages never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop.
likewise, the suffering of intellectual pursuits never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop.

The suffering of accepting and rejecting never ends.The only way to end it is simply to stop.
likewise, the suffering of proof and rebuttal never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop.

[Mariusz]

You go first. Tell me where Gorampa actually says this. It is not sufficient to produce a charge without providing evidence.

My quote of the Karmapa is already in the first post where "The Feast for the Fortunate. A Commentary on the Entrance to the Middle Way That Easily Pulls Along the Chariot of the Takpo Kagyü Siddhas " of the Karmapa; 2.2.2.1.1.6.2.3.1.1.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.2.2.2. (Refuting claims that the above refutation applies equally to our own explanation of memory).

[Malcolm]

You go first. Tell me where Gorampa actually says this. It is not sufficient to produce a charge without providing evidence.

My quote of the Karmapa is already in the first post where "The Feast for the Fortunate. A Commentary on the Entrance to the Middle Way That Easily Pulls Along the Chariot of the Takpo Kagyü Siddhas " of the Karmapa; 2.2.2.1.1.6.2.3.1.1.1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.2.2.2. (Refuting claims that the above refutation applies equally to our own explanation of memory).

Not playing. This kind of thing for me is no longer of any importance.But I do suggest that those who are interested may read Gorampa for themselves.

[Mariusz]

298............................................................................... The issue at hand
here—whether there is a difference with regard to the ontological status of the relative
truth and the conventional truth—brings to light a key point on which the two mas-
ters differ. The passage of Gorampa referenced here is found in his commentary to the
Entrance to the Middle Way entitled Dispelling Bad Views: A Sectional Outline of the
Entrance to the Middle Way and an Analysis of Each of the Text’s Difficult Points (Uma
Jugpe Kyü kyi Sabchepa dang Shung Sosö Kawe Ne la Chepa Tawa Ngensel/dbu ma ’jug
pa’i dkyus kyi sa bcad pa dang| gzhung so so’i dka ba’i gnas la dpyad pa lta ba ngan sel)
(Gorampa Sönam Senge 1979, p. 608). Whereas Gorampa distinguishes between what
is “conventional” and what is “relative,” Mikyö Dorje and Wanghcuk Dorje seem to
treat the two terms as synonyms. Another point on which Mikyö Dorje and Gorampa
differ is explained above in a footnote to the discussion regarding Zilungpa’s position
on whether afflictive obscurations pervade clinging to true existence.
Gorampa seems to be classifying relative truth into the two categories of correct rel-
ative truth and false relative truth, with the latter category being composed of phe-
nomena that would not qualify as existents. The Karmapa, however, and as explained
in the text, holds the false relative as not belonging to the relative truth at all.

Not playing. This kind of thing for me is no longer of any importance.But I do suggest that those who are interested may read Gorampa for themselves.

As you see the topic is linked to our discussion in Madyamika Sautrantika vs Prasangika forum, so I think it is beneficial.

[dzoki]

To be honest it seems to me that (with all the respect to all the past masters) these intersectarian discussions such as Sakya Pandita pointing out (reportedly) "flaws" of Gampopa´s Mahamudra, some Kadampas arguing against validity of Maha Sandhi or here Karmapa saying that Gorampa was a substantialist etc. stem purely from lack of understanding of what other lineage or master is really saying or what they practice and instead drawing just conclusion from outside and from watching the teaching of the other school just from afar and from surface and not from inside. It is very unfortunate that masters like these were also prone to such things but I guess that is just nature of our kaliyuga. So it is best to just skip these little remarks and rather focus on the main point of the teachings. Othervise one will find many of these in many different texts and this will not support our faith in Dharma. Plus many of these could have been smugled into the texts in the process of later reproduction and copying.

[Malcolm]

As you see the topic is linked to our discussion in Madyamika Sautrantika vs Prasangika forum, so I think it is beneficial.

Yup. Don't care.

[Anders]

There are some, such as Gorampa and Shākya Chokden, who say that this verse [verse 6.75 of the Entrance] proves that Chandrakīrti holds, from his own perspective, that self-awareness exists conventionally. They also say that in Chandrakīrti’s tradition the all-base, self-awareness, outer objects, and the per-
son all exist conventionally, but they do not exist as “conventional phenomena that can withstand analysis.”

These positions are untenable. The master Chandrakīrti does not, as his own position, accept any phenomenon as existent or nonexistent in either ultimate or conventional truth

Stupid outsider question here that I am sure has been covered a thousand times in the endless Prasangika/Svatantrika debates, but what exactly is wrong with saying that things exist conventionally? How could there even be language if we did not play along with the convention that things exist?

[Malcolm]

There are some, such as Gorampa and Shākya Chokden, who say that this verse [verse 6.75 of the Entrance] proves that Chandrakīrti holds, from his own perspective, that self-awareness exists conventionally. They also say that in Chandrakīrti’s tradition the all-base, self-awareness, outer objects, and the per-
son all exist conventionally, but they do not exist as “conventional phenomena that can withstand analysis.”

These positions are untenable. The master Chandrakīrti does not, as his own position, accept any phenomenon as existent or nonexistent in either ultimate or conventional truth

Stupid outsider question here that I am sure has been covered a thousand times in the endless Prasangika/Svatantrika debates, but what exactly is wrong with saying that things exist conventionally? How could there even be language if we did not play along with the convention that things exist?

This is all nauseating hair-splitting by Tibetan scholars with nothing better to do with their time.

[Jikan]

The suffering of chasing mirages never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop.
likewise, the suffering of intellectual pursuits never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop.

The suffering of accepting and rejecting never ends.The only way to end it is simply to stop.
likewise, the suffering of proof and rebuttal never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop.

[Mariusz]

There are some, such as Gorampa and Shākya Chokden, who say that this verse [verse 6.75 of the Entrance] proves that Chandrakīrti holds, from his own perspective, that self-awareness exists conventionally. They also say that in Chandrakīrti’s tradition the all-base, self-awareness, outer objects, and the per-
son all exist conventionally, but they do not exist as “conventional phenomena that can withstand analysis.”

These positions are untenable. The master Chandrakīrti does not, as his own position, accept any phenomenon as existent or nonexistent in either ultimate or conventional truth

Stupid outsider question here that I am sure has been covered a thousand times in the endless Prasangika/Svatantrika debates, but what exactly is wrong with saying that things exist conventionally? How could there even be language if we did not play along with the convention that things exist?

As I quoted many times in Dharmawheel from "The Center of Sunlit Sky":
“Thus, for Buddhist reasoning and meditation to be soteriologically efficient,
it is crucial to acknowledge that their actual target lies not at the level of the
apprehended objects—the notions of a real personal or phenomenal identity—
but at the level of the apprehending subject—the largely unconscious and instinctive
clinging to such identities.”

[Mariusz]

Using the quote of the Karmapa I suspect for Gorampa the worldly perspective alone is not all that is needed
for positing relative truth.

They (Gorampa) also say that in Chandrakīrti’s
tradition the all-base, self-awareness, outer objects, and the per-
son all exist conventionally, but they do not exist as “conven-
tional phenomena that can withstand analysis.”
These positions are untenable.

The book explained:
Since the dependent nature does not even slightly exist, it cannot be the
cause or basis of relative appearances as the Proponents of Consciousness
claim. By positing an utterly false basis of the relative truth, the Propo-
nents of Consciousness lose the relative truth of the world completely. In
the view of Chandrakīrti, the worldly perspective alone is all that is needed
for positing relative truth. Chandrakīrti identifies the relative truth of the
world of no analysis as the method, and the ultimate truth, the realization
of the way things are, as what arises from relating to that method skillfully.
As Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom proclaims:
Without relying on conventions,
One cannot realize the ultimate.
Without realizing the ultimate,
One cannot attain nirvāṇa. (24.10)

[Anders]

There are some, such as Gorampa and Shākya Chokden, who say that this verse [verse 6.75 of the Entrance] proves that Chandrakīrti holds, from his own perspective, that self-awareness exists conventionally. They also say that in Chandrakīrti’s tradition the all-base, self-awareness, outer objects, and the per-
son all exist conventionally, but they do not exist as “conventional phenomena that can withstand analysis.”

These positions are untenable. The master Chandrakīrti does not, as his own position, accept any phenomenon as existent or nonexistent in either ultimate or conventional truth

Stupid outsider question here that I am sure has been covered a thousand times in the endless Prasangika/Svatantrika debates, but what exactly is wrong with saying that things exist conventionally? How could there even be language if we did not play along with the convention that things exist?

As I quoted many times in Dharmawheel from "The Center of Sunlit Sky":
“Thus, for Buddhist reasoning and meditation to be soteriologically efficient,
it is crucial to acknowledge that their actual target lies not at the level of the
apprehended objects—the notions of a real personal or phenomenal identity—
but at the level of the apprehending subject—the largely unconscious and instinctive
clinging to such identities.”

Like I said, stupid outsider. I've not seen a big deal made of this in east-asian madhyamika so there are several lines of reasoning I am not schooled in here. At a glance, I don't really get how your quote relates to the asserted problem of existence as convention.