Inherency and the Object of Negation

[Tom]

Gelugpas classify some conceptual cognitions as direct realizes (དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་) because they say that they realize their object through the force of experience. Examples include the second moment of an inferential cognition and also memory.

Certainly, Dignaga who defines direct perception as “that which is free from conceptualization (kalpanā)" would protest and then Dharmakīrti would follow, and then Candrakīrti would also object.

And this because they follow the system Phyapa as noted above...

Sorry, if i'm repeating something above... only read the last couple of posts.

[Tom]

Gelugpas classify some conceptual cognitions as direct realizes (དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་) because they say that they realize their object through the force of experience. Examples include the second moment of an inferential cognition and also memory.

Certainly, Dignaga who defines direct perception as “that which is free from conceptualization (kalpanā)" would protest and then Dharmakīrti would follow, and then Candrakīrti would also object.

.but these too are not direct perceptions.

A distinction is made here between མངོན་སུམ་ཏུ་རྟོགས་པ་ and དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་.

[Malcolm]

Gelugpas classify some conceptual cognitions as direct realizes (དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་) because they say that they realize their object through the force of experience. Examples include the second moment of an inferential cognition and also memory.

Certainly, Dignaga who defines direct perception as “that which is free from conceptualization (kalpanā)" would protest and then Dharmakīrti would follow, and then Candrakīrti would also object.

.but these too are not direct perceptions.

A distinction is made here between མངོན་སུམ་ཏུ་རྟོགས་པ་ and དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་.

Yes, the formere is a direct perception, tne latter cannot be.

[Malcolm]

Gelugpas classify some conceptual cognitions as direct realizes (དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་) because they say that they realize their object through the force of experience. Examples include the second moment of an inferential cognition and also memory.

Certainly, Dignaga who defines direct perception as “that which is free from conceptualization (kalpanā)" would protest and then Dharmakīrti would follow, and then Candrakīrti would also object.

And this because they follow the system Phyapa as noted above...

Sorry, if i'm repeating something above... only read the last couple of posts.

No worries Tom.

[Tom]

.but these too are not direct perceptions.

A distinction is made here between མངོན་སུམ་ཏུ་རྟོགས་པ་ and དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་.

Yes, the formere is a direct perception, tne latter cannot be.

yep.

[Herbie]

When we say "analysis" and "no analysis" in relation to Madhyamaka, we are confining ourselves to ontological investigation. Understanding epistemology, perception, etc. is not analysis and is thoroughly on the level of convention.

So you want to say that one who has performed ontological investigation in the context of validating Prasangika returns to ignorant speech afterwards even when he is communicating in the context of Prasangika here in this forum? Sorry but that sounds like ... bullshit?
you are not communicating with Joe the plumber here about what he has to fix.

First, some minor quibbles: Ontological investigation isn't used to "validate Prasangika,"

That is utterly wrong since the mode of existence is the object of investigation. And identifying the psycho-mental phenomenon that corresponds to the philosophical object "inherent existence" is what validates the philosophy.

and the means by which phenomena appear and are cognized is not part of Nagarjuna's system, really--that is my point. ... Nagarjuna and Candrakirti

I am not interested in Nagarjuna's irrational system but Tsongkahapa's rational interpretation of it. Same holds for Candrakirti's system.

Regardless of whether you want to call my discussions about perception and cognition "Analysis," they are not called such in the context of Madhyamaka.

Madhyamaka isn't everyday use of language. Madhyamaka is philosphy and as such it is analysis.

Joe the Plumber has to analyze the pipes and fittings in order to fix things--would you liken that analysis to the ontological analysis that is the method of Madhyamaka?

It is you who wants to equate Joe the Plumbe's everyday analysis with Madhyamaka analysis, not me.

When existence is imputed onto a phenomenon, what is the basis of that imputation?

The "basis of imputation" is also only imputedly existent and the expression "basis of imputation" is used to denote the object of the imputing subject, but neither object nor subject exist inherently but only imputedly. That is why the basis of imputation arises simultaneously with the activity of imputing. If you think that there is a basis waiting for a label then this is Sautrantika.

Conventionally there are appearing phenomena, conventionally there are appearing perceivers, and conventionally there are conceptual imputations, mental images, etc.

But that is not everyday non-philosophical convention but philosophical Madhyamaka convention.

Your position that the basis of imputation arises simultaneous with the activity of imputing ignores the sensibilia, does it not?

No, since the basis of imputation "sensibilia" arise simultaneously with the imputation "sensibilia".

Saying there is appearing phenomena, as well as appearing imputations, appearing concepts, appearing "experiencers" or "subjects" does not negate the nonexistence of all such designations after analysis.

All are existent only dependent on conceptual imputations. Like you and me. We both are existent only dependent on conceptual imputations and so are all our conceptual imputations.

For Joe the Plumber, the external world of phenomena, and the subjective "person" who experiences such a world, exists.

correctly: For Joe the Plumber those exist inherently.

Joe can recognize the difference between the idea of an orange, and the orange in his hand, as I had previously said, but he will argue that the orange in his hand exists more surely than the idea of an orange in his mind. This sort of existence and experience is the focus of Madhyamaka analysis, really.

That may be your Madhyamaka but it isn't Prasangika. Because in Prasangika the orange in his hand is supported by valid cognition as is the difference between the orange in his hand and the idea of an orange in his hand. your Madhyamaka might say there is no difference between the idea of the orange in his hand and the orange in his hand but in Prasangika there is a difference based on valid cognition although both the idea of the orange in his hand as well as the orange in his hand exist only dependent on conceptual imputation.

[Justmeagain]

A distinction is made here between མངོན་སུམ་ཏུ་རྟོགས་པ་ and དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་.

Yes, the formere is a direct perception, tne latter cannot be.

...why would དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་ not be classed as a direct perception?

[conebeckham]

Herbie-
Best of luck with your rational philosophy. I hope it brings you an end to suffering and boundless peace and happiness.

[Bakmoon]

That may be your Madhyamaka but it isn't Prasangika. Because in Prasangika the orange in his hand is supported by valid cognition as is the difference between the orange in his hand and the idea of an orange in his hand. your Madhyamaka might say there is no difference between the idea of the orange in his hand and the orange in his hand but in Prasangika there is a difference based on valid cognition although both the idea of the orange in his hand as well as the orange in his hand exist only dependent on conceptual imputation.

No one is saying that there is no difference at all between an orange and the idea of an orange. Conventionally there is a difference because the idea of an orange isn't a functioning orange. But there is no difference between them in terms of their final ontological status, because when we inquire into the ontological status of both of them by means of rational analysis, the result is exactly the same. Both are equally empty and equally unestablished on the ultimate level.

[conebeckham]

That may be your Madhyamaka but it isn't Prasangika. Because in Prasangika the orange in his hand is supported by valid cognition as is the difference between the orange in his hand and the idea of an orange in his hand. your Madhyamaka might say there is no difference between the idea of the orange in his hand and the orange in his hand but in Prasangika there is a difference based on valid cognition although both the idea of the orange in his hand as well as the orange in his hand exist only dependent on conceptual imputation.

No one is saying that there is no difference at all between an orange and the idea of an orange. Conventionally there is a difference because the idea of an orange isn't a functioning orange. But there is no difference between them in terms of their final ontological status, because when we inquire into the ontological status of both of them by means of rational analysis, the result is exactly the same. Both are equally empty and equally unestablished on the ultimate level.

Right. Madhyamaka is not about parsing out the differences between conventional phenomena.

[Justmeagain]

Yes, the formere is a direct perception, tne latter cannot be.

...why would དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་ not be classed as a direct perception?

...why would དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་ not be classed as a direct perception?

[Herbie]

That may be your Madhyamaka but it isn't Prasangika. Because in Prasangika the orange in his hand is supported by valid cognition as is the difference between the orange in his hand and the idea of an orange in his hand. your Madhyamaka might say there is no difference between the idea of the orange in his hand and the orange in his hand but in Prasangika there is a difference based on valid cognition although both the idea of the orange in his hand as well as the orange in his hand exist only dependent on conceptual imputation.

No one is saying that there is no difference at all between an orange and the idea of an orange. Conventionally there is a difference because the idea of an orange isn't a functioning orange. But there is no difference between them in terms of their final ontological status, because when we inquire into the ontological status of both of them by means of rational analysis, the result is exactly the same. Both are equally empty and equally unestablished on the ultimate level.

Well this is what i said, isn't it? I said - right in your quote: "but in Prasangika there is a difference based on valid cognition although both the idea of the orange in his hand as well as the orange in his hand exist only dependent on conceptual imputation".

Right. Madhyamaka is not about parsing out the differences between conventional phenomena.

That may be right as to your irrational Madhyamaka but is not right as to rational Prasangika because there is a difference between the idea of the orange in his hand and the orange in his hand although both the idea of the orange in his hand as well as the orange in his hand exist only dependent on conceptual imputation. So rational Prasangika is suitable for living in the world but irrational Madhyamaka is suitable only for special buddhist gatherings.

[Bakmoon]

Right. Madhyamaka is not about parsing out the differences between conventional phenomena.

That may be right as to your irrational Madhyamaka but is not right as to rational Prasangika because there is a difference between the idea of the orange in his hand and the orange in his hand although both the idea of the orange in his hand as well as the orange in his hand exist only dependent on conceptual imputation. So rational Prasangika is suitable for living in the world but irrational Madhyamaka is suitable only for special buddhist gatherings.

Detailed explanations for how things operate conventionally isn't the intended purpose of Madhyamaka. That doesn't mean that understanding how things work isn't important, but if someone wants to do that, they should study Abhidharma or something, just like you don't go to a dentist to get eye glasses. Different branches of knowledge are used for different things.

[Herbie]

Right. Madhyamaka is not about parsing out the differences between conventional phenomena.

That may be right as to your irrational Madhyamaka but is not right as to rational Prasangika because there is a difference between the idea of the orange in his hand and the orange in his hand although both the idea of the orange in his hand as well as the orange in his hand exist only dependent on conceptual imputation. So rational Prasangika is suitable for living in the world but irrational Madhyamaka is suitable only for special buddhist gatherings.

Detailed explanations for how things operate conventionally isn't the intended purpose of Madhyamaka. That doesn't mean that understanding how things work isn't important, but if someone wants to do that, they should study Abhidharma or something, just like you don't go to a dentist to get eye glasses. Different branches of knowledge are used for different things.

From my perspective a philosophy has to cover all and everything: science, religions, politics, other philosophies, ideologies, everyday life, psycho-mental phenomena, language, truths and ultimate reality. A philosophy that does not cover all and everthing is invalid from my perspective.

[Bakmoon]

From my perspective a philosophy has to cover all and everything: science, religions, politics, other philosophies, ideologies, everyday life, psycho-mental phenomena, language, truths and ultimate reality. A philosophy that does not cover all and everthing is invalid from my perspective.

So according to you, how does Prasangika cover all of this?

[Bristollad]

...why would དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་ not be classed as a direct perception?

...why would དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་ not be classed as a direct perception?

'cos it's far too small to be read?

[Herbie]

From my perspective a philosophy has to cover all and everything: science, religions, politics, other philosophies, ideologies, everyday life, psycho-mental phenomena, language, truths and ultimate reality. A philosophy that does not cover all and everthing is invalid from my perspective.

So according to you, how does Prasangika cover all of this?

I can talk like a scientist. I can talk like a buddhist. I can talk like a christian or muslim. I can talk like Joe the plumber. etc etc In whichever way I talk I am not contradicting myself. Why? Because there is no truth in language but language can be applied as deemed appropriate depending on context.

[conebeckham]

From my perspective a philosophy has to cover all and everything: science, religions, politics, other philosophies, ideologies, everyday life, psycho-mental phenomena, language, truths and ultimate reality. A philosophy that does not cover all and everthing is invalid from my perspective.

So according to you, how does Prasangika cover all of this?

I can talk like a scientist. I can talk like a buddhist. I can talk like a christian or muslim. I can talk like Joe the plumber. etc etc In whichever way I talk I am not contradicting myself. Why? Because there is no truth in language but language can be applied as deemed appropriate depending on context.

Okay. God does not inherently exist. Please talk like a monotheist about that topic.

[Herbie]

So according to you, how does Prasangika cover all of this?

I can talk like a scientist. I can talk like a buddhist. I can talk like a christian or muslim. I can talk like Joe the plumber. etc etc In whichever way I talk I am not contradicting myself. Why? Because there is no truth in language but language can be applied as deemed appropriate depending on context.

Okay. God does not inherently exist. Please talk like a monotheist about that topic.

As a monotheist applying the convention of the community of monotheists I would say "God exists". Why? Because monotheists' convention does not differentiate between imputed existence and inherent existence because their convention does not know an object of negation.
But since regardless of what I am saying I am applying Prasangika as a meta-system that covers all and everything I know that for one who says "God exists" in the affirmative and who has not identified the object of negation according Prasangika the object "God exists" appears as if inherently existing although it exists only depending on conceptual imputation [for him]. But for me applying Prasangika as a meta-system that covers all and everything there is no difference in saying "God exists" or "God does not exist" because I know that a linguistic expression is just a linguistic expression and no true object can be found in linguistic expressions although linguistic expressions are usually associated with conditioned ideas in the context of concept formation.

Now if with "Please talk like a monotheist about that topic." you are asking me to argue in favor of God's existence then please accept that I am not able to do this here and now because I would first have to study their conventional arguments for God's existence before being able to express them. But it is not that I could not express them without contradicting myself.

[Lukeinaz]

Dependent existence is precisely emptiness.


Dependent existence has no existence, by definition. "

If dependent arising was precisely emptiness then all it would take to realize emptiness is to perceive an arising. I don't believe these two are synonymous yet I am pretty sure we are not agreeing on the definition. Can you please define dependent arising as viewed from your system.

"Dependent" obviously refutes independence.

And "arising" refutes non-existence. You may call it mere appearance while we would call it conventionally existing by mere imputation.