What Tsongkhapa said

[cloudburst]

But I still consider it a good base and I have found the attacks on the Gelug position here very disconcerting.

It is normal. The Gelugpas engaged in the suppression of other religion traditions for centuries.

This is not a very mature position. I agree that the tone of attacks on the Gelug position here is often off-putting, and the fact that Gelugs supressed the views of others is also off putting, one does not justify the other.

[Malcolm]

But I still consider it a good base and I have found the attacks on the Gelug position here very disconcerting.

It is normal. The Gelugpas engaged in the suppression of other religion traditions for centuries.

This is not a very mature position. I agree that the tone of attacks on the Gelug position here is often off-putting, and the fact that Gelugs supressed the views of others is also off putting, one does not justify the other.

In fact, Tsongkhapa started it by attacking the views of others. Thus, it is normal that others will respond.

[conebeckham]

But I still consider it a good base and I have found the attacks on the Gelug position here very disconcerting.

It is normal. The Gelugpas engaged in the suppression of other religion traditions for centuries.

This is not a very mature position. I agree that the tone of attacks on the Gelug position here is often off-putting, and the fact that Gelugs supressed the views of others is also off putting, one does not justify the other.

With all due respect, Cloudburst, all the Tibetan lineages engaged in warfare, including slaughter. TsongKhapa' system was largely an attack on Dolpopa. Geluk authorities burned texts that they found antithetical to their tradition. Monasteries and monks were forcibly converted, by Gelukpas and by other lineages. I don't think substantive intellectual arguments can compare with the history of Tibetan politics--but discussing the faults of a given system is much more mature, wouldn't you say?

[DGA]

inherent existence appears to no-one, ever, anywhere, at anytime

If you want to understand Je Tsongkhapas position, you need to understand that inherent existence appears to all sentient beings, at all times, except for aryas in equipoise.

How would you prove a categorical statement like this?

Prasangikas (who never existed in India)

Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Chandrakirti, Buddhapalita and Atisha were all prasangikas existing in India.

How would you prove the existence of the category "prasangika" in the time of Nagarjuna et al?

[Konchog1]

It is normal. The Gelugpas engaged in the suppression of other religion traditions for centuries.

This is not a very mature position. I agree that the tone of attacks on the Gelug position here is often off-putting, and the fact that Gelugs supressed the views of others is also off putting, one does not justify the other.

In fact, Tsongkhapa started it by attacking the views of others. Thus, it is normal that others will respond.

The Lord Buddha repeatedly criticized fire worship, holy war, and animal sacrifice as worthless and sinful.

[Malcolm]

This is not a very mature position. I agree that the tone of attacks on the Gelug position here is often off-putting, and the fact that Gelugs supressed the views of others is also off putting, one does not justify the other.

In fact, Tsongkhapa started it by attacking the views of others. Thus, it is normal that others will respond.

The Lord Buddha repeatedly criticized fire worship, holy war, and animal sacrifice as worthless and sinful.

Tsongkhapa on the other hand attacked fellow Buddhists for having what he decided were wrong views. But he was somewhat polite about it, and kind. His disciple, Kaydrup, on the other hand as neither polite, nor kind. The polemical climate in Tibet was not Tsongkhapa's fault of course. He was following the example of his teacher, the Sakya master Rendawa.

As I have observed before, there is virtually no benefit to studying Tibetan Madhyamaka scholars.

[Konchog1]

In fact, Tsongkhapa started it by attacking the views of others. Thus, it is normal that others will respond.

The Lord Buddha repeatedly criticized fire worship, holy war, and animal sacrifice as worthless and sinful.

Tsongkhapa on the other hand attacked fellow Buddhists for having what he decided were wrong views. But he was somewhat polite about it, and kind. His disciple, Kaydrup, on the other hand as neither polite, nor kind. The polemical climate in Tibet was not Tsongkhapa's fault of course. He was following the example of his teacher, the Sakya master Rendawa.

As I have observed before, there is virtually no benefit to studying Tibetan Madhyamaka scholars.

What did Rendawa attack, besides Kalachakra?

[cloudburst]

inherent existence appears to no-one, ever, anywhere, at anytime

If you want to understand Je Tsongkhapas position, you need to understand that inherent existence appears to all sentient beings, at all times, except for aryas in equipoise.

How would you prove a categorical statement like this?

Since this is a core position of Je tsongkhapa, you would need to understand it to understand his position.

Prasangikas (who never existed in India)

Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Chandrakirti, Buddhapalita and Atisha were all prasangikas existing in India.

How would you prove the existence of the category "prasangika" in the time of Nagarjuna et al?[/quote]

the scholars I mention above use prasangas to refute the positions of others that are grounded in inherent existence, and they refute the use of autonomous syllogisms. Therefore prasangikas existed in india

[cloudburst]

With all due respect, Cloudburst, all the Tibetan lineages engaged in warfare, including slaughter. TsongKhapa' system was largely an attack on Dolpopa. Geluk authorities burned texts that they found antithetical to their tradition. Monasteries and monks were forcibly converted, by Gelukpas and by other lineages. I don't think substantive intellectual arguments can compare with the history of Tibetan politics--but discussing the faults of a given system is much more mature, wouldn't you say?

I think discussion is much more mature than politics and supression, yes. As you correctly point out, Tibetan religious history as a whole is a spectacular display of sectarian behaviours. The point I was making is that saying that Gelugs suppressed other traditions is not a justification for the anti-gelug tone that sometimes dominates here. Others may not see it that way, I understand.

[Malcolm]

The Lord Buddha repeatedly criticized fire worship, holy war, and animal sacrifice as worthless and sinful.

Tsongkhapa on the other hand attacked fellow Buddhists for having what he decided were wrong views. But he was somewhat polite about it, and kind. His disciple, Kaydrup, on the other hand as neither polite, nor kind. The polemical climate in Tibet was not Tsongkhapa's fault of course. He was following the example of his teacher, the Sakya master Rendawa.

As I have observed before, there is virtually no benefit to studying Tibetan Madhyamaka scholars.

What did Rendawa attack, besides Kalachakra?

gzhan stong, he called it "outside Buddhadharma."

[Malcolm]

they refute the use of autonomous syllogisms. Therefore prasangikas existed in india

Oh nonsense. Candra uses syllogisms in the Madhyamakāvatāra.

The absurdity of this is that the term "prasangika" etc, is a wholly Tibetan invention, invented by someone who Tsongkhapa himself refutes (Patshab).

Further, Tsongkhapa himself uses syllogisms all of the time.

[Konchog1]

Tsongkhapa on the other hand attacked fellow Buddhists for having what he decided were wrong views. But he was somewhat polite about it, and kind. His disciple, Kaydrup, on the other hand as neither polite, nor kind. The polemical climate in Tibet was not Tsongkhapa's fault of course. He was following the example of his teacher, the Sakya master Rendawa.

As I have observed before, there is virtually no benefit to studying Tibetan Madhyamaka scholars.

What did Rendawa attack, besides Kalachakra?

gzhan stong, he called it "outside Buddhadharma."

Was this something that he himself thought or did he learn it from another? I'm wondering how far it goes.

[Malcolm]

What did Rendawa attack, besides Kalachakra?

gzhan stong, he called it "outside Buddhadharma."

Was this something that he himself thought or did he learn it from another? I'm wondering how far it goes.

AFAIK, it was Rendawa's extremist position alone, but one that influenced his disciple, Tsongkhapa, tremendously.

[conebeckham]

By all accounts, at the time of Dolpopa, Dolpopa himself was like a rock star...carried everywhere on a chair, people literally fell under him, and there were scenes of unbridled enthusiasm, it it said. It was a crazy scene. So......there's that, for a sober monk to contemplate.

[DGA]

If you want to understand Je Tsongkhapas position, you need to understand that inherent existence appears to all sentient beings, at all times, except for aryas in equipoise.

How would you prove a categorical statement like this?

Since this is a core position of Je tsongkhapa, you would need to understand it to understand his position.

You are avoiding the question. How do you prove that inherent existence appears to all sentient beings, at all times, except for aryas in equipoise?

It's one thing to understand whether or not Je Tsongkhapa makes such a claim. it's another thing to demonstrate that it is so. How would you do it?

[cloudburst]

they refute the use of autonomous syllogisms. Therefore prasangikas existed in india

Oh nonsense. Candra uses syllogisms in the Madhyamakāvatāra.
Further, Tsongkhapa himself uses syllogisms all of the time.

yes, madhymikas use syllogisms

The absurdity of this is that the term "prasangika" etc, is a wholly Tibetan invention, invented by someone who Tsongkhapa himself refutes (Patshab).

Where the term was invented has no bearing on whether Chandrakirti, for example,was a Prasangika

[Malcolm]

they refute the use of autonomous syllogisms. Therefore prasangikas existed in india

Oh nonsense. Candra uses syllogisms in the Madhyamakāvatāra.
Further, Tsongkhapa himself uses syllogisms all of the time.

yes, madhymikas use syllogisms

The absurdity of this is that the term "prasangika" etc, is a wholly Tibetan invention, invented by someone who Tsongkhapa himself refutes (Patshab).

Where the term was invented has no bearing on whether Chandrakirti, for example,was a Prasangika

Of course it has a bearing.

[Jeff H]

Great Treatise, v.3, chapter 16, “Not Negating Enough”

I’m finding this chapter a little harder to summarize. If anyone can provide Gelug-oriented insight and/or correction, I’d appreciate it. (If you offer a non-Gelug perspective, please clearly identify it as such. The sole purpose of this thread is to elucidate what Lama Tsongkhapa actually says in the Lam Rim Chenmo.)

This chapter starts with an opponent defining the object of negation as “an intrinsic nature that has three attributes: (1) causes and conditions do not bring it into being, (2) its condition is immutable, and (3) it is posited without depending on some other phenomenon.” (p.195)

LTK says, this is correct as far as it goes, but it doesn’t go far enough. The opponent’s position is too coarse. We can logically verify that all phenomena depend on causes, conditions, and parts, and on that basis we can develop the conclusion that entities have no intrinsic nature. But LTK says, “these statements indicate fallacies that would be entailed if things existed essentially; they do not identify the object of negation on its own terms.” (p.196) [Emphasis added]

These coarse misapprehensions are culturally acquired, not innate. We are not born with ideas of independent existence, partless particles, or creator gods. Overcoming such acquired concepts is not enough to combat the root ignorance that has generated our samsaric worlds since beginningless time.

Here we are moving up the three levels of dependent arising: 1.) Things are dependent upon causes (sequentially in time); 2.) Things are dependent upon parts (spatially in the present); and, most importantly, 3.) Things are dependently designated.

This last one, dependent designation, goes far deeper than the first two. It is not merely that fire depends on fuel as a causal condition; the very existence of “fuel” depends on its designation of being burnable. It is not enough for the chariot to depend on its parts; the parts themselves depend on their designated potential to form a chariot.

It is only at this level that we are getting closer to our prey: intrinsic existence as the innate, fundamental object of negation. For LTK, intrinsic nature (self), understood “on its own terms” means existing without being consciously posited. As trainees in the path, we can argue about whether or not we naturally perceive objects as unitary, permanent, and independent. But what LTK means about all beings experiencing mere existence is that we are blind to the fact that our experienced reality arises from dependently designated consciousness. This subtle realization is the exact opposite of ignorance and leads to the cessation of suffering.

At the bottom of p.197 he seems (to me) to go in a different direction. There he says, “The Buddha posits a ‘nature,’ saying ‘This is the reality of phenomena.’ It is not fabricated and does not depend on something else.” He backs this up with a quote from Chandrakirti.

Is there a nature that has such qualifications as the master Nagarjuna claims? Yes, it is the “reality” of which the Bhagavan spoke extensively, saying, “Whether tathagatas appear or not, the nature of phenomena remains.” What is the “reality”? It is the nature of things such as these eyes. And, what is their nature? It is that in them which is neither fabricated nor dependent upon something else; it is their identity as known by knowledge free from the impairment of ignorance. Does it exist or not? If it did not exist, for what purpose would bodhisattvas cultivate the path of the perfections? Why would bodhisattvas undergo hundreds of hardships in order to know reality?

So what does this mean in the context of arriving at a definition of the object of negation on its own terms? I think Geshe Tashi gives the key when he introduces this chapter. He gives the characteristics of Ultimate Reality versus Conventional Reality as follows.

• Conventional Reality = Dependent; Made; and Relative.
  Ultimate Reality = Nature (reality); Unmade; and Unrelated.

The objective of the path is the union of these apparent opposites. The key, for determining the fundamental object of negation, is observing the quality of “Nature”, which refers to self-nature and ultimate reality. The object of negation (intrinsic existence) refers to a false nature of non-fabrication and non-relatedness being imputed upon the appearances to mind. But the peace of true cessation (enlightenment) is also unmade and unrelated. In this way, a correlation is drawn between realizing the root of all ignorance and the attainment of enlightenment.

“Compounded phenomena such as eyes are not natures in the sense of being essentially existent, nor are they natures when reality is posited as the final nature. So they are neither sort of nature. Ultimate truths are natures when reality is posited as the final nature, but what establishes them as such natures is that they are non-fabricated and do not depend upon something else. They do not at all exist as natures in the sense of being essentially existent. Thus, they exist merely conventionally.
…
Since forms and so forth are neither type of nature, when you speak of cultivating the path in order to view the final nature, “nature” has the sense of reality. Therefore, Candrakirti says that pure conduct is not senseless. Moreover, he explains that his utter lack of an assertion that phenomena have a nature in the sense of essential existence does not contradict his incidental assertion of a final nature.

[cloudburst]

Oh nonsense. Candra uses syllogisms in the Madhyamakāvatāra.
Further, Tsongkhapa himself uses syllogisms all of the time.

yes, madhymikas use syllogisms

The absurdity of this is that the term "prasangika" etc, is a wholly Tibetan invention, invented by someone who Tsongkhapa himself refutes (Patshab).

Where the term was invented has no bearing on whether Chandrakirti, for example,was a Prasangika

Of course it has a bearing.

you make a strong case

[Jeff H]

Great Treatise, v.3, chapter 17, “The Actual Object to Be Negated”

Geshe Tashi Tsering advises that Lama Tsongkhapa’s most crucial explanation of the object of negation is contained in chapter 17. He recommends re-reading it often. The three chapters that follow it are considered the most difficult section of the Lam Rim Chenmo, so I plan to stop here, after chapter 17.

Objects of negation fall into two types, those negated by the path, and those negated by reason. The first pertain to objects of knowledge, namely existent things. The second pertain to misconceptions, namely non-existent things.

Objects negated by the path include the afflictive obscurations and the cognitive obscurations, all of which are objects of knowledge which keep us tied to samsara.

Objects negated by reason include misconceptions of mind and the intrinsic natures they apprehend, that is, two types of misconceptions to be negated. Of those two, the apprehended intrinsic nature is the primary object of negation. “For, in order to stop an inaccurate consciousness, you must first refute the object which that consciousness apprehends.” (p.204)

Once it is understood with certainty that such inherent objects do not exist and have never existed, the misconceptions dissolve. Negating by reason does not cause the apprehensions not to exist, it merely illuminates the fact of their non-existence.

This latter object of negation cannot be among objects of knowledge because, if it did exist, then it could not be refuted. Still, there are mistaken superimpositions that apprehend it as existing, so you must refute it. This refutation is not like destroying a pot with a hammer; rather, it is a matter of developing certain knowledge that recognizes the nonexistent as nonexistent. When you develop certain knowledge that it does not exist, the mistaken consciousness that apprehends it as existing will stop.

What use is it to establish the negation
Of what does not exist anyway even without words?
To answer that, the words “does not exist”
Cause understanding; they do not eliminate.

We distinguish “observed objects” from “referent objects”. Observed objects actually exist (meaning they function conventionally) and are the objects of the applied antidotes on the path. Such antidotes counteract specifically targeted afflictions. Referent objects do not exist and are the objects of negation.

In the case of the self of persons, the I that exists and functions is the observed object. That is the agent and subject of method practice, cultivating compassion and purifying karma. The intrinsically existent I we grasp onto is the non-existent referent object to be negated.

In general, there are a limitless number of conceptual consciousnesses that apprehend the object of negation; however, you should carefully identify the incorrect conceptual consciousness that is the root of all faults and defects and you should eradicate its referent object. For, if that is stopped, then all faults and defects will be stopped.

Moreover, the remedies set forth in sutra for other afflictions, such as attachment, cure a portion of the afflictions, whereas the remedies set forth for ignorance cure all afflictions. Therefore, ignorance is the basis of all faults and defects.

LTK also says, “ignorance is the opposite of knowledge, and this does not refer to just any knowledge, but to the wisdom that knows the reality that is selflessness.” (p.208) This does not mean the absence of such wisdom or the presence of something other than wisdom, but it means a conception that is "wisdom's contradictory equivalent", superimposing a self. Geshe Tashi points out that the opposition of ignorance and wisdom works like a scale: the more of one we have, the less of the other, in perfect balance.

When ignorance is stopped
Compositional activity will not arise at all.
That which stops ignorance
Is knowing and meditating on reality.

Seeing what is not real, you are bound;
Seeing the real, you are free.

(Compare this with the discussion of “nature” in chapter 16.)

Geshe Tashi comments, the referent object of innate ignorance imposing intrinsic existence is the principal object of negation. Therefore, do not be distracted by the imaginary constructs developed by the tenet schools to explain inherent existence. It’s the innate ignorance that binds us, not the acquired ignorance of Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. It must be known clearly, with specific and certain knowledge, that this is the case and to focus on identifying the innate ignorance that is our nemesis.

To summarize: The ultimate wrong consciousness is the innate mind imposing intrinsic existence which is the first of the twelve links. Acquired ignorance merely superimposes based on this innate ignorance. Thus, reasoning does not negate all cognitive processes through non-conceptual consciousnesses (perceptions). Reasoning does not negate the computer I’m typing on, for example, it only negates its falsely apprehended quality of existing in its own essence without need of conscious input. Only conceptual cognitive processes are negated by reason, and not all of them. Rational analysis never negates perceptual consciousness -- otherwise there would be nothing to observe, nothing to analyze. The thing is there; the issue is how we apprehend it. So reason does not refute perception, only the referent object of the conceptual mind. More specifically, two conceptual minds are refuted: that which superimposes an intrinsic self on objects, and that which superimposes an intrinsic self on persons.