How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

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boda
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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by boda » Tue Dec 27, 2016 3:20 am

Kenneth Chan wrote:It [becoming a better person] is much more than just a means to an end. It is both the means and the end, as well the way to end all suffering.
The end is the cessation of suffering. It can't be the cessation of suffering, as well as the cessation of suffering. And if it we're both the means and the end it would only be about becoming a better person.
So please refrain from propagating the idea that The Four Noble Truths suggest, in any way, that “Buddhism is not about becoming a better person.”
It may include becoming a better person but it's about the cessation of suffering. Becoming a better person is nice, and it is meaningful in a practical way, but the cessation of suffering is very meaningful and in a transcendent way.

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Anders
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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Anders » Tue Dec 27, 2016 8:37 am

Sila is certainly a fruit in itself, since a number of joyous qualities arise freely from it.

The Buddha didn't teach this way: I teach Virtue, but only as a means to and end. if there were other means to that end, I wouldn't teach virtue.

That's the teaching of someone who would like to skip that part.

The Buddha taught virtue without a reservation of any kind.
"Even if my body should be burnt to death in the fires of hell
I would endure it for myriad lifetimes
As your companion in practice"

--- Gandavyuha Sutra

Malcolm
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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Malcolm » Tue Dec 27, 2016 12:23 pm

Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Malcolm wrote:
Since self and inherent existent are synonyms, if there is a valid basis for designating a self there should be a valid designation for designating inherent existence since a self and internet existence are one and the same thing.
Self and inherent existence are not synonyms. Inherent existence does not exist but the self clearly does as it can perform actions. The self of Buddha benefits all each and every living being every day.

It's a big mistake to conflate the merely imputed self with an inherently existent self. Those who are unable to tell the difference will definitely fall into the extremes of inherent existence and non-existence, as you have done.
The imputation of a self exists I.e., the conception exists, but it is a false imputation since it has no valid basis of designation. The proposition of a self is exactly the same as proposing inherent existence. The refutation of one is the refutation of the other.

In other words, the negation of the self does not confirm a merely existing self. It merely points to its absence in the aggregates, and so on.

This is also why existence is included in inherent existence sui generis. The Buddha said it is fine to use say "self" as long as one understood nothing real was indicated. It is the same with the term existence.

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Kenneth Chan » Tue Dec 27, 2016 3:09 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Malcolm wrote:
Actually, Candra rejects this idea. There is no valid basis at all for designating a self.
That's completely incorrect.
Since self and inherent existent are synonyms, if there is a valid basis for designating a self there should be a valid designation for designating inherent existence since a self and internet existence are one and the same thing.

Instead Candra rejects all bases of designation of a self, asserting in its place that the imputation of self needs to no basis of designation because it is wholly unreal.

Some people get confused about this point because it is certain that the thought of a self arises in dependence on appearances which are mistakenly designated a self, but in fact there is no valid basis of designation a self. Those who do not understand this point do not understand the profound point of Prasanga.
Malcolm, how did you come to the conclusion that "self and inherent existent are synonyms"? Please explain.

Also, what exactly do you mean by "valid basis" and "valid designation"? In terms of the ultimate truth, of course, we can say that there is no valid basis, no valid designation, no basis of designation, etc, etc. Because all things are empty of inherent existence, we can always say no this and no that, and no one can dispute it. But what exactly is the point you are trying to make?

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Malcolm » Tue Dec 27, 2016 3:57 pm

Kenneth Chan wrote:
Malcolm wrote:
Tsongkhapafan wrote: That's completely incorrect.
Since self and inherent existent are synonyms, if there is a valid basis for designating a self there should be a valid designation for designating inherent existence since a self and internet existence are one and the same thing.

Instead Candra rejects all bases of designation of a self, asserting in its place that the imputation of self needs to no basis of designation because it is wholly unreal.

Some people get confused about this point because it is certain that the thought of a self arises in dependence on appearances which are mistakenly designated a self, but in fact there is no valid basis of designation a self. Those who do not understand this point do not understand the profound point of Prasanga.
Malcolm, how did you come to the conclusion that "self and inherent existent are synonyms"? Please explain.

Also, what exactly do you mean by "valid basis" and "valid designation"? In terms of the ultimate truth, of course, we can say that there is no valid basis, no valid designation, no basis of designation, etc, etc. Because all things are empty of inherent existence, we can always say no this and no that, and no one can dispute it. But what exactly is the point you are trying to make?
The self proposed by ātmanāvadins is permanent, unchanging, and unconditioned, just the way inherent existence is defined.

As someone mentioned before, Bhavaviveka asserts that consciousness is a suitable conventional basis for designation a self, but Candra rejects this and asserts out there is no suitable basis for designating a self, even conventionally. Instead Candra says that I-making is a habit which imputes a nonexistent. He also claims this habit is capable of generating karma and experiencing its ripening. The habit of course is a dependently originated phenomena, but the I which it imputes does not exist at all. Likewise, the imputation of inherent existence arises in dependence, but that imputation is a false one, like the imputation of self.

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Jeff H » Tue Dec 27, 2016 4:09 pm

Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Bakmoon wrote:
Tsongkhapafan wrote:Clearly people do not understand that there is a valid basis of designation for the self. The self that exists is the mere 'I' that is imputed upon the basis of the body and mind. This mere I is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection. The conceived object of the view of the transitory collection is this mere I grasped as being an inherently existent I.

The mere I exists and functions whereas the inherently existent I that is the conceived object does not.

There's no difference between the I and a car. If you want to say that there's no valid basis of imputation for the I, you have to say that there's no valid basis of imputation for a car. The valid basis of imputation for a car are the parts of the car and the valid basis of imputation for the I are the parts of the I. Neither a car nor the self can be found upon investigation but conventionally they exist and function.

And of course the I arises dependently in five ways. It is a dependent arising on the basis of causes, parts, name, basis of imputation and mere imputation by conception. The twelve dependent related links explains that self arises dependently - it is dependent related name and form, the fourth link.
The aggregates are indeed designated as the aggregates, but this isn't actually a valid designation because the innate concept of self people have is that of a unitary unchanging core observer, and this concept doesn't correspond to anything in the aggregates.
Yes, but the view of the transitory collection depends upon the aggregates. There is no valid or invalid view of self without them.
This explanation by Tsongkhapafan is exactly how I was taught, where the permanent "core observer" is the utterly non-existent inherent self. But this discussion seems to get hung up on conflicting perspectives: ultimate versus conventional.
Malcolm wrote:The Buddha said it is fine to say ‘self’ as long as one understood nothing real was indicated. It is the same with the term existence.
and
Some people get confused about this point because it is certain that the thought of a self arises in dependence on appearances which are mistakenly designated a self, but in fact there is no valid basis of designation a self. Those who do not understand this point do not understand the profound point of Prasanga.
I understand Tsongkhapa to say that ultimately nothing real is indicated by the designation “mere self”, but that conventionally there is a meaningful distinction between valid (i.e. functional) designations of appearances and invalid ones.

Georges Dreyfus calls the Prasangika's "realists", not because they advocate a material reality but because they ascribe validity to the workings of conventional reality. That is the context in which everyone other than buddhas do our work and pursue the path.
We who are like children shrink from pain but love its causes. - Shantideva

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Malcolm » Tue Dec 27, 2016 4:19 pm

Jeff H wrote:
Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Bakmoon wrote: The aggregates are indeed designated as the aggregates, but this isn't actually a valid designation because the innate concept of self people have is that of a unitary unchanging core observer, and this concept doesn't correspond to anything in the aggregates.
Yes, but the view of the transitory collection depends upon the aggregates. There is no valid or invalid view of self without them.
This explanation by Tsongkhapafan is exactly how I was taught, where the permanent "core observer" is the utterly non-existent inherent self. But this discussion seems to get hung up on conflicting perspectives: ultimate versus conventional.
Malcolm wrote:The Buddha said it is fine to say ‘self’ as long as one understood nothing real was indicated. It is the same with the term existence.
and
Some people get confused about this point because it is certain that the thought of a self arises in dependence on appearances which are mistakenly designated a self, but in fact there is no valid basis of designation a self. Those who do not understand this point do not understand the profound point of Prasanga.
I understand Tsongkhapa to say that ultimately nothing real is indicated by the designation “mere self”, but that conventionally there is a meaningful distinction between valid (i.e. functional) designations of appearances and invalid ones.

Georges Dreyfus calls the Prasangika's "realists", not because they advocate a material reality but because they ascribe validity to the workings of conventional reality. That is the context in which everyone other than buddhas do our work and pursue the path.
Please tell us upon what appearance a self is designated, and I will show the appearance that Candra rejects as a basis for designation a self. If Candra ever rejects designating a self on the basis of a consciousness, what else could there be left over? Nevertheless, Candra says this imputation of the nonexistent I is fully functional and can generate karma as well as experience its ripening.

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Jeff H » Tue Dec 27, 2016 4:45 pm

Malcolm wrote:... Nevertheless, Candra says this imputation of the nonexistent I is fully functional and can generate karma as well as experience its ripening.
Isn't "this imputation of the nonexistent I" exactly what is meant by "mere self"? It seems like the distinction is that from an ultimate perspective there is no valid basis of designation, but from a conventional perspective it functions and we can use this fictitious agent to direct our karmic path.
We who are like children shrink from pain but love its causes. - Shantideva

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Malcolm » Tue Dec 27, 2016 5:04 pm

Jeff H wrote:
Malcolm wrote:... Nevertheless, Candra says this imputation of the nonexistent I is fully functional and can generate karma as well as experience its ripening.
Isn't "this imputation of the nonexistent I" exactly what is meant by "mere self"? It seems like the distinction is that from an ultimate perspective there is no valid basis of designation, but from a conventional perspective it functions and we can use this fictitious agent to direct our karmic path.
No, the distinction is not from the ultimate, it is from the relative. This is what it means when Candra rejects all basis of designation for the self. The self is a designation which lacks a basis of designation. This is what makes it a false imputation. This is the unique point of view of Candra.

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Jeff H » Tue Dec 27, 2016 5:21 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Jeff H wrote:
Malcolm wrote:... Nevertheless, Candra says this imputation of the nonexistent I is fully functional and can generate karma as well as experience its ripening.
Isn't "this imputation of the nonexistent I" exactly what is meant by "mere self"? It seems like the distinction is that from an ultimate perspective there is no valid basis of designation, but from a conventional perspective it functions and we can use this fictitious agent to direct our karmic path.
No, the distinction is not from the ultimate, it is from the relative. This is what it means when Candra rejects all basis of designation for the self. The self is a designation which lacks a basis of designation. This is what makes it a false imputation. This is the unique point of view of Candra.
I guess I'm just not getting it. Conventionally the basis of designation for the I is the aggregates. They distinguish one being from another. Granted the aggregates have no existence, but the basis for designating "I" is the appearance of the aggregates. In TKF's explanation, the body has parts just as a car does. The feelings I identify as "mine" are different than others'. "I" discriminate differently than others, etc. I don't understand how those appearing aggregates are not valid bases of designation for the conventional agent I call "me".
We who are like children shrink from pain but love its causes. - Shantideva

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Malcolm » Tue Dec 27, 2016 5:36 pm

Jeff H wrote: I guess I'm just not getting it. Conventionally the basis of designation for the I is the aggregates.
Yes, and Candrakīrti rejects this. So when someone claims that the aggregates are the basis of designating a self, they do not understand Candra's view.

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Jeff H » Tue Dec 27, 2016 6:40 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Jeff H wrote: I guess I'm just not getting it. Conventionally the basis of designation for the I is the aggregates.
Yes, and Candrakīrti rejects this. So when someone claims that the aggregates are the basis of designating a self, they do not understand Candra's view.
Sad to say, I have to count my so-called self in that group. :crying:
We who are like children shrink from pain but love its causes. - Shantideva

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by cloudburst » Tue Dec 27, 2016 8:08 pm

Jeff H wrote: I guess I'm just not getting it. Conventionally the basis of designation for the I is the aggregates.

you are doing fine.

The self is like an illusion, the aggregates are taken as the basis upon which the self is imputed. Thus they are called "appropriated aggregates."

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Kenneth Chan » Tue Dec 27, 2016 8:43 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Kenneth Chan wrote:
Malcolm wrote: Since self and inherent existent are synonyms, if there is a valid basis for designating a self there should be a valid designation for designating inherent existence since a self and internet existence are one and the same thing.

Instead Candra rejects all bases of designation of a self, asserting in its place that the imputation of self needs to no basis of designation because it is wholly unreal.

Some people get confused about this point because it is certain that the thought of a self arises in dependence on appearances which are mistakenly designated a self, but in fact there is no valid basis of designation a self. Those who do not understand this point do not understand the profound point of Prasanga.
Malcolm, how did you come to the conclusion that "self and inherent existent are synonyms"? Please explain.

Also, what exactly do you mean by "valid basis" and "valid designation"? In terms of the ultimate truth, of course, we can say that there is no valid basis, no valid designation, no basis of designation, etc, etc. Because all things are empty of inherent existence, we can always say no this and no that, and no one can dispute it. But what exactly is the point you are trying to make?
The self proposed by ātmanāvadins is permanent, unchanging, and unconditioned, just the way inherent existence is defined.
I think this only means that “self” and “inherent existence” have similar properties. That does not mean that they are synonyms.
Malcolm wrote: As someone mentioned before, Bhavaviveka asserts that consciousness is a suitable conventional basis for designation a self, but Candra rejects this and asserts out there is no suitable basis for designating a self, even conventionally.
Actually I think you may not be putting this properly by saying that “there is no suitable basis for designating a self.” What Chandrakirti is saying is that without the consciousness labelling the object, there is nothing existing from the object’s own side. In other words, there is a basis for the designation of a self, but this basis is also empty of inherent existence, in the sense that there is nothing existing from its own side. The self exists purely imputed by the conventional consciousness.

Svatantrika Madhyamaka explains dependent arising on two levels. Things are dependently arisen because they depend on causes and conditions, and because they depend on their parts. Prasangika Madhyamaka accepts these two levels of dependent arising, but they take it one step further, and say that things are dependently arisen because they also depend on the conventional consciousness that labels them. Without this consciousness labelling the thing, there is nothing existing from the thing’s own side. That is what is meant by the “I” existing in mere name only.
Malcolm wrote: Instead Candra says that I-making is a habit which imputes a nonexistent. He also claims this habit is capable of generating karma and experiencing its ripening. The habit of course is a dependently originated phenomena, but the I which it imputes does not exist at all. Likewise, the imputation of inherent existence arises in dependence, but that imputation is a false one, like the imputation of self.
I don’t think that Chandrakirti is saying that “the I which it imputes does not exist at all.” What he is saying is that the existence of the “I” depends purely upon the imputation of the mind that apprehends it. The “I” does not have an intrinsic nature that exists from its own side. But that does not mean that the “I” is completely nonexistent. It is, however, empty of inherent existence because it depends upon causes and conditions, because it depends upon its aggregates, and because it depends upon the imputation of the consciousness that labels it. That is why the "I" exists in mere name only.

It is, in fact, this understanding that things exist only in dependence upon the imputation by the conventional consciousness that makes Madhyamika philosophy fit so well with quantum mechanics. The collapse of the wave function, which Heisenberg likens to the transition from the “possible” to the “actual,” only occurs upon the actual measurement or observation by the conscious observer. This means that this process of transition from the “possible” to the “actual” is a process of dependent arising that depends on the mind of the observer.

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Jeff H » Tue Dec 27, 2016 9:08 pm

cloudburst wrote:
Jeff H wrote: I guess I'm just not getting it. Conventionally the basis of designation for the I is the aggregates.

you are doing fine.

The self is like an illusion, the aggregates are taken as the basis upon which the self is imputed. Thus they are called "appropriated aggregates."
Yes, I agree with this, and I believe it is reasonable to take it on the authority of the teachers who have passed it down to me that this is a useful way to understand it and practice. I'm not giving that up.

However, I also believe Malcolm has authority on his side and I'd like to understand what he is saying is wrong with this formulation.

I just re-read a discussion in Longchenpa's Great Chariot, (chapter III.B.2.a "By knowing or not knowing what we are there are liberation or confusion") and it seems to be addressing exactly this. But I still can't see what is different between the "mere I" of Tsongkhapa and the "confused appearance of impure relativity" of Longchenpa. Having dispensed with true existence, we are still left with habitual appearances for constructing our suffering world or Dharma path.

I think that the following passage from the Bodhicharyavatara applies and can incorporate the mere I. As I interpret this, Shantideva says that Buddha taught about "things" for those of us who need a little extra help. But in fact we are only dealing with illusions, which account for both samsara and nirvana. At the entry level Buddha spoke as if things existed. Tsongkhapa's view is a little more nuanced by saying that we have to identify and negate the inherent I, but then, temporarily, we can work with the illusion-like mere I until we are ready to realize that it is just as illusory as the inherent I.
In chapter 9 Shantideva wrote:7. But that he might instruct the worldly,
Our Protector spoke of “things.”
But these in truth lack even momentariness.
Now if you say it’s wrong to claim the momentary as relative,

8. There is no fault. For momentariness
Is relative for yogis, but for worldly beings, ultimate.
Were it otherwise, the common view
Could fault the yogic insight into corporal impurity.

9. “Through a Buddha, who is but illusion, how does merit spring?”
As if the Buddha were existing truly.
“But,” you ask, “if beings are like illusions,
How, when dying, can they take rebirth?”

10. As long as the conditions are assembled,
Illusions, likewise, will persist and manifest.
Why, through simply being more protracted,
Should sentient beings be regarded as more real?
We who are like children shrink from pain but love its causes. - Shantideva

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Tsongkhapafan » Tue Dec 27, 2016 9:14 pm

It's hard to believe that someone like Malcolm who is so well studied could have such confused views about Chandrakirti. If the aggregates are not the basis of imputation for the self, what is? There's no self without them. That alone proves that the aggregates are the correct basis of imputation for the self.

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Caoimhghín » Tue Dec 27, 2016 10:26 pm

Tsongkhapafan wrote:It's hard to believe that someone like Malcolm who is so well studied could have such confused views about Chandrakirti. If the aggregates are not the basis of imputation for the self, what is? There's no self without them. That alone proves that the aggregates are the correct basis of imputation for the self.
This is a little passive-aggressive. If you want to address Malcolm, do it directly, right? Addressing an imaginary "all assembled" gives you artificial authoritative weight, because you single out Malcolm and claim ability to speak to "the all" about his behaviour, thus to represent the interests of the "all assembled", rather than talking to him directly, person-to-person, as another person, one not representing the "all assembled", right?
歸命本覺心法身常住妙法心蓮臺本來莊嚴三身徳三十七尊住心
城遠離因果法然具普門塵數諸三昧無邊徳海本圓滿還我頂禮心諸佛

In reverence for the root gnosis of the heart, the dharmakāya,
for the ever present good law of the heart, the lotus terrace,
for the inborn adornment of the trikāya, the thirty-seven sages dwelling in the heart,
for that which is removed from seed and fruit, the upright key to the universal gate,
for all boundless concentrations, the sea of virtue, the root perfection,
I prostrate, bowing to the hearts of all Buddhas.

胎藏金剛菩提心義略問答鈔, Treatise on the teaching of the gnostic heart of the womb and the diamond, T2397.1.470c5-8

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Matt J
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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Matt J » Tue Dec 27, 2016 10:40 pm

The difference that I see is that the Gelug presentation has a kind of a safety valve. It is like saying, "See, emptiness isn't that scary, things are still real, just not ultimately so." It feels like a sort of half measure and life can move on largely as it did before. But the full version is uncompromising. Everything is empty through and through.

Just thinking about that--- it is terrifying. There is no firm foundation for ANYTHING, no certainty, no safety, no security at all. Once this sinks in, and really sinks in, it pretty much upends everything we've been taught to believe our whole lives. It is like discovering that our entire experience is a machine generated illusion.

I like how Trungpa Rinpoche puts it: “The bad news is you’re falling through the air, nothing to hang on to, no parachute. The good news is there’s no ground.” A lot of people like this quote and tend to laugh, but there's a real sense of terror there.
Jeff H wrote: I just re-read a discussion in Longchenpa's Great Chariot, (chapter III.B.2.a "By knowing or not knowing what we are there are liberation or confusion") and it seems to be addressing exactly this. But I still can't see what is different between the "mere I" of Tsongkhapa and the "confused appearance of impure relativity" of Longchenpa. Having dispensed with true existence, we are still left with habitual appearances for constructing our suffering world or Dharma path.
"The essence of meditation practice is to let go of all your expectations about meditation. All the qualities of your natural mind -- peace, openness, relaxation, and clarity -- are present in your mind just as it is. You don't have to do anything different. You don't have to shift or change your awareness. All you have to do while observing your mind is to recognize the qualities it already has."
--- Yongey Mingyur Rinpoche

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by cloudburst » Tue Dec 27, 2016 11:21 pm

Matt J wrote:The difference that I see is that the Gelug presentation has a kind of a safety valve. It is like saying, "See, emptiness isn't that scary, things are still real, just not ultimately so." It feels like a sort of half measure and life can move on largely as it did before. But the full version is uncompromising. Everything is empty through and through.
the Gelug presentation is that everything is empty, through and through

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Re: How Madhyamika Philosophy Solves the Mystery of Quantum Physics

Post by Jeff H » Tue Dec 27, 2016 11:27 pm

Matt J wrote:The difference that I see is that the Gelug presentation has a kind of a safety valve. It is like saying, "See, emptiness isn't that scary, things are still real, just not ultimately so." It feels like a sort of half measure and life can move on largely as it did before. But the full version is uncompromising. Everything is empty through and through.
...

I like how Trungpa Rinpoche puts it: “The bad news is you’re falling through the air, nothing to hang on to, no parachute. The good news is there’s no ground.” A lot of people like this quote and tend to laugh, but there's a real sense of terror there.
I like your explanation and especially the Trungpa Rinpoche quote. When I started Tibetan Buddhism I had trouble accepting that I reify objects as permanent, unitary, and independent. Tsongkhapa addresses that, as Guy Newland explains in Introduction to Emptiness:
Guy Newland wrote:We are addicted to intrinsic nature, the idea that we exist by way of some built-in power to be. Since this habit causes us and those around us vast and needless misery, we have to begin by really seeing that we do have this problem. We have to identify the misconception that is the target of our analysis.

Through clinging to the illusion of a certain sort of self, we suffer again and again. By believing in that kind of self, we are trapped; by seeing that it does not exist, we will become free. Seeking spiritual liberation, we have to locate very precisely just that sense of a "real self" which is the root of our suffering. Tsong-kha-pa writes of this very clearly:
In order to be sure that a certain person is not present, you must know the absent person. Likewise, in order to be certain of the meaning of "selflessness" or the "lack of intrinsic existence," you must carefully identify the self, or intrinsic nature, that does not exist.
In other words, a crucial first step in the refutation of "self" or "essence" is to accurately identify the target of our arguments. Reason is a powerful tool; if we misidentify the target even slightly, we will probably refute too much or too little.

Guy Newland. Introduction to Emptiness: As Taught in Tsong-kha-pa's Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path (Kindle Locations 299-306). Kindle Edition.
We who are like children shrink from pain but love its causes. - Shantideva

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