Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

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Sherab
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Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Sherab »

I don't recall the Buddha actually using the Catuṣkoṭi form of analysis himself. I can only recall the Buddha using it only in relation to its use by his opponents.

Would appreciate if someone could provide examples in the Suttas or Sutras where the Buddha himself resorted to Catuṣkoṭi analysis in his teaching?
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by zerwe »

I am not certain that you will necessarily find examples in Sutra (or purported words of the Buddha himself-whatever that means, IDK).
The Catuskoti, at least in terms of actual examples from a textual source, I believe is primarily associated with Arya Nagarjuna.

Shaun :namaste:
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Aemilius »

Brahmaja sutta 2.27
'What is the fourth way? Here, an ascetic or Brahmin is dull and stupid. Because of his dullness and stupidity, when he is questioned he resorts to evasive statements and wriggles like an eel: "If you ask me whether there is another world. But I don't say so. And I don't say otherwise. And I don't say it is not, and I don't not say it is not." "Is there no other world?..." "Is there both another world and no other world?..."Is there neither another world nor no other world?..." "Are there spontaneously-born beings?..." "Are there not...?" "Both...? "Neither...?" "Does the Tathagata exist after death? Does he not exist after death? Does he both exist and not exist after death? Does he neither exist nor not exist after death?..." "If I thought so, I would say so...I don't say so...I don't say it is not." This is the fourth case.'[15]

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, by K. N. Jayatilleke, from the contents pages:
"Was the logic of four alternatives (the four-fold schema) an innovation of the Sceptics (157)? The first three schools of Sceptics mentioned in the Pali Nikayas (158-170). The similarity with Pyrrhonean scepticism (171-174). The fourth school of Sceptics (175-181). Two theories as to the origin of the four-fold schema (182-190). The relation of scepticism to the relativism (syavada) of the Jains (191-194). The rational origins of the main concepts of the Ajivikas (195-200). Their interest in causal arguments (201-208). Their use of reason (209-212). Their claims to mystical intuition (213-215) and belief in tradition (216). The three-fold schema and the three standpoints of the Trairasika Ajivikas (217-230). The main elements of the Jain theory of knowledge (231-243)."
svaha
"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Sarvē mānavāḥ svatantrāḥ samutpannāḥ vartantē api ca, gauravadr̥śā adhikāradr̥śā ca samānāḥ ēva vartantē. Ētē sarvē cētanā-tarka-śaktibhyāṁ susampannāḥ santi. Api ca, sarvē’pi bandhutva-bhāvanayā parasparaṁ vyavaharantu."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1. (in english and sanskrit)
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Sherab
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Sherab »

Aemilius wrote: Fri Aug 24, 2018 8:26 am Brahmaja sutta 2.27
'What is the fourth way? Here, an ascetic or Brahmin is dull and stupid. Because of his dullness and stupidity, when he is questioned he resorts to evasive statements and wriggles like an eel: "If you ask me whether there is another world. But I don't say so. And I don't say otherwise. And I don't say it is not, and I don't not say it is not." "Is there no other world?..." "Is there both another world and no other world?..."Is there neither another world nor no other world?..." "Are there spontaneously-born beings?..." "Are there not...?" "Both...? "Neither...?" "Does the Tathagata exist after death? Does he not exist after death? Does he both exist and not exist after death? Does he neither exist nor not exist after death?..." "If I thought so, I would say so...I don't say so...I don't say it is not." This is the fourth case.'[15]

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, by K. N. Jayatilleke, from the contents pages:
"Was the logic of four alternatives (the four-fold schema) an innovation of the Sceptics (157)? The first three schools of Sceptics mentioned in the Pali Nikayas (158-170). The similarity with Pyrrhonean scepticism (171-174). The fourth school of Sceptics (175-181). Two theories as to the origin of the four-fold schema (182-190). The relation of scepticism to the relativism (syavada) of the Jains (191-194). The rational origins of the main concepts of the Ajivikas (195-200). Their interest in causal arguments (201-208). Their use of reason (209-212). Their claims to mystical intuition (213-215) and belief in tradition (216). The three-fold schema and the three standpoints of the Trairasika Ajivikas (217-230). The main elements of the Jain theory of knowledge (231-243)."
I supposed the above meant that the Buddha never used it directly himself but only in relation to its used by others. This was my impression all along anyway.
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Aemilius »

Buddha himself is a Tathagata, and he describes the state of a Tathagata with the help of the catuskoti. So he talks about himself also. There is a lot about its place in buddhist logic, early and later, in K. N. Jayatilleke. He just goes on and on. One thing is that it was common property of the Shramana schools, i.e. the wandering nonvedic ascetics.
Buddha doesn't use it extensively, it seems to be disparaged somewhat, to distinguish himself from the other sramana teachers presumably. But not so much in some other sutras/suttas. Buddha himself says there are the unanswerable questions. How is he different from the "eelwrigglers" then? -One may ask. The catuskoti is used regularly in the list of unanswerable questions.
In the Mahayana Lankavatara sutra he says that the unanswerable questions are left aside for the beginners, but not so for the spiritually mature ascetics, persons or the bodhisattvas.
svaha
"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Sarvē mānavāḥ svatantrāḥ samutpannāḥ vartantē api ca, gauravadr̥śā adhikāradr̥śā ca samānāḥ ēva vartantē. Ētē sarvē cētanā-tarka-śaktibhyāṁ susampannāḥ santi. Api ca, sarvē’pi bandhutva-bhāvanayā parasparaṁ vyavaharantu."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1. (in english and sanskrit)
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Sherab
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Sherab »

Aemilius wrote: Fri Aug 24, 2018 12:25 pm Buddha himself is a Tathagata, and he describes the state of a Tathagata with the help of the catuskoti. So he talks about himself also. There is a lot about its place in buddhist logic, early and later, in K. N. Jayatilleke. He just goes on and on. One thing is that it was common property of the Shramana schools, i.e. the wandering nonvedic ascetics.
Buddha doesn't use it extensively, it seems to be disparaged somewhat, to distinguish himself from the other sramana teachers presumably. But not so much in some other sutras/suttas. Buddha himself says there are the unanswerable questions. How is he different from the "eelwrigglers" then? -One may ask. The catuskoti is used regularly in the list of unanswerable questions.
In the Mahayana Lankavatara sutra he says that the unanswerable questions are left aside for the beginners, but not so for the spiritually mature ascetics, persons or the bodhisattvas.
Read the quotation that you quoted again, but this time, pay attention to the punctuation marks such as colon and quotations marks. Like I said, the Buddha used it in relation to its use by others.
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Aemilius »

Have you read the whole Brahmajala sutta? It is about wrong views or about views. According to it you can never say for example "reincarnation " without committing to a wrong view or to a view at all!! Can anybody say anything without committing to a view? -Even Buddha himself! It is a wonderful sutra, much worth reading.

There is acollection of suttas that deals with this question in a more straightforward manner: the Avyakata-Samyutta: SN44.1, SN 44.2, SN 44.3, etc...to SN 44.11
Also Anuraadho sutta, SN 22.86
svaha
"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Sarvē mānavāḥ svatantrāḥ samutpannāḥ vartantē api ca, gauravadr̥śā adhikāradr̥śā ca samānāḥ ēva vartantē. Ētē sarvē cētanā-tarka-śaktibhyāṁ susampannāḥ santi. Api ca, sarvē’pi bandhutva-bhāvanayā parasparaṁ vyavaharantu."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1. (in english and sanskrit)
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Caoimhghín »

Aemilius wrote: Fri Aug 24, 2018 8:26 am Brahmaja sutta 2.27
'What is the fourth way? Here, an ascetic or Brahmin is dull and stupid. Because of his dullness and stupidity, when he is questioned he resorts to evasive statements and wriggles like an eel: "If you ask me whether there is another world. But I don't say so. And I don't say otherwise. And I don't say it is not, and I don't not say it is not." "Is there no other world?..." "Is there both another world and no other world?..."Is there neither another world nor no other world?..." "Are there spontaneously-born beings?..." "Are there not...?" "Both...? "Neither...?" "Does the Tathagata exist after death? Does he not exist after death? Does he both exist and not exist after death? Does he neither exist nor not exist after death?..." "If I thought so, I would say so...I don't say so...I don't say it is not." This is the fourth case.'[15]
This is position 4, the position of the eel-wrigglers, who have no position themselves, but evade evade answering questions like the holder of a basket of slippery eels (amaraviksheppa) might disturb it, that their position might seem more profound and subtle, as no one can grasp their "subtleties". Nowadays we might call it "moving the goalposts".
Then, the monks uttered this gāthā:

These bodies are like foam.
Them being frail, who can rejoice in them?
The Buddha attained the vajra-body.
Still, it becomes inconstant and ruined.
The many Buddhas are vajra-entities.
All are also subject to inconstancy.
Quickly ended, like melting snow --
how could things be different?

The Buddha passed into parinirvāṇa afterward.
(T1.27b10 Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra DĀ 2)
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Caoimhghín »

Coëmgenu wrote: Fri Aug 24, 2018 6:54 pmamaraviksheppa
amaravikṣepa, no geminated P, apologies.
Then, the monks uttered this gāthā:

These bodies are like foam.
Them being frail, who can rejoice in them?
The Buddha attained the vajra-body.
Still, it becomes inconstant and ruined.
The many Buddhas are vajra-entities.
All are also subject to inconstancy.
Quickly ended, like melting snow --
how could things be different?

The Buddha passed into parinirvāṇa afterward.
(T1.27b10 Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra DĀ 2)
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Sherab »

Aemilius wrote: Fri Aug 24, 2018 5:06 pm Have you read the whole Brahmajala sutta? It is about wrong views or about views. According to it you can never say for example "reincarnation " without committing to a wrong view or to a view at all!! Can anybody say anything without committing to a view? -Even Buddha himself! It is a wonderful sutra, much worth reading.

There is acollection of suttas that deals with this question in a more straightforward manner: the Avyakata-Samyutta: SN44.1, SN 44.2, SN 44.3, etc...to SN 44.11
Also Anuraadho sutta, SN 22.86
Whatever.
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Sherab »

Coëmgenu wrote: Fri Aug 24, 2018 6:54 pm
Aemilius wrote: Fri Aug 24, 2018 8:26 am Brahmaja sutta 2.27
'What is the fourth way? Here, an ascetic or Brahmin is dull and stupid. Because of his dullness and stupidity, when he is questioned he resorts to evasive statements and wriggles like an eel: "If you ask me whether there is another world. But I don't say so. And I don't say otherwise. And I don't say it is not, and I don't not say it is not." "Is there no other world?..." "Is there both another world and no other world?..."Is there neither another world nor no other world?..." "Are there spontaneously-born beings?..." "Are there not...?" "Both...? "Neither...?" "Does the Tathagata exist after death? Does he not exist after death? Does he both exist and not exist after death? Does he neither exist nor not exist after death?..." "If I thought so, I would say so...I don't say so...I don't say it is not." This is the fourth case.'[15]
This is position 4, the position of the eel-wrigglers, who have no position themselves, but evade evade answering questions like the holder of a basket of slippery eels (amaraviksheppa) might disturb it, that their position might seem more profound and subtle, as no one can grasp their "subtleties". Nowadays we might call it "moving the goalposts".
Glad someone understood.

You seem to be an academic to me. Do you think the Catuṣkoṭi makes sense as a method of analysis on its own?

Fyi, I don't. I think it creates confusion when the Catuṣkoṭi is used without the terms within it clearly defined. If the terms are clearly defined, the Catuṣkoṭi structure can be seen to contain redundancy and inadequacy as a method of analysis.

Because past Indian masters and current Buddhist masters do use the Catuṣkoṭi, I am interested to know if there were any instance of the Buddha himself using the Catuṣkoṭi analysis himself. His opponents certainly did.

My opinion is that the Buddha's opponents had fuzzy notions of existence and non existence (the area where the Catuṣkoṭi was applied). If they had clear idea of what is existence and what is non existence entailed, it seemed to me that their logic and reasoning were questionable.
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Caoimhghín »

Sherab wrote: Sat Aug 25, 2018 12:51 am
Coëmgenu wrote: Fri Aug 24, 2018 6:54 pm
Aemilius wrote: Fri Aug 24, 2018 8:26 am Brahmaja sutta 2.27
'What is the fourth way? Here, an ascetic or Brahmin is dull and stupid. Because of his dullness and stupidity, when he is questioned he resorts to evasive statements and wriggles like an eel: "If you ask me whether there is another world. But I don't say so. And I don't say otherwise. And I don't say it is not, and I don't not say it is not." "Is there no other world?..." "Is there both another world and no other world?..."Is there neither another world nor no other world?..." "Are there spontaneously-born beings?..." "Are there not...?" "Both...? "Neither...?" "Does the Tathagata exist after death? Does he not exist after death? Does he both exist and not exist after death? Does he neither exist nor not exist after death?..." "If I thought so, I would say so...I don't say so...I don't say it is not." This is the fourth case.'[15]
This is position 4, the position of the eel-wrigglers, who have no position themselves, but evade evade answering questions like the holder of a basket of slippery eels (amaraviksheppa) might disturb it, that their position might seem more profound and subtle, as no one can grasp their "subtleties". Nowadays we might call it "moving the goalposts".
Glad someone understood.

You seem to be an academic to me. Do you think the Catuṣkoṭi makes sense as a method of analysis on its own?

Fyi, I don't. I think it creates confusion when the Catuṣkoṭi is used without the terms within it clearly defined. If the terms are clearly defined, the Catuṣkoṭi structure can be seen to contain redundancy and inadequacy as a method of analysis.

Because past Indian masters and current Buddhist masters do use the Catuṣkoṭi, I am interested to know if there were any instance of the Buddha himself using the Catuṣkoṭi analysis himself. His opponents certainly did.

My opinion is that the Buddha's opponents had fuzzy notions of existence and non existence (the area where the Catuṣkoṭi was applied). If they had clear idea of what is existence and what is non existence entailed, it seemed to me that their logic and reasoning were questionable.
IMO catuṣkoṭi is a more complete, more fleshed-out version, of the various "Noble Silences" of the Buddha.

The Buddha simply never met an equivocator so thorough he required all four negations in the same sitting afaik.

But you can find it individually in a lot of places.

Like in the Attakārīsutta, that has positions 1-3 outlined.
Then, the monks uttered this gāthā:

These bodies are like foam.
Them being frail, who can rejoice in them?
The Buddha attained the vajra-body.
Still, it becomes inconstant and ruined.
The many Buddhas are vajra-entities.
All are also subject to inconstancy.
Quickly ended, like melting snow --
how could things be different?

The Buddha passed into parinirvāṇa afterward.
(T1.27b10 Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra DĀ 2)
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Caoimhghín »

Incidentally, the "Noble Silence" itself is position 4, the eel-wriggler's.

The difference is that the amaravikṣepa has no thesis, and the Buddha, allegedly, has a thesis, which is dependent origination.

That is really the only thing separating the Buddhas and the eel-wrigglers.

Of course, above, when I said, "the Buddha, allegedly, has a thesis," the "a position, Vacchagotta, is something that the Tathāgata has done away with" (severe paraphrase) quote came to mind.

Is "no thesis" itself a thesis?

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Sherab wrote: Sat Aug 25, 2018 12:51 amI think it creates confusion when the Catuṣkoṭi is used without the terms within it clearly defined. If the terms are clearly defined, the Catuṣkoṭi structure can be seen to contain redundancy and inadequacy as a method of analysis.
I should ask if you are talking about the fourfold or eightfold negations in the above statement. I agree that the eightfold negation is a scholastic excess, but where are the redundancies in the fourfold negation?
Last edited by Caoimhghín on Sat Aug 25, 2018 4:38 am, edited 1 time in total.
Then, the monks uttered this gāthā:

These bodies are like foam.
Them being frail, who can rejoice in them?
The Buddha attained the vajra-body.
Still, it becomes inconstant and ruined.
The many Buddhas are vajra-entities.
All are also subject to inconstancy.
Quickly ended, like melting snow --
how could things be different?

The Buddha passed into parinirvāṇa afterward.
(T1.27b10 Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra DĀ 2)
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Sherab »

Coëmgenu wrote: Sat Aug 25, 2018 3:45 am Incidentally, the "Noble Silence" itself is position 4, the eel-wriggler's.

The difference is that the amaravikṣepa has no thesis, and the Buddha, allegedly, has a thesis, which is dependent origination.

That is really the only thing separating the Buddhas and the eel-wrigglers.

Of course, above, when I said, "the Buddha, allegedly, has a thesis," the "a position, Vacchagotta, is something that the Tathāgata has done away with" (severe paraphrase) quote came to mind.

Is "no thesis" itself a thesis?

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Sherab wrote: Sat Aug 25, 2018 12:51 amI think it creates confusion when the Catuṣkoṭi is used without the terms within it clearly defined. If the terms are clearly defined, the Catuṣkoṭi structure can be seen to contain redundancy and inadequacy as a method of analysis.
I should ask if you are talking about the fourfold or eightfold negations in the above statement. I agree that the eightfold negation is a scholastic excess, but where are the redundancies in the fourfold negation?
The usual Catuṣkoṭi structure:
(a) A
(b) NOT A
(c) A AND NOT A
(d) NOT (A OR NOT A)

Case I
Assume A is identical to NOT NOT A …… (1)
Then X is A and X is not A cover all unique possibilities.
But if you use the Catuṣkoṭi structure, then (a) and (b) are okay, but (c) is all possibilities and (d) is outside of all possibilities.

Case II
Assume A and B where A and B are mutually exclusive
Assume (1) holds for A and for B. Then X is A, X is B, X is not (A OR B) cover all unique possibilities
But if you use the Catuṣkoṭi structure and substituting A with A and substituting NOT A with B, then (a) and (b) are okay but (c) is flawed because it is not a possibility.

Case III
Assume A and B where A and B are not mutually exclusive.
Assume (1) holds for A and B. Then X is (A AND NOT B), X is (B AND NOT A), X is (A AND B), X is (NOT A OR NOT B) cover all unique possibilities.
But if you use the Catuṣkoṭi structure and substituting A with A and substituting NOT A with B, then except for (c), the others are all imprecise.
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

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Coëmgenu wrote: Sat Aug 25, 2018 3:45 am Incidentally, the "Noble Silence" itself is position 4, the eel-wriggler's.

The difference is that the amaravikṣepa has no thesis, and the Buddha, allegedly, has a thesis, which is dependent origination.

That is really the only thing separating the Buddhas and the eel-wrigglers.

Of course, above, when I said, "the Buddha, allegedly, has a thesis," the "a position, Vacchagotta, is something that the Tathāgata has done away with" (severe paraphrase) quote came to mind.

Is "no thesis" itself a thesis?
I presume you’re familiar with the fact that Nāgārjuna says that he maintains no thesis of his own? [Which is the point of ‘the emptiness of emptiness’.] The point of the tetralemma is wholly deconstructive i.e. to show the contradictions in the opponent’s view. But, he says, this can be done without actually advancing a view of one’s own. Or so I understand.
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Caoimhghín »

Wayfarer wrote: Sat Aug 25, 2018 8:49 am
Coëmgenu wrote: Sat Aug 25, 2018 3:45 am Incidentally, the "Noble Silence" itself is position 4, the eel-wriggler's.

The difference is that the amaravikṣepa has no thesis, and the Buddha, allegedly, has a thesis, which is dependent origination.

That is really the only thing separating the Buddhas and the eel-wrigglers.

Of course, above, when I said, "the Buddha, allegedly, has a thesis," the "a position, Vacchagotta, is something that the Tathāgata has done away with" (severe paraphrase) quote came to mind.

Is "no thesis" itself a thesis?
I presume you’re familiar with the fact that Nāgārjuna says that he maintains no thesis of his own? [Which is the point of ‘the emptiness of emptiness’.] The point of the tetralemma is wholly deconstructive i.e. to show the contradictions in the opponent’s view. But, he says, this can be done without actually advancing a view of one’s own. Or so I understand.
Hence my "is no thesis it's own thesis?"
Then, the monks uttered this gāthā:

These bodies are like foam.
Them being frail, who can rejoice in them?
The Buddha attained the vajra-body.
Still, it becomes inconstant and ruined.
The many Buddhas are vajra-entities.
All are also subject to inconstancy.
Quickly ended, like melting snow --
how could things be different?

The Buddha passed into parinirvāṇa afterward.
(T1.27b10 Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra DĀ 2)
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Caoimhghín »

Sherab wrote: Sat Aug 25, 2018 8:33 am
Coëmgenu wrote: Sat Aug 25, 2018 3:45 am Incidentally, the "Noble Silence" itself is position 4, the eel-wriggler's.

The difference is that the amaravikṣepa has no thesis, and the Buddha, allegedly, has a thesis, which is dependent origination.

That is really the only thing separating the Buddhas and the eel-wrigglers.

Of course, above, when I said, "the Buddha, allegedly, has a thesis," the "a position, Vacchagotta, is something that the Tathāgata has done away with" (severe paraphrase) quote came to mind.

Is "no thesis" itself a thesis?

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Sherab wrote: Sat Aug 25, 2018 12:51 amI think it creates confusion when the Catuṣkoṭi is used without the terms within it clearly defined. If the terms are clearly defined, the Catuṣkoṭi structure can be seen to contain redundancy and inadequacy as a method of analysis.
I should ask if you are talking about the fourfold or eightfold negations in the above statement. I agree that the eightfold negation is a scholastic excess, but where are the redundancies in the fourfold negation?
The usual Catuṣkoṭi structure:
(a) A
(b) NOT A
(c) A AND NOT A
(d) NOT (A OR NOT A)

Case I
Assume A is identical to NOT NOT A …… (1)
Then X is A and X is not A cover all unique possibilities.
You will have to rewind for me.

The first possibility is affirmation, the second is negation, and the last two are ways of suggesting "something else". Either a combination of 1 & 2 or something else altogether (4).

How are 3 & 4 not unique ways to suggest "something else" than options 1 & 2?
Then, the monks uttered this gāthā:

These bodies are like foam.
Them being frail, who can rejoice in them?
The Buddha attained the vajra-body.
Still, it becomes inconstant and ruined.
The many Buddhas are vajra-entities.
All are also subject to inconstancy.
Quickly ended, like melting snow --
how could things be different?

The Buddha passed into parinirvāṇa afterward.
(T1.27b10 Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra DĀ 2)
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Wayfarer »

Coëmgenu wrote: Sat Aug 25, 2018 9:52 amHence my "is no thesis it's own thesis?"
Only if you make something of it. :smile:
'Only practice with no gaining idea' ~ Suzuki Roshi
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Caoimhghín
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Caoimhghín »

Wayfarer wrote: Sat Aug 25, 2018 10:31 am
Coëmgenu wrote: Sat Aug 25, 2018 9:52 amHence my "is no thesis it's own thesis?"
Only if you make something of it. :smile:
Is Buddhahood "something"? :smile: :spy:
Then, the monks uttered this gāthā:

These bodies are like foam.
Them being frail, who can rejoice in them?
The Buddha attained the vajra-body.
Still, it becomes inconstant and ruined.
The many Buddhas are vajra-entities.
All are also subject to inconstancy.
Quickly ended, like melting snow --
how could things be different?

The Buddha passed into parinirvāṇa afterward.
(T1.27b10 Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra DĀ 2)
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Re: Catuṣkoṭi analysis used by the Buddha himself

Post by Wayfarer »

I could respond by saying ‘if it’s something, then it’s “eternalism”, if it’s nothing, then it’s “nihilism”. I hope that is not too trite an answer. But a verse does come to mind here:
any physical form by which one describing the Tathagata would describe him: That the Tathagata has abandoned, its root destroyed, made like a palmyra stump, deprived of the conditions of development, not destined for future arising. Freed from the classification of form, Vaccha, the Tathagata is deep, boundless, hard to fathom, like the sea. 'Reappears' doesn't apply. 'Does not reappear' doesn't apply. 'Both does & does not reappear' doesn't apply. 'Neither reappears nor does not reappear' doesn't apply
aggi-vachagotta-sutta.

So, we ought not to try and ‘pin the tathagatha down’ as existing or not existing. Logic itself, ‘it exists’, ‘it doesn’t exist’, pertains to the phenomenal domain, the realm of becoming, where things come into and pass out of existence. Whereas the tathagatha is ‘thus gone’, not within scope of logical affirmation and negation. Hence the tetralemma and the whole logic of the middle way.
'Only practice with no gaining idea' ~ Suzuki Roshi
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