Ideally. You're just telling me what the manual says, not how real life works.
In real life, when you have a vow not to kill, and you kill, the demerit is stronger, much stronger, than if you did not have such a vow. The merit of refraining from killing is likewise much stronger
If you want to be a śramaṇa and behave like one, then you're a śramaṇa, i.e., a monk. If you're a student of the Buddha's teachings, you're a Buddhist monk. You don't need anyone's consent or acknowledgement to be a śramaṇa.
To be a Buddhist śramanera, in fact you do. Otherwise, one is merely engaging in personal fabrications.
And all their preceptors and their own going back twenty-some centuries were all having intact vows?
In the case of Tibetan ordination lineages, this is the case. I can't speak about those in other transmissions.
You once said samaya is a social construct. How can you argue that while saying ordination is not?
Ordination has no meaning outside of its social context, just like Samaya. Just like Samaya, it too is a tradition, a transmission, from awakened people. Like samaya, ordination is a species of contract between the one who imparts the vow and the vow holder.
I never said however that Samaya was not important. It is. How it is understood differs in different tantras. You can make the same argument for pratimokṣa vows, but in order to have them modified by bodhisattva vows, first you must have received pratimokṣa vows.
Thus far, we have only been dealing pratimokṣa vows. We have not been considering the way in which bodhisattva vows and even samaya vows affect one's basic pratimokṣa vows.
In principle, I think it is too hard to be a Buddhist monk in this day and age. I never said we should abandon the bodhisattva trainings or Vajrayāna contracts.