The attainment of the Arhats

[Malcolm]

But to realize the emptiness of self you have to have some understanding of the emptiness of aggregates that make up the self, no?

The argument is that since in Hinayana the focus is on the method of recognising that there are only the aggregates but no self, they take the aggregates to be substantial. However, if we think about this a bit, this reasoning doesn't hold up, because shravakas need to realise that the aggregates are neither self nor the possessions of a self, so to say that they are regarded as substantial contradicts the teachings.

Non sequitur. Understanding that there is no ghost in the machine is a not a refutation or negation of the machine's substantiality.

Similarly, as in the Lankavatara Sutra, there is the argument that shravakas do not know that there is no grasping and no grasped, but that is again refutable once we consider that without attachment to the aggregates there is no basis any more for such a duality. Hence what is called the shravakayana in Mahayana scriptures refers practitioners who misunderstood things, and not what is actually found in the Hinayana works.

Hahaha, this is again a very poor argument. Becoming free from the clinging to the aggregates is possible merely through understanding they are impermanent. There is no need for a nondual understanding to attain arhatship, much less stream-entry.

[Astus]

Understanding that there is no ghost in the machine is a not a refutation or negation of the machine's substantiality.

The machine is not the cause of the problems, it is the illusion of the ghost. Once there is no clinging, how could it matter what the status of something is? Even the concepts about the machine are let go of.

Becoming free from the clinging to the aggregates is possible merely through understanding they are impermanent. There is no need for a nondual understanding to attain arhatship, much less stream-entry.

Understanding impermanence is the path, abandonment of all attachments is the result. The point is that without attachment there is no basis for any view.

[Malcolm]

Understanding that there is no ghost in the machine is a not a refutation or negation of the machine's substantiality.

The machine is not the cause of the problems, it is the illusion of the ghost. Once there is no clinging, how could it matter what the status of something is? Even the concepts about the machine are let go of.

Not necessarily.

Becoming free from the clinging to the aggregates is possible merely through understanding they are impermanent. There is no need for a nondual understanding to attain arhatship, much less stream-entry.

Understanding impermanence is the path, abandonment of all attachments is the result. The point is that without attachment there is no basis for any view.

This does not necessarily follow. One may have no attachments, but this still does not preclude one from imputing substantiality to this or that dharma.

[Astus]

One may have no attachments, but this still does not preclude one from imputing substantiality to this or that dharma.

Even if one free from attachments would have an incorrect assumption about something, it would be an assumption not grasped at.

This reminds me of a Zen story (GG 13).

One day Tokusan went down toward the dining room, holding his bowls.Seppo met him and asked, "Where are you off to with your bowls? The bell has not rung, and the drum has not sounded." Tokusan turned and went back to his room.
Seppo mentioned this to Ganto, who remarked, "Tokusan is renowned, but he does not know the last word."
Tokusan heard about this remark and sent his attendant to fetch Ganto. "You do not approve of me?" he asked. Ganto whispered his meaning.
Tokusan said nothing at the time, but the next day he ascended the rostrum, and behold! he was very different from usual!
Ganto, going toward the front of the hall, clapped his hands and laughed loudly, saying, "Congratulations! Our old man has got hold of the last word! From now on, nobody in this whole country can outdo him!"

[Malcolm]

One may have no attachments, but this still does not preclude one from imputing substantiality to this or that dharma.

Even if one free from attachments would have an incorrect assumption about something, it would be an assumption not grasped at.

It is nevertheless incorrect, and therefore, it is not surprising in the least that Arhats have a incomplete understanding of emptiness, which is the point of this whole exchange.

[Astus]

It is nevertheless incorrect, and therefore, it is not surprising in the least that Arhats have a incomplete understanding of emptiness, which is the point of this whole exchange.

If by emptiness you refer to a conceptual explanation, yes, there can be misunderstandings. But if you mean freedom from the four extreme views, then they are necessarily free from those.

[Malcolm]

It is nevertheless incorrect, and therefore, it is not surprising in the least that Arhats have a incomplete understanding of emptiness, which is the point of this whole exchange.

If by emptiness you refer to a conceptual explanation, yes, there can be misunderstandings. But if you mean freedom from the four extreme views, then they are necessarily free from those.

You have not shown this to be so. In other words, there is a disconnect between your assertion that arhats are free from clinging to their aggregates and your assertion that they realize emptiness free from the four extremes.

The emptiness the arhats realize is the implicative emptiness described in the Cullasunatta sūtra; not the nonimplicative emptiness of the Perfection of Wisdom.

But you feel free to believe whatever warms your heart.

[Astus]

You have not shown this to be so. In other words, there is a disconnect between your assertion that arhats are free from clinging to their aggregates and your assertion that they realize emptiness free from the four extremes.

The four extreme views are concepts. Concepts are within the domain of the aggregates. Arhats do not cling to the aggregates, hence they cannot have the four extreme views. Where is the disconnect here?

[Malcolm]

You have not shown this to be so. In other words, there is a disconnect between your assertion that arhats are free from clinging to their aggregates and your assertion that they realize emptiness free from the four extremes.

The four extreme views are concepts. Concepts are within the domain of the aggregates. Arhats do not cling to the aggregates, hence they cannot have the four extreme views. Where is the disconnect here?

Arhats have the view that aggregates exist. But they do not cling to them. That is your disconnect.

[Admin_PC]

You have not shown this to be so. In other words, there is a disconnect between your assertion that arhats are free from clinging to their aggregates and your assertion that they realize emptiness free from the four extremes.

The four extreme views are concepts. Concepts are within the domain of the aggregates. Arhats do not cling to the aggregates, hence they cannot have the four extreme views. Where is the disconnect here?

Arhats have the view that aggregates exist. But they do not cling to them. That is your disconnect.

Would Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga be representative of the Arhat view/stance?

[Malcolm]

The four extreme views are concepts. Concepts are within the domain of the aggregates. Arhats do not cling to the aggregates, hence they cannot have the four extreme views. Where is the disconnect here?

Arhats have the view that aggregates exist. But they do not cling to them. That is your disconnect.

Would Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga be representative of the Arhat view/stance?

Yes, considering that atoms in that text are considered illustrative of ultimate dharmas, etc.

[Admin_PC]

Yes, considering that atoms in that text are considered illustrative of ultimate dharmas, etc.

Actually, I was thinking of Chapter XXI and the 8 Knowledges in regards to the 5 skandhas...

“And he who looks upon the world
As one who looks upon a bubble,
As one who looks upon a mirage,
Is out of sight of Death the King” (Dhp 170).

...

"He sees both the sign and the occurrence as empty, vain, void, without power
or guide, like an empty village, a mirage, a goblin city, etc., when he brings
[them] to mind as not-self, and so the sign and occurrence appear to him as a
terror."

...

"He sees all formations as not-self for the following reasons: because they are
alien, empty, vain, void, ownerless, with no Overlord, with none to wield power
over them, and so on."

---------

However, I'm not making the case that this is the same as the realization of the emptiness of all dharmas.

[Astus]

Arhats have the view that aggregates exist. But they do not cling to them. That is your disconnect.

If one has a view but does not cling to that view, does one actually have a view? For instance, an arhat has the view that a particular robe is his, still, it is not a view that binds him. Similarly, all teachings are recognised as pointing to liberation, and not something that one should remain attached to.

[Malcolm]

Arhats have the view that aggregates exist. But they do not cling to them. That is your disconnect.

If one has a view but does not cling to that view, does one actually have a view? For instance, an arhat has the view that a particular robe is his, still, it is not a view that binds him. Similarly, all teachings are recognised as pointing to liberation, and not something that one should remain attached to.

The question is not whether they are bound. The question is "what kind of realization is necessary for freedom from rebirth?" The answer is: "Not very deep."

[Schrödinger’s Yidam]

I just came across this in my reading. From "Ornament of Precious Liberation" by Gompopa, p.284 (It's a new translation of "Jewel Ornament of Liberation".)

The qualities emerging from a little relation of dharmakaya are all the qualities of purification, clear cognition, supernatural ability, and so for of realized sravaka arhats.

He goes on to say that partial realization of dharmakaya equates to pratyekabuddha arhats, nearly complete realization to bodhisattvas, etc.

[Astus]

The question is not whether they are bound. The question is "what kind of realization is necessary for freedom from rebirth?" The answer is: "Not very deep."

How is that the question? What realisation is deeper/higher then what is free from all attachments, hence also free from conceptual proliferation?

[Lucas Oliveira]

The question is not whether they are bound. The question is "what kind of realization is necessary for freedom from rebirth?" The answer is: "Not very deep."

How is that the question? What realisation is deeper/higher then what is free from all attachments, hence also free from conceptual proliferation?

[Schrödinger’s Yidam]

He talks about arhats at 32 minutes.

https://livestream.com/wisdompublicatio ... /151361050

[Malcolm]

The question is not whether they are bound. The question is "what kind of realization is necessary for freedom from rebirth?" The answer is: "Not very deep."

How is that the question? What realisation is deeper/higher then what is free from all attachments, hence also free from conceptual proliferation?

Freedom from attachments does not equal freedom from proliferation. If it did, arhats would be omniscient. They also could not fall back from the state of arhatship, but some do.

[Astus]

Freedom from attachments does not equal freedom from proliferation.

When no concepts grasped, how can there be proliferation?

"There's no trail in space,
no outside contemplative.
People are smitten with objectifications (papanca),
but devoid of objectification (nippapanca) are the Tathagatas."
(Dhp 18.254)

If it did, arhats would be omniscient. They also could not fall back from the state of arhatship, but some do.

Those are clearly problematic points, but secondary.