What are the General Mahayana Teachings?

[Malcolm]

the field of sentient beings is called the sattvadhātu and the field of emptiness is called the dharmatā-dhātu (dharmadhātu for short).

Why is the sattvadhātu then not the sattvatādhātu?

The only attestation I can find of the internet for the usage of the term dharmatādhātu is in your own translation of Treasury of Ati. I am not doubting the term, but I am wondering its source.

There is another conversation on DharmaWheel that I found that addresses this. The Tibetan chos nyid dbyings is specifically dharmatādhātu not dharmadhātu, correct?

Could the poor attestation of dharmatādhātu on the internet be because of the availability of Sanskrit texts available romanized? Are the texts that contain usage of dharmatādhātu only extant in Tibetan? Do you know if any of these texts would also be in Chinese? I am wondering how they translated the term.

The term itself is mainly confined to the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, but you can see many sūtras where the term dharmatā is systematically related to dharmadhātu. For example, the Bodhisattvapitika sutra among others makes the following statement:

That dharmatā should be understood to be a place, therefore, the dharmadhātu is called "a place."

Or, The Sarvabuddha-viṣayāvatāra-jñānālokālaṃkāra-sūtra states:

Whether the tathāgatas arise or not, dharmatā, dharmasthitikatā, and this dharmadhātu are only places.

The equivalence of this trio is repeated over and over again in the order, dharmatā, dharmadhātu and dharmasthitikatā.

There are further uses in Tantric literature but I generally exclude those here.

[Astus]

But also: the āgamāḥ do not necessarily equal "śrāvaka Buddhadharma". Śrāvaka Buddhadharma is also Abhidharma, treatises, etc.

If it is said that sravakas do not see the emptiness of dharmas, but believe that dharmas are self-existent, and that belief is taught not in the agamas but in the abhidharma, then which abhidharma is taught by the Buddha before the Mahayana sutras?

[Astus]

The Great Discourse on the Emptiness of Dharmas and it analogue do not really discuss the emptiness of phenomena, it refers to the emptiness of persons.

It might not be the best example, but that's how it is interpreted in the MPPS. And there is a reason to say that it confirms the emptiness of appearances, because it talks of how there is no self in dependent origination, in other words, appearances are empty.

[Malcolm]

The Great Discourse on the Emptiness of Dharmas and it analogue do not really discuss the emptiness of phenomena, it refers to the emptiness of persons.

It might not be the best example, but that's how it is interpreted in the MPPS. And there is a reason to say that it confirms the emptiness of appearances, because it talks of how there is no self in dependent origination, in other words, appearances are empty.

One can infer the selflessness of phenomena from teachings in the Agamas, but it is not directly taught there.

[Astus]

One can infer the selflessness of phenomena from teachings in the Agamas, but it is not directly taught there.

Nor is it taught that they are self-existent, hence nothing to oppose the emptiness of appearances to. And as far as the aggregates and sense-areas go, they are taught to be without self many times.

[Malcolm]

One can infer the selflessness of phenomena from teachings in the Agamas, but it is not directly taught there.

Nor is it taught that they are self-existent, hence nothing to oppose the emptiness of appearances to. And as far as the aggregates and sense-areas go, they are taught to be without self many times.

This the selflessness of the person, not of phenomena.

[Astus]

This the selflessness of the person, not of phenomena.

The selflessness of person is that there is no person, only the aggregates, while the selflessness of phenomena is that the aggregates themselves are without essence. The sutra talks about how phenomena themselves are dependent and without any will of their own, so it matches what the Lankavatara Sutra (2.24, tr Red Pine) says: "And what does it mean to know that dharmas have no self? It means to be aware that the self-existence of the skandhas, dhatus, and ayatanas is imaginary, that the skandhas, dhatus, and ayatanas are devoid of a self or anything that belongs to a self, that the skandhas, dhatus, and ayatanas are assemblages tied to desire and karma and that they arise from the interplay of conditions but are themselves passive, and that all dharmas are like this."

[Malcolm]

This the selflessness of the person, not of phenomena.

The selflessness of person is that there is no person, only the aggregates, while the selflessness of phenomena is that the aggregates themselves are without essence. The sutra talks about how phenomena themselves are dependent and without any will of their own, so it matches what the Lankavatara Sutra (2.24, tr Red Pine) says: "And what does it mean to know that dharmas have no self? It means to be aware that the self-existence of the skandhas, dhatus, and ayatanas is imaginary, that the skandhas, dhatus, and ayatanas are devoid of a self or anything that belongs to a self, that the skandhas, dhatus, and ayatanas are assemblages tied to desire and karma and that they arise from the interplay of conditions but are themselves passive, and that all dharmas are like this."

The main point, Astus, is that even though the selflessness of phenomena may be briefly mentioned in Agama and Nikaya texts, it is not extensively mentioned in these texts. On this point, Candrakīrti cites Nāgārjuna's Lokātītastava:

You have said there is no liberation without realizing the signless,
therefore, you have taught this completely in the Mahāyāna.

[Astus]

it is not extensively mentioned in these texts.

And the reason for that is that dharmas are not taught to have/be svabhava in them either, furthermore, even the concept of dharma as a fundamental element is missing. And according to Bhikkhu Bodhi (Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, p 3): "Even in the Abhidhamma Pitaka itself the dhamma theory is not yet expressed as an explicit philosophical tenet; this comes only later, in the Commentaries."

[Malcolm]

it is not extensively mentioned in these texts.

And the reason for that is that dharmas are not taught to have/be svabhava in them either, furthermore, even the concept of dharma as a fundamental element is missing. And according to Bhikkhu Bodhi (Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, p 3): "Even in the Abhidhamma Pitaka itself the dhamma theory is not yet expressed as an explicit philosophical tenet; this comes only later, in the Commentaries."

I think you mean that the Mahāyāna taught extensively on absence of self in phenomena as a remedy to Sarvastivadin, etc., assertions of svalakṣana and svabhāva, assertions absent in so-called Early Buddhism. Whatever the case may be, the issue is not addressed at length in the Nikayas/Agamas.

[Astus]

Whatever the case may be, the issue is not addressed at length in the Nikayas/Agamas.

So it is.

[Malcolm]

Whatever the case may be, the issue is not addressed at length in the Nikayas/Agamas.

So it is.

Another thing is that since the issue is not sufficiently addressed at length, people were able to invent these intrinsic characteristics and so on -- no wonder Mahāyānis had doubts about an arhat's awakening.

[ivette18]

For a beginner the general Mahayana teaching to know are Karma, Nirvana and enlightenment.

[Caoimhghín]

This the selflessness of the person, not of phenomena.

The selflessness of person is that there is no person, only the aggregates, while the selflessness of phenomena is that the aggregates themselves are without essence. The sutra talks about how phenomena themselves are dependent and without any will of their own, so it matches what the Lankavatara Sutra (2.24, tr Red Pine) says: "And what does it mean to know that dharmas have no self? It means to be aware that the self-existence of the skandhas, dhatus, and ayatanas is imaginary, that the skandhas, dhatus, and ayatanas are devoid of a self or anything that belongs to a self, that the skandhas, dhatus, and ayatanas are assemblages tied to desire and karma and that they arise from the interplay of conditions but are themselves passive, and that all dharmas are like this."

The main point, Astus, is that even though the selflessness of phenomena may be briefly mentioned in Agama and Nikaya texts, it is not extensively mentioned in these texts.

Venerble Huifeng wrote a whole paper disagreeing with what seems to be your position. I'm not saying he's right on account of that, anyone can write a "whole paper", but it might provide some interesting points.