What are the General Mahayana Teachings?

[Josef]

Buddhahood is all beings' destiny. There are uncountable beings helping you get there.

According to the Mahayana

[Malcolm]

The two selflessnesses are the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena.

If I may, how does the literature in question differentiate between these two selflessnesses?

My guess is that the selflessness of persons refers to the lack of an essential self in the five skandha whereas the selflessness of phenomena has to do with their dependently arisen nature, but naught to do with the skandha. One could argue that the selflessness of persons is also included in the selflessness of phenomena.

Oh, but you asked for an example from literature, so you must excuse my interjection.

Citing the commentary on this sūtra by Jñānaśribhadra:

"All of that which exists is momentary, like the sound of a finger snap or a waterfall. There is no self in persons since the permanent does not arise, it cannot be held to exist, that is, like the son of a barren women and so on. The absence of self in phenomena is the qualities of form and so on such as thick and thin that are analytically destroyed with discerning wisdom (prajñā) and become empty like a house, a village, a forest, and so on."

[Grigoris]

So it is talking about the emptiness of characteristics when referring to phenomena?

[Malcolm]

So it is talking about the emptiness of characteristics when referring to phenomena?

Another way of understanding it is that proliferation occurs because of not seeing the selflessness of phenomena. Bhavaviveka writes in his MMK commentary:

Whatever concepts cause karma and afflictions, since those arise from proliferation, those are called "from proliferation," that is, they arises from the proliferation of the characteristic of strong attachment to conventional truth.

If it is what can stop that proliferation, proliferation, as it is said, "is stopped by emptiness."... it is stopped by realizing the characteristic of the selflessness of phenomena."

He says more but I don't have time to translate it for you.

[Grigoris]

So it is talking about the emptiness of characteristics when referring to phenomena?

Another way of understanding it is that proliferation occurs because of not seeing the selflessness of phenomena. Bhavaviveka writes in his MMK commentary:

Whatever concepts cause karma and afflictions, since those arise from proliferation, those are called "from proliferation," that is, they arises from the proliferation of the characteristic of strong attachment to conventional truth.

If it is what can stop that proliferation, proliferation, as it is said, "is stopped by emptiness."... it is stopped by realizing the characteristic of the selflessness of phenomena."

He says more but I don't have time to translate it for you.

Thanks for the effort.

It seems like a fine distinction based on the fact that there was no conception of an atman in phenomena anyway, so the Buddha's teaching on anatman was not enough to cover the emptiness of phenomena too. Seems to me that the emptiness of persons is covered by the emptiness of characteristics of phenomena, like it is a subset of this conception of emptiness.

[Malcolm]

So it is talking about the emptiness of characteristics when referring to phenomena?

Another way of understanding it is that proliferation occurs because of not seeing the selflessness of phenomena. Bhavaviveka writes in his MMK commentary:

Whatever concepts cause karma and afflictions, since those arise from proliferation, those are called "from proliferation," that is, they arises from the proliferation of the characteristic of strong attachment to conventional truth.

If it is what can stop that proliferation, proliferation, as it is said, "is stopped by emptiness."... it is stopped by realizing the characteristic of the selflessness of phenomena."

He says more but I don't have time to translate it for you.

Thanks for the effort.

It seems like a fine distinction based on the fact that there was no conception of an atman in phenomena so the Buddha's teaching on anatman was not enough to cover the emptiness of phenomena too.

Yes, this is the observation made about Nikaya/Agama sūtras.

Seems to me that the emptiness of persons is covered by the emptiness of characteristics of phenomena, like it is a subset of this conception of emptiness.

Well, I think this difference is that a person never arose; there is no such thing as an atman, which is why Jñānaśribhadra compared an atman with something permanent that does not arise, hence it does not exist at all, like the son of a barren women, etc. The selflessness of phenomena on the other hand is the recognition of that karma and affliction arise from proliferation due to clinging to conventional truth, i.e. clinging to functional phenomena. The first, the absence of self in persons is coarse; realizing it eliminates the afflictive obscuration; the second, the absence of self in phenomena is more subtle, and when realized, eliminates the knowledge obscuration.

[Caoimhghín]

atman in phenomena

Its called dharmadhātu, but they emptied all of its ātman, so no one needs to worry about that stuff sneaking into their Buddhism.

I'm sure.

[Malcolm]

atman in phenomena

Its called dharmadhātu...

Umm, no. The dharmadhātu, in Mahāyāna terms, is the emptiness of all phenomena. Dharmatā is the emptiness of a specific entity.

[Caoimhghín]

atman in phenomena

Its called dharmadhātu...

Umm, no. The dharmadhātu, in Mahāyāna terms, is the emptiness of all phenomena.

Yes. This is what I said. I made a joke about "its" ātman having been emptied by "someone".

[Malcolm]

Its called dharmadhātu...

Umm, no. The dharmadhātu, in Mahāyāna terms, is the emptiness of all phenomena.

Yes. This is what I said. I made a joke about "its" ātman having been emptied by "someone".

I wish there was an emoticon which clearly indicated that one was humorless.

Perhaps

[Caoimhghín]

Umm, no. The dharmadhātu, in Mahāyāna terms, is the emptiness of all phenomena.

Yes. This is what I said. I made a joke about "its" ātman having been emptied by "someone".

I wish there was an emoticon which clearly indicated that one was humorless.

Perhaps

I'm more curious about the division between dharmadhātu & dharmatā you have drawn up than if you find me funny , IMO I am very funny .

Nothing about dharmatā, in the word itself, signals it out as referring exclusively to the emptiness of any "particular" dharmāḥ instead of just "dharmāḥ in general", à la dharmadhātu. From where does this distinction come?

Dharmatā & dharmadhātu are completely identical, functionally, afaik, in their translated Chinese correspondences (i.e. they are synonyms in Chinese, more or less), but Chinese does all sorts of "interesting" things to Indic grammar & semantics.

[Malcolm]

Yes. This is what I said. I made a joke about "its" ātman having been emptied by "someone".

I wish there was an emoticon which clearly indicated that one was humorless.

Perhaps

I'm more curious about the division between dharmadhātu & dharmatā you have drawn up than if you find me funny , IMO I am very funny .

Nothing about dharmatā, in the word itself, signals it out as referring exclusively to the emptiness of any "particular" dharmāḥ instead of just "dharmāḥ in general", à la dharmadhātu. From where does this distinction come?

Dharmatā & dharmadhātu are completely identical, functionally, afaik, in their translated Chinese correspondences (i.e. they are synonyms in Chinese, more or less), but Chinese does all sorts of "interesting" things to Indic grammar & semantics.

tā makes it a nature. dhātu makes it a field. In this usage, dharmatā means emptiness. Of course, the term has many different uses, for example, it indicates the predicate of an argument in Logic, whereas dharmin represents the subject.

You should consult the Dharmadharmatāvibhanga by Maitreyanātha for a Yogacāra take on this, based on the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, which itself has a whole section on the distinction between dharmas and their dharmatā, and how they can neither be the same nor different.

[Caoimhghín]

tā makes it a nature. dhātu makes it a field.

If you will forgive me a point-counter-point: dhātu makes it a nature, kṣetra makes it a field, if we have "Buddha" instead of "Dharma" in front of it.

Buddhadhātu is generally translated as "Buddha-nature", even though a better translation might be "Buddha-constituent" or "Buddha-element", even "Buddha-characteristic", yes? No?

[Astus]

It seems like a fine distinction based on the fact that there was no conception of an atman in phenomena so the Buddha's teaching on anatman was not enough to cover the emptiness of phenomena too.

Yes, this is the observation made about Nikaya/Agama sūtras.

The view that sravakas do not know the emptiness of phenomena is more a Yogacara interpretation than a universal one. After a number of quotes - e.g. SA 297 (SN 12.35) - from the Agamas the MPPS states:

"In place after place within the sutras of the Śrāvakas are discussions such as these which explain the emptiness of all dharmas."
(tr B. Dharmamitra, p 20, T1509, v18, p193c1)

[Caoimhghín]

It seems like a fine distinction based on the fact that there was no conception of an atman in phenomena so the Buddha's teaching on anatman was not enough to cover the emptiness of phenomena too.

Yes, this is the observation made about Nikaya/Agama sūtras.

The view that sravakas do not know the emptiness of phenomena is more a Yogacara interpretation than a universal one. After a number of quotes - e.g. SA 297 (SN 12.35) - from the Agamas the MPPS states:

"In place after place within the sutras of the Śrāvakas are discussions such as these which explain the emptiness of all dharmas."
(tr B. Dharmamitra, p 20, T1509, v18, p193c1)

But also: the āgamāḥ do not necessarily equal "śrāvaka Buddhadharma". Śrāvaka Buddhadharma is also Abhidharma, treatises, etc.

There is an article by Ven Huifeng tracing the dependently originated as the empty in the āgamāḥ.

[Malcolm]

It seems like a fine distinction based on the fact that there was no conception of an atman in phenomena so the Buddha's teaching on anatman was not enough to cover the emptiness of phenomena too.

Yes, this is the observation made about Nikaya/Agama sūtras.

The view that sravakas do not know the emptiness of phenomena is more a Yogacara interpretation than a universal one. After a number of quotes - e.g. SA 297 (SN 12.35) - from the Agamas the MPPS states:

"In place after place within the sutras of the Śrāvakas are discussions such as these which explain the emptiness of all dharmas."
(tr B. Dharmamitra, p 20, T1509, v18, p193c1)

The Great Discourse on the Emptiness of Dharmas and it analogue do not really discuss the emptiness of phenomena, it refers to the emptiness of persons.

For example, this passage actually refers to the selflessness of persons:

What is the great discourse on the emptiness of dharmas? It is this: Because this exists, that exists; because this arises, that arises. That is to say: Conditioned by ignorance, activities arise; because of activities, consciousness arises, and so on …, and thus arises this whole mass of suffering.

“Regarding the statement conditioned by birth, aging-and-death arises, someone may ask: Who is it that ages-and-dies? To whom does aging-and-death belong?

“And he may answer: It is the self that ages-and-dies. Aging-and-death belongs to the self; aging-and-death is the self.

[Malcolm]

tā makes it a nature. dhātu makes it a field.

If you will forgive me a point-counter-point: dhātu makes it a nature, kṣetra makes it a field, if we have "Buddha" instead of "Dharma" in front of it.

Buddhadhātu is generally translated as "Buddha-nature", even though a better translation might be "Buddha-constituent" or "Buddha-element", even "Buddha-characteristic", yes? No?

The Tibetans translate the term dhātu as either khams (element) or dbying (a nature or a source) depending on whether it is Mahāyāna or not. Tibetan masters expert in Sanskrit such as Jetsun Dragpa Gyaltsen gloss it as source (ākara, 'byung gnas), and so does Longchenpa in its Mahāyāna context.

The term dhātu itself is a term that denotes a collection. A field of poppies could be called a poppy-dhātu; just as the field of sentient beings is called the sattvadhātu and the field of emptiness is called the dharmatā-dhātu (dharmadhātu for short).

[Caoimhghín]

the field of sentient beings is called the sattvadhātu and the field of emptiness is called the dharmatā-dhātu (dharmadhātu for short).

Why is the sattvadhātu then not the sattvatādhātu?

[Caoimhghín]

the field of sentient beings is called the sattvadhātu and the field of emptiness is called the dharmatā-dhātu (dharmadhātu for short).

Why is the sattvadhātu then not the sattvatādhātu?

The only attestation I can find of the internet for the usage of the term dharmatādhātu is in your own translation of Treasury of Ati. I am not doubting the term, but I am wondering its source.

There is another conversation on DharmaWheel that I found that addresses this. The Tibetan chos nyid dbyings is specifically dharmatādhātu not dharmadhātu, correct?

Could the poor attestation of dharmatādhātu on the internet be because of the availability of Sanskrit texts available romanized? Are the texts that contain usage of dharmatādhātu only extant in Tibetan? Do you know if any of these texts would also be in Chinese? I am wondering how they translated the term.

[Malcolm]

the field of sentient beings is called the sattvadhātu and the field of emptiness is called the dharmatā-dhātu (dharmadhātu for short).

Why is the sattvadhātu then not the sattvatādhātu?

It is collecting sentient beings, not the nature of sentient beings.