Nāgārjuna's Fourfold Negation & Śrāvakayāna

[Caoimhghín]

How does venerable Nāgārjuna's fourfold (or eightfold) negation build, via logic, inference, sūtra-citation, etc, upon the various negations presented in śrāvakayāna (i.e. Sarvāstivāda, Mahāsāṃghika, Theravāda/Pāli, etc) literature?

For context, if I may be forgiven, I would like to quote a very long exchange from a quasi-relevant quasi-tangent on this thread:

At this point, your argument has completely left the confines of Buddhism (and entered the framework of materialism and a very materialistic view of science);

How is it significantly different than when Nāgasena Bhikṣu deconstructs the chariot for Menander I principally by breaking it down into its constituents in analysis?

I [...] wouldn't call deconstructing the atom unBuddhist.

For one, the alleged chariot and its parts are held to be equally unfindable, and the chariot is not considered to be composed of parts. At least per Candrakīrti's rendition.

But look at what it says: "We look at A and see that it is formed of B. At the level of B, A does not exist. We look at B, and see that it is formed of C...", ad infinitum, well-past the exhaustion of the latin alphabet.

Nothing is found here either.

Whether or not they intended it, the user Sherab presented the Chariot simile, essentially. I am not familiar with whether or not Ven Candrakīrti wrote a commentary on the Nāgasenabhikṣusūtra.

[...]

That is not how the chariot example works in Candrakīrti's exposition, but perhaps that is now it is in the teaching you are referring to.

How does Ven Candrakīrti treat the long tradition of the chariot simile?

'Ad infinitum' is the novel element of its presentation in this thread. Nāgasena Bhikṣu is content to simply break down the chariot into constituents. He doesn't further break them down into particles etc.

Candrakīrti does not break the chariot into constituent pieces but instead demonstrates that the basis of imputation does not contain or produce a chariot at all.

Constituent pieces or constituent parts, either way, the sevenfold negation appears to rely on breaking down the suggestion of "a chariot" principally by looking at the relation of the suggested entity and the parts that comprise it:

(i) There is no chariot which is other than its parts

(ii) There is no chariot which is the same as its parts

(iii) There is no chariot which possesses its parts

(iv) There is no chariot which depends on its parts

(v) There is no chariot upon which the parts depend

(vi) There is no chariot which is the collection of its parts

(vii) There is no chariot which is the shape of its parts

By having us look at the suggested chariot at the level of its constituents rather than at the level of the suggested compounded object.

Quite literally deconstructing the suggestion.

The question is, where is the chariot?

The question is, where is the chariot?

That may be how Ven Candrakīrti frames it, but, in the Nāgasenabhikṣusūtra, Nāgasenabhikṣu inquires how Milindarāja came be where it is. By chariot, is the responce.

Nāgasenabhikṣu asks: And what is that?

He gives Milindarāja a list of proposals only somewhat similar to Ven Candrakīrti's seven propositions outlined earlier, similar mostly only because there are seven:

1. The chariot is the axle.
2. The chariot is the wheels.
3-5. The chariot is the chassis/reins/yoke.
6. The chariot is the sum of its parts.
7. The chariot is other than its parts.

All of these are negated. Milindarāja proposes that "it is because it has all these parts that it comes under the term chariot" (from the Pāli parallel trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi) and Nāgasenabhikṣu commends Milindarāja, saying that he is correct.

He is not, however, quite correct, but perhaps it is understandable that Nāgasenabhikṣu would say "correct", given that Nāgasenabhikṣu is giving a simple introductory lesson to a non-Buddhist. Nāgasenabhikṣu goes on to clarify that the dialogue is like when *Śailabhikṣuṇī (Shíshì the mendicant, 石室比丘, *Selābhikkhunī after Marcus Bingenheimer, Vajirābhikkhunī in the Pāli parallel) speaks to the evil one Māra:

「眾魔生邪見， 謂有眾生想，假空以聚會， 都無有眾生。 譬如因眾緣， 和合有車用， 陰界入亦爾， [...] 」
"You Māra live with demonic view, speaking of the existence of all sentient beings and believing it, the conventional is empty as well as compounded, ultimately there are no sentient beings. It is like how causes and myriad conditions, fuse and there is "chariot-function" (車用)***, the five skandhāḥ the eighteen dhātavaḥ and the twelve āyatanāni are also thus so like this[...]"

***alternatively, Marcus Bingenheimer renders this as "causes and various conditions converge and yield the use of a ‘chariot’"

(Shorter Saṃyuktāgama 別譯雜阿含經 T100 Scroll 12 454c24)

In the Pāli parallel, Vajirābhikkhunī is more direct about the non-existence of the "parts" that the chariot/self is broken down into: "Suddhasaṅkhārapuñjoyaṃ, nayidha sattupalabbhati. [...] Dukkhameva hi sambhoti, dukkhaṃ tiṭṭhati veti ca; nāññatra dukkhā sambhoti, nāññaṃ dukkhā nirujjhatī”ti." ("This is a mere pile of conditions, you wont find a sentient being here. [... it is] only suffering that comes to be, lasts a while, then disappears, naught but suffering comes to be, naught but suffering ceases.", Translation Ven Sujato. Jayarava's Raves has suddhasaṅkhārapuñjoyaṃ rendered as "a mere heap of fabrication.")

As I see it: "where is the chariot" is an instruction to "define the location of the chariot", and "what is the chariot" is a more general instruction, as in, "define 'chariot'".

Before I end this post it should be also clarified that the āgama above is Sarvāstivāda śrāvaka literature. Furthermore, the aforementioned Nāgasenabhikṣusūtra is also śrāvaka literature, preserved in two recenions: Sarvāstivāda & Theravāda.

This śrāvaka literature is interesting and compelling Buddhavacana in its right, but is generally neyartha from the POV of the Mahāyāna.

@Malcolm, @krodha, or anyone else, if you are so inclined, for the sake of a shared inquiry into this simile, shared as it is by the śrāvakāḥ & the bodhisattvāḥ with differing interpretations and presentations, how does Ven Candrakirtī build on these earlier accounts of the chariot simile? How does the framing of the question on terms of "where is X" (regardless of if 'X' is a chariot, the self, or the 'scent of a flower') instead of "what is X" change the question & the answer?

How does the framing of the question on terms of "where is X" (regardless of if 'X' is a chariot, the self, or the 'scent of a flower') instead of "what is X" change the question & the answer?

"Chariot" is a conventional truth, meaning when we hitch it up to horses, etc., we can go places. We know what a chariot is. No one has doubts about what a chariot is.

But where the chariot is, this another issue altogether. Things are designated on a collection of parts. But a given thing cannot be found in any of the parts, all the parts together, or separate from the parts. So where is that given thing? The thing is found in our imputation and no where else. This is why the question of identity is what is this given thing, but where is this given thing. The purpose of this analysis, naturally, is to show that the self is merely an imputation on a collection of aggregates and that is all.

Sherab's analysis merely indicates that ultimate truth is cognition, not that it is an independent reality. In Abhidharma, Vasubandhu says the perception of water is relative truth, the perception of its wetness, coolness, and limpidity is ultimate truth.

Finally, if the ultimate truth of emptiness is not a conventional truth, it will not be effective in bringing about elimination of clinging, etc. Therefore, we say that ultimate truth is part of conventional truth.

"Chariot" is a conventional truth, meaning when we hitch it up to horses, etc., we can go places. We know what a chariot is. No one has doubts about what a chariot is.

Nāgasenabhikṣu certainly thought that Milindarāja may not know what a chariot "is".

I couldn't help but notice that the 7 negated propositions of Ven Candrakirtī (related or unrelated to the 7 propositions of Nāgasenabhikṣu) mirror the Discourse on the Flower's Scent by Chà Mó Bhikṣu, which also, in its way, challenges the listener to "locate" or "define" the origination of a flower's scent through 6 propositions and one additional question:

1. The scent of the flower either belongs to or is other than the roots of the flower.
2. The scent of the flower either belongs to or is other than the stem of the flower.
3. The scent of the flower either belongs to or is other than the leaf [i.e. petals?] of the flower.
4. The scent of the flower either belongs to or is other than the whiskers [i.e. stamens] of the flower.
5. The scent of the flower either belongs to or is other than the fine constituents of the flower.
6. The scent of the flower either belongs to or is other than the coarse constituents of the flower.
& 7. Are the fine constituents other than the coarse constituents of the flower?

These can be further broken down into more general questions, if we omit 7:

1. Does the scent of the flower belong to X?
2. Is the scent other than X?

As usual, all is negated.

譬如優鉢羅、鉢曇摩、拘牟頭、分陀利華香，為即根香耶？為香異根耶？為莖葉鬚精麤香耶？為香異精麤耶？為等說不？」
Analogy thus: the utpala, paduma, kumuda, or puṇḍarīka flower's scent, is it the root's scent? Is the scent other than the roots? Is it the stem's, the leaf's, the whiskers' [i.e. "stamen's"], the fine constituents', or the coarse constituents' scent? Are the fine constituents other than the coarse constituents? It is so said, no?"

諸上座答言：「不也，差摩比丘！非優鉢羅、鉢曇摩、拘牟頭、分陀利根即是香、非香異根，亦非莖葉鬚精麤是香，亦非香異精麤也。」
The myriad sthavirāḥ responded: "No, resolutely, Chà Mó Bhikṣu! It is not the utpala's, the paduma's, the kumuda's, the puṇḍarīka's root’s scent, but it is not that the scent is other than root, so too also it is not the stem's, the leaf's, the whiskers', the fine constituents', or the coarse constituents' scent, so too also it is not that the fine constituents are other than the coarse constituents resolutely."

差摩比丘復問：「彼何等香？」
Chà Mó Bhikṣu again asked: "It is what's scent?"

上座答言：「是華香。」
The sthavirāḥ replied: "It is the flower's."

差摩比丘復言：「我亦如是。非色即我，我不離色；非受、想、行識即我，我不離識。
Chà Mó Bhikṣu again replied: "I, too, am thus so. It is not that my form is me, yet I am not other than form; there is no feeling, thought, formation, or consciousness that is resolutely mine, yet I am not apart from consciousness.

然我於五受陰見非我、非我所，而於我慢、我欲、我使，未斷、未知、未離、未吐。
So I in these five aggregates of binding see no me, and they are nothing I own, as such is self-conceit, self-desiring, self-causation, not yet resolute, not yet knowing, not yet having severed, not yet having vomited.

(Saṃyuktāgama 雜阿含經 T99 Scroll 5 30b10)

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然我於五受陰見非我、非我所，而於我慢、我欲、我使，未斷、未知、未離、未吐。
So I in these five aggregates of binding see no me, and they are nothing I own, as such is self-conceit, self-desiring, self-causation, not yet resolute, not yet knowing, not yet having severed, not yet having vomited.

This is an abridging-and-expanding of a longer repeating refrain from the āgama:

「我觀五受陰非我、非我所，非漏盡阿羅漢也。」
“I observe these five aggregates of binding and find no me, and they are nothing I own, but it is not that my āsravāḥ are all ended [and it is not] that I am an arhat resolutely.”

And, a last question: from where does this treatment of the Chariot simile by the venerable Candrakīrti originate? Which text does he discuss it in?

[Astus]

How does venerable Nāgārjuna's fourfold (or eightfold) negation build, via logic, inference, sūtra-citation, etc, upon the various negations presented in śrāvakayāna (i.e. Sarvāstivāda, Mahāsāṃghika, Theravāda/Pāli, etc) literature?

It is merely a format to negate all possibilities, an extension on denying the extremes of existence and annihilation. It is not an argument in itself.

And, a last question: from where does this treatment of the Chariot simile by the venerable Candrakīrti originate? Which text does he discuss it in?

Madhyamakavatara 6.151-161.

[krodha]

In SN 12.15, Śākyamuni states:

"Everything exists": That is one extreme. "Everything doesn't exist": That is a second extreme. Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma via the middle.

The fourfold catuṣkoṭi tetralemma in Mahāyāna is really just an extension of the above. Thankfully where the Śravāka suttas tend to be implicit and indirect, the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras are generally explicit and direct, elaborating on some of these vague statements in the suttas.

[Kim O'Hara]

In SN 12.15, Śākyamuni states:

"Everything exists": That is one extreme. "Everything doesn't exist": That is a second extreme. Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma via the middle.

The fourfold catuṣkoṭi tetralemma in Mahāyāna is really just an extension of the above. Thankfully where the Śravāka suttas tend to be implicit and indirect, the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras are generally explicit and direct, elaborating on some of these vague statements in the suttas.

I love the Pali canon because it is so clear and direct, and find many of the Mahayana sutras irritatingly long-winded.
To each his own, I guess.


Kim

[pael]

My friend (He is God-believer) didn't like Fourfold Negation. He did say it is

"empty rhetoric"

. Help?
I did say that Nagarjuna says:

things are not-A, not-B, not-AB, neither not-A-not-B

.

[krodha]

My friend (He is God-believer) didn't like Fourfold Negation. He did say it is

"empty rhetoric"

. Help?
I did say that Nagarjuna says:

things are not-A, not-B, not-AB, neither not-A-not-B

.

Someone who believes in God is committed to believing in the existence of said god, and therefore upholds a view that aligns with the first extreme.

Really their opinion of the fourfold freedom from extremes ala Mahāyāna is worthless.