Rabbit's Horns

[Malcolm]

ha ha! cute



congratulations.
My point here is that terms can be used in different ways at different times and we mustn't try to win arguments by pretending we dont know that. Even people like CNN use the term existent in the sloppy sense when context is relevant.

I don't accept that space etc., are existents even in the sloppy everyday context.

if you dont believe cessations can be known by mind, in the everyday conventional sense of course, I suppose theres not much that can be done for you.

I don't accept that everything that can be "known by a mind" needs to be an existent in a formal sense.

[Malcolm]

I don't accept that space etc., are existents even in the sloppy everyday context.

You must exist in a really bizarre world beyond space and time then, like Schroedinger’s cat.

Wrong space. Not talking about space in Einsteins relativity, we are talking about unconditioned dharmas. I think you ought to try rereading the analysis of the elements in MMK again.

[PuerAzaelis]

Oh, well, if space is by definition an unconditioned dharma, even conventionally, then certainly there’s nothing to debate.

PS: I meant Chapter 25 of MMK in the earlier post, the chapter on Nirvana.

[Malcolm]

Oh, well, if space is by definition an unconditioned dharma, even conventionally, then certainly there’s nothing to debate.

Space is by definition one of the three unconditioned dharmas. There is also conditioned space, such as cavities and so on.

[PuerAzaelis]

Anyway it is strange to assert that all sides agree to the conventional truth that Nirvana is attained but at the same time it’s forbidden to assert cessation exists even conventionally.

Seems pointless.

[Malcolm]

Anyway it is strange to assert that all sides agree to the conventional truth that Nirvana is attained but at the same time it’s forbidden to assert cessation exists even conventionally.

Seems pointless.

Who says we agree on this? I don't. As Nāgārjuna points out, since there are no aggregates in nirvana, what person could there be to attain it?

[aflatun]

The characteristic of cessation is absence of arising.

Absence of arising of what?

[cloudburst]

I don't accept that space etc., are existents even in the sloppy everyday context.

if you dont believe cessations can be known by mind, in the everyday conventional sense of course, I suppose theres not much that can be done for you.

I don't accept that everything that can be "known by a mind" needs to be an existent in a formal sense.

Horns of rabbits can be known by the mind as well, therefore you have accept they are existents by your definition

To be less sloppy, horns of rabbits can NOT actually be known by mind, as such a thing never existed. You could perhaps apprehend a generic image of Rabbit horns.

The point is that cessations and space, of course, do exist.

Chandrakirti said

Is there a nature that has such qualifications as the master
Nagarjuna claims? Yes, it is the “reality” of which the Bhagavan
spoke extensively, saying, “Whether tathagatas appear or not, the
reality of phenomena remains.” What is this “reality”? It is the
nature of things such as these eyes. And, what is their nature? It
is that in them which is neither fabricated nor dependent upon
something else; it is their identity as known by knowledge free
from the impairment of ignorance. Does it exist or not? If it did
not exist, for what purpose would bodhisattvas cultivate the path
of the perfections? Why would bodhisattvas undergo hundreds
of hardships in order to know reality?

Namkhai Norbu said

The calm state is the condition of the mind in which no thoughts arise. An example of this is the space that exists between the disappearance of one thought and the arising of another, a space that is usually imperceptible.

[Malcolm]

Namkhai Norbu said

The calm state is the condition of the mind in which no thoughts arise. An example of this is the space that exists between the disappearance of one thought and the arising of another, a space that is usually imperceptible.

The term "space" here is not nam mkha'. The term here is "bar." In other words, this is describing the gap between two thoughts.

[Malcolm]

To be less sloppy, horns of rabbits can NOT actually be known by mind, as such a thing never existed. You could perhaps apprehend a generic image of Rabbit horns.

The point is that cessations and space, of course, do exist.

They have the same existence as anything which cannot be/is not produced. They simply don't. The example for how things exist is space. The example for how space exists is hair on a tortoise— it just doesn't grow.

[Grigoris]

Overall, nirvāṇa is a cessation and cessations are not existent entities, so I would argue the fact that nirvāṇa lacks existence goes without saying. Then there is also the undeniable point that only conditioned entities exist, and if you assert that nirvāṇa exists, you are by default stating it is conditioned, which contradicts the teachings given that we both know nirvāṇa is unconditioned. But to unpack this further for the purposes of discussion, here is Nāgārjuna offering insight into the position Madhyamaka takes on the matter:

• This pair, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, does not exist.
  Thorough knowledge of saṃsāra is said to be nirvāṇa.

and Candrakīrti:

• At the level of the unborn, there is no distinction of attaining nirvāṇa or not attaining nirvāṇa.
  The unborn nature itself is also not there, because there is no thing which is unborn.

Madhyamaka dialectics are quite clear that an unconditioned nature is not established at all due to the fact that the alleged ultimate nature, is truly nothing more than the non-arising of the so-called "relative", and therefore is nothing in and of itself. That is the meaning of the emptiness of essence [prakṛtisūnyatā] and naturelessness [niḥsvabhāva], which are synonymous principles that that Madhyamaka undoubtedly champions.

Again from Nāgārjuna:

• Since arising, abiding and perishing are not established,
  the conditioned is not established;
  since the conditioned is never established,
  how can the unconditioned be established?

Candrakīrti again echoing these sentiments:

• Since nirvāṇa is the supreme goal, it is the ultimate, beyond all suffering. This being empty of itself is the voidness of the ultimate. Indeed to counter the conviction that nirvāṇa is a real existent entity, the knower of the ultimate set forth the voidness of the ultimate.

The Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra unpacks this principle of prakṛtisūnyatā a bit further:

• People still say: "The five aggregates [skandha], the twelve bases of consciousness [āyatana] and the eighteen elements [dhātu] are all empty. Only suchness [tathatā], the fundamental element [dharmadhātu], the highest culminating point of the truth [bhūtakoṭi] are true essences [bhūtaprakṛti]." - In order to cut through this error, the Buddha simply replied "The five aggregates [skandha], but also suchness, the fundamental element and the culminating point of the truth are empty." This is called the emptiness of the essences [prakṛtisūnyatā].

And then the tantras and various adepts of Vajrayāna, along with Yogācāra texts such as the Saṃdhinirmocana are brutally explicit in their clarification that nirvāṇa (and an unconditioned nature in general) lacks existence. They truly leave no room for misinterpretation.

[Grigoris]

Horns of rabbits can be known by the mind as well, therefore you have accept they are existents by your definition. When I talk about these things, I use Dharma language, not sloppy everyday language.

They exist for the mind, so it would be equally wrong to say they are non-existent.

[MiphamFan]

By that same logic Superman exists since he exists in the minds of millions.

[cloudburst]

To be less sloppy, horns of rabbits can NOT actually be known by mind, as such a thing never existed. You could perhaps apprehend a generic image of Rabbit horns.

The point is that cessations and space, of course, do exist.

They have the same existence as anything which cannot be/is not produced. They simply don't. The example for how things exist is space. The example for how space exists is hair on a tortoise— it just doesn't grow.

I guess its you vs Chandrakiriti then

[Malcolm]

To be less sloppy, horns of rabbits can NOT actually be known by mind, as such a thing never existed. You could perhaps apprehend a generic image of Rabbit horns.

The point is that cessations and space, of course, do exist.

They have the same existence as anything which cannot be/is not produced. They simply don't. The example for how things exist is space. The example for how space exists is hair on a tortoise— it just doesn't grow.

I guess its you vs Chandrakiriti then

It isn't actually. It's between me and how you (mis)understand Chandrakirti.

[PuerAzaelis]

They have the same existence as anything which cannot be/is not produced. They simply don't.

?

7.

If Nirvana is not a [positive] existent, how will nirvana be an "absence"?
Where there is no existent, there is no "absence".

8.

And if nirvana is an "absence" how can nirvana be non-dependent?
There is no absence that exists without dependence.

MMK, 25 (Siderits, scare quotes added by me)

[conebeckham]

"Nonabiding Nirvana, or dharmadhatu-the object of the true, complete awakening with respect to all phenomena in all aspects--and wisdom-that which comprehends such an object-are beyond singularity and multiplicity. They comprise the actual ultimate truth, which is free from conceptual imputations. They are not of the nature of imputed phenomena, the confusion of the relative, and of obscurations. Different from it are all relative phenomena-samsara and nirvana, the two truths, and so on. All those relative phenomena are mere conceptual imputations--their apparent manifestations along with their true natures are both empty of their own entities. They have no nature established as real or unreal.

As to the mental states that impute such relative phenomena, some are distorted even on the level of imputation. If, for example, one were to impute the existence of cold fire or of the horns of a rabbit, one's imputation could not possibly correlate to anything conventionally, from the perspective of being in harmony with interdependence. Other imputations are in harmony, conventionally, with interdependence. the hotness of of fire, the nonexistence of rabbit horns, the result of happiness arising from the cause of virtue--all of these are imputations in accord with interdependence arisen due to beginningless, innate ignorance. Conventionally, they arise as undeceiving interdependence. From that perspective, they afford no opportunity for confusion, because they are designated via dependence.

That is a description of relative phenomena: samsara and nirvana, the two truths, and so on. ....(SNIP)

Some who have not understood this point say, "Pillars are real as things that are pillars, but they are not truly existent as things that are objects of refutation by reasons." They claim that through this statement alone they are able to explain how conventionally the thing that is a pillar is empty of it's own entity.

When they speak of "pillars as things that are pillars," they are contradicting the thesis they claim to hold that "The thing that is a pillar is empty even conventionally of it's own entity." They are not satisfied with simply determining that all conceptually imputed apparent phenomena are emptiness. Rather, in order to realize emptiness, they seek out the referent object behind the imputation. They say that determining the emptiness of the referent object is the perfectly pure emptiness. They say that the cognition that all interdependent phenomena are empty of their own entities is nihilism; it does not suffice as a genuine realization of emptiness.

This approach is not the intention of the protector Nagarjuna. The emptiness of any given phenomenon is realized by determining the emptiness of the imputation of the apparent phenomenon. Refraining from determining the emptiness of a quality that does not exist among knowable objects will not do even the slightest harm to those who desire liberation. For there is no basis for conceiving qualities that do not exist among knowable objects to be real."

--Karmapa Wangchuk Dorje, from "The Karmapa's Middle Way: Feast for the Fortunate," Brunnholzl, trans. and commentary. PP/570-571, emphases mine.

[Lukeinaz]

This reminds me of something I read awhile ago.

How we first put the horns on the rabbit and then take them off, thus refuting inherent existence.

Anyone remember the exact quote?

[conebeckham]

This reminds me of something I read awhile ago.

How we first put the horns on the rabbit and then take them off, thus refuting inherent existence.

Anyone remember the exact quote?

No, but it is apt.

[DGA]

From the Gelug POV:

“The horns of a rabbit do not inherently exist because they do not exist at all. The mere realization of their non-existence reveals that the horns of a rabbit do not inherently exist; therefore, the non-inherent existence of the horns of a rabbit is not an emptiness. An emptiness is not understood through realizing the mere non-existence of an object; it is known through comprehending in an existent object the absence of the quality of inherent or objective existence.”

The introduction of the concept of "inherent existence" seems unnecessary to me. Why? Because rabbits don't have horns. They don't have any kind of existence at all. The horn of the rabbit is a metaphor for something that is fictional, nonexistent, nonsense. Why bring in all that conceptual elaboration to just point at something and say, "such bullshit"? Because it is.

it's not all turtles, you know. it's all nonsense, all the way down. it's incoherent and it doesn't mean a damned thing.

Personally I found it coherent and meaningful - horses for courses.

How is samsara (or any particular dharma) coherent or meaningful?