Rabbit's Horns

[Malcolm]

Of course it's not always easy to decide when Nagarjuna is making an opponent's argument or his own

It's is very easy. Just follow Buddhapalita.

[PuerAzaelis]

What do you think of Mabja Jangchub Tsondru's commentary of the Dharmachakra committee's translation?

[PS, never mind, obviously it's excellent]

[Malcolm]

What do you think of Mabja Jangchub Tsondru's commentary of the Dharmachakra committee's translation?

It's pretty good. But it does not negate my point.

[Lukeinaz]

"leaving this vivid appearance where it is, they search for something protruding to refute"

lcang skya rinpoche from "The Madmans Middle Way"

[cloudburst]

Your position is akin to the Svatantrika position that things exist not truly, but by virtue of their characteristics. Svatantrikas say that things like the process of production exist on the conventional level and that to deny this is to posit a complete nonexistence.

Prasangikgas assert that things are produced conventionally.

Chandrakirti, in his commentary to the Yuktisastika writes

We do not propound that an apprehension of a reflection— dependently produced and seen strictly as false—is not produced in any way. However, we say that it does not occur in terms of the nature, and we do propound that it is not produced in that sense. What is the nature in terms of which we say that it is not produced? A nature that you can clearly hold as a truth. However, it is not that it is not produced as something false, because we do assert that it arises as that dependently.

This is a position I agree with, but it is not in anyway like the svatantrika position that things are produced by virtue of their own characteristics, for as Mipham correctly points out in the quotation you cite

This notion that the specifically characterized production of conventional phenomena exists as it appears is none other than the apprehension of, and clinging to, the phenomenal self.

As Chandrakirti explains, Prasangikas understand that it does not occur in terms of a nature. No one is saying that mere nominal production exists as it appears, this is a red herrring.

Chandrakirti answers that Madhyamaka analysis counters a truly existent "process of production," (and thus, a cesssation, etc., on the absolute level), and that which cannot be existent on the absolute level is impossible to find on the conventional level.

This is correct, the process of truly existent production refuted on the ultimate level is also impossible to find on the conventional level.

We can say that there is the appearance of the process of production, etc., but that such appearance has no ontological status. It appears to ordinary beings and is only on the level of no analysis that such an existence could be assumed.

I agree with this in spirit. In fact, I believe you and I agree substantially on this point, what we are actually debating is terminology.

For example, if the term "existent" is defined as existing from the objects own side, or existing by way of a nature, then the statement "Houses do not exist, but they appear" is correct.

On the other hand, if "exists" means mere appearance, or appearing yet not existing by nature, then we can say "houses exist." Generally, Gelugs use the latter system and non-Gelugs use the former. The strong points of the latter are that it corresponds to the meaning of the teachings, if not always the literal words. It also goes well with whole approach, championed by Buddha and his Prasangika followers, that we do not contradict the valid conventions of ordinary people. Ordinary worldly people accept that houses exist, and so should Prasangikas. What is meant by each is the object of discussion.

Rather than just claiming I am misinterpreting Chandrakirti, perhaps address the quotation I supplied. Here again for your consideration where Chandrakriti states that emptiness, a cessation, exists

Is there a nature that has such qualifications as the master Nagarjuna claims? Yes, it is the “reality” of which the Bhagavan spoke extensively, saying, “Whether tathagatas appear or not, the reality of phenomena remains.” What is this “reality”? It is the nature of things such as these eyes. And, what is their nature? It is that in them which is neither fabricated nor dependent upon something else; it is their identity as known by knowledge free from the impairment of ignorance. Does it exist or not? If it did not exist, for what purpose would bodhisattvas cultivate the path of the perfections? Why would bodhisattvas undergo hundreds
of hardships in order to know reality?

[conebeckham]

Rather than just claiming I am misinterpreting Chandrakirti, perhaps address the quotation I supplied. Here again for your consideration where Chandrakriti states that emptiness, a cessation, exists

Is there a nature that has such qualifications as the master Nagarjuna claims? Yes, it is the “reality” of which the Bhagavan spoke extensively, saying, “Whether tathagatas appear or not, the reality of phenomena remains.” What is this “reality”? It is the nature of things such as these eyes. And, what is their nature? It is that in them which is neither fabricated nor dependent upon something else; it is their identity as known by knowledge free from the impairment of ignorance. Does it exist or not? If it did not exist, for what purpose would bodhisattvas cultivate the path of the perfections? Why would bodhisattvas undergo hundreds
of hardships in order to know reality?

Would you care to source that quote?

[conebeckham]

Cloudburst, I think I have identified the passage.

Is there a nature that has such qualifications as the master Nagarjuna claims? Yes, it is the “reality” of which the Bhagavan spoke extensively, saying, “Whether tathagatas appear or not, the reality of phenomena remains.” What is this “reality”? It is the nature of things such as these eyes. And, what is their nature? It is that in them which is neither fabricated nor dependent upon something else; it is their identity as known by knowledge free from the impairment of ignorance. Does it exist or not? If it did not exist, for what purpose would bodhisattvas cultivate the path of the perfections? Why would bodhisattvas undergo hundreds of hardships in order to know reality?

This nature --unfabricated and not dependent--is emptiness, as you've said. As for whether it exists or not, It is said to be like burning wood and fire. When fire consumes the wood, both the wood and the fire cease.

It could be said that one must set fire to the wood, which is why the Bodhisattvas must pursue the path.

"We do not assert "emptiness."
We do not assert "nonemptiness."
We do not assert "both" or "neither."
We use these only as labels."


Jnanagarbha says:
From the standpoint of the genuine, there is no duality.
Therefore, the genuine is not emptiness.
It is not nonemptiness, nor does it exist or not exist.
It is not nonarisen, nor is it arisen.
Such is the teaching of the Transcendent Conqueror.

[Malcolm]

like the svatantrika position that things are produced by virtue of their own characteristics

This is not the position of any Madhyamaka, Bhavaviveka included.