Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
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Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
Why do Gelugs claim this (or maybe I’m getting confused about what they teach)? It seems contradictory to what Nāgārjuna and the Sutras taught. How can he claim things exist like that when the Mahāyāna teahces dharma are inherently not born and phenomena are like empty flowers seen by sick people that disappear when cured?
Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
Coming from Gelug training and now (for about a year) transitioning to Dzogchen, here's my understanding of it.thecowisflying wrote: ↑Sun Feb 11, 2018 2:13 pm Why do Gelugs claim this (or maybe I’m getting confused about what they teach)? It seems contradictory to what Nāgārjuna and the Sutras taught. How can he claim things exist like that when the Mahāyāna teahces dharma are inherently not born and phenomena are like empty flowers seen by sick people that disappear when cured?
The Gelug lamrim is a Sutrayana path from the perspective of ordinary beings, whereas Vajrayana paths take the perspective of enlightened beings. Tsongkhapa's lamrim always points directly to Vajrayana, as expressed in the Foundation of All Good Qualities prayer:
In Sutrayana one considers all the groundwork necessary to prepare oneself for Vajrayana. It is said that following the Sutrayana path to completion requires 3 great eons whereas in Vajrayana enlightenment is possible in one lifetime. My own take on that is that whoever achieves enlightenment in one lifetime necessarily spent many prior lifetimes preparing for it.Tsongkhapa wrote: Having become a pure vessel by training in the general path,
Please bless me to enter
The holy gateway of the fortunate ones:
The supreme vajra vehicle.
Regardless, the teaching of inherent existence in Gelug is intended to help people like me, who come to Buddhism thinking they already, and naturally, understand impermanence. In learning about inherent existence, the problem I encountered was understanding that, in fact, I do reify the phenomena I perceive. I thought, “Of course everything changes! What’s the big deal?” But in studying and meditating on Tsongkhapa’s distinction between inherent existence and mere existence, I eventually came to recognize how it is that I superimpose permanence even while I think I realize nothing could possibly be permanent.
The claim that “emptiness means things exist without self nature” does not mean that substantial “things” have real “existence”. It is meant to help people distinguish artificially imposed inherency from the mere fact that our very awareness, which can’t be refuted, presents us with apparent objects, even though those objects have no substantial existence whatsoever.
The Gelug term “mere existence” refers to the nominal appearance of dependently arisen phenomena; it absolutely does not posit any “real” existence.
Where now is my mind engaged? - Shantideva
Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
They do not claim that things exist without self-nature. They claim that things exist dependent on imputations made upon a collections of parts.
They claim that the emptiness taught by the Buddha is simply the emptiness of true existence that is the absence of the inherent existence of things.
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Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
Lzr likes to say: "things don't exist from their own side"
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Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
So from what I Kbow about TB much of it is focused on Nāgārjuna so how does Tsongkhapa explain non-arising as only the absence of inheritent existence? If something is non-arisen how can it exist at all even if it does so without inherent existence?Malcolm wrote: ↑Sun Feb 11, 2018 7:23 pmThey do not claim that things exist without self-nature. They claim that things exist dependent on imputations made upon a collections of parts.
They claim that the emptiness taught by the Buddha is simply the emptiness of true existence that is the absence of the inherent existence of things.
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Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
Thanks for clearing things up. But when someone perceives something to be existent like a cup, normally they wouldn't be projecting inherent existence but rather just existence in general. Or am I getting them mixed up somehow?Jeff H wrote: ↑Sun Feb 11, 2018 5:32 pmComing from Gelug training and now (for about a year) transitioning to Dzogchen, here's my understanding of it.thecowisflying wrote: ↑Sun Feb 11, 2018 2:13 pm Why do Gelugs claim this (or maybe I’m getting confused about what they teach)? It seems contradictory to what Nāgārjuna and the Sutras taught. How can he claim things exist like that when the Mahāyāna teahces dharma are inherently not born and phenomena are like empty flowers seen by sick people that disappear when cured?
The Gelug lamrim is a Sutrayana path from the perspective of ordinary beings, whereas Vajrayana paths take the perspective of enlightened beings. Tsongkhapa's lamrim always points directly to Vajrayana, as expressed in the Foundation of All Good Qualities prayer:In Sutrayana one considers all the groundwork necessary to prepare oneself for Vajrayana. It is said that following the Sutrayana path to completion requires 3 great eons whereas in Vajrayana enlightenment is possible in one lifetime. My own take on that is that whoever achieves enlightenment in one lifetime necessarily spent many prior lifetimes preparing for it.Tsongkhapa wrote: Having become a pure vessel by training in the general path,
Please bless me to enter
The holy gateway of the fortunate ones:
The supreme vajra vehicle.
Regardless, the teaching of inherent existence in Gelug is intended to help people like me, who come to Buddhism thinking they already, and naturally, understand impermanence. In learning about inherent existence, the problem I encountered was understanding that, in fact, I do reify the phenomena I perceive. I thought, “Of course everything changes! What’s the big deal?” But in studying and meditating on Tsongkhapa’s distinction between inherent existence and mere existence, I eventually came to recognize how it is that I superimpose permanence even while I think I realize nothing could possibly be permanent.
The claim that “emptiness means things exist without self nature” does not mean that substantial “things” have real “existence”. It is meant to help people distinguish artificially imposed inherency from the mere fact that our very awareness, which can’t be refuted, presents us with apparent objects, even though those objects have no substantial existence whatsoever.
The Gelug term “mere existence” refers to the nominal appearance of dependently arisen phenomena; it absolutely does not posit any “real” existence.
What do you mean by this?But in studying and meditating on Tsongkhapa’s distinction between inherent existence and mere existence, I eventually came to recognize how it is that I superimpose permanence even while I think I realize nothing could possibly be permanent.
Edit: I'm the same poster as OP, I lost the password for that account but is still logged in on my ipad where I made the post.
Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
Things are empty of inherent existence, because they arise depending upon causes and conditions. Also, it is because things are empty of inherent existence that they are able to appear to us at all.thecowisflying wrote: ↑Mon Feb 12, 2018 8:15 amSo from what I Kbow about TB much of it is focused on Nāgārjuna so how does Tsongkhapa explain non-arising as only the absence of inheritent existence? If something is non-arisen how can it exist at all even if it does so without inherent existence?Malcolm wrote: ↑Sun Feb 11, 2018 7:23 pmThey do not claim that things exist without self-nature. They claim that things exist dependent on imputations made upon a collections of parts.
They claim that the emptiness taught by the Buddha is simply the emptiness of true existence that is the absence of the inherent existence of things.
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Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
Try thinking about it like this:What do you mean by this?But in studying and meditating on Tsongkhapa’s distinction between inherent existence and mere existence, I eventually came to recognize how it is that I superimpose permanence even while I think I realize nothing could possibly be permanent.
Who here hasn’t seen a very attractive person and thought to themselves, “Now that is the real deal”?
In so doing you are imposing an idea of a qualitative essence on the person, even though you intellectually know their desireability is impermanent.
(In a post such as this I will confidently make the claim to speak from first hand experience withoutthe need for supporting citation.)
Last edited by Schrödinger’s Yidam on Mon Feb 12, 2018 3:53 pm, edited 5 times in total.
1.The problem isn’t ‘ignorance’. The problem is the mind you have right now. (H.H. Karmapa XVII @NYC 2/4/18)
2. I support Mingyur R and HHDL in their positions against lama abuse.
3. Student: Lama, I thought I might die but then I realized that the 3 Jewels would protect me.
Lama: Even If you had died the 3 Jewels would still have protected you. (DW post by Fortyeightvows)
2. I support Mingyur R and HHDL in their positions against lama abuse.
3. Student: Lama, I thought I might die but then I realized that the 3 Jewels would protect me.
Lama: Even If you had died the 3 Jewels would still have protected you. (DW post by Fortyeightvows)
Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
Phenomena, including things, feelings, thoughts, etc., come into our awareness and interact with each other through dependent arising. That is the sole nature of their existence, but it is not existence in the sense that we usually mean it. There is absolutely nothing about any phenomenon that exists independently of its confluence of dependencies. Most of us hear that and think, “so you’re saying it doesn’t exist because phenomena have no sustaining substance.” Gelugpas respond, “phenomena don’t exist substantially, as they appear, but neither can their apparent presence and effectiveness be denied.”ItsRaining wrote: ↑Mon Feb 12, 2018 10:34 amThanks for clearing things up. But when someone perceives something to be existent like a cup, normally they wouldn't be projecting inherent existence but rather just existence in general. Or am I getting them mixed up somehow?Jeff H wrote: ↑Sun Feb 11, 2018 5:32 pmComing from Gelug training and now (for about a year) transitioning to Dzogchen, here's my understanding of it.thecowisflying wrote: ↑Sun Feb 11, 2018 2:13 pm Why do Gelugs claim this (or maybe I’m getting confused about what they teach)? It seems contradictory to what Nāgārjuna and the Sutras taught. How can he claim things exist like that when the Mahāyāna teahces dharma are inherently not born and phenomena are like empty flowers seen by sick people that disappear when cured?
The Gelug lamrim is a Sutrayana path from the perspective of ordinary beings, whereas Vajrayana paths take the perspective of enlightened beings. Tsongkhapa's lamrim always points directly to Vajrayana, as expressed in the Foundation of All Good Qualities prayer:In Sutrayana one considers all the groundwork necessary to prepare oneself for Vajrayana. It is said that following the Sutrayana path to completion requires 3 great eons whereas in Vajrayana enlightenment is possible in one lifetime. My own take on that is that whoever achieves enlightenment in one lifetime necessarily spent many prior lifetimes preparing for it.Tsongkhapa wrote: Having become a pure vessel by training in the general path,
Please bless me to enter
The holy gateway of the fortunate ones:
The supreme vajra vehicle.
Regardless, the teaching of inherent existence in Gelug is intended to help people like me, who come to Buddhism thinking they already, and naturally, understand impermanence. In learning about inherent existence, the problem I encountered was understanding that, in fact, I do reify the phenomena I perceive. I thought, “Of course everything changes! What’s the big deal?” But in studying and meditating on Tsongkhapa’s distinction between inherent existence and mere existence, I eventually came to recognize how it is that I superimpose permanence even while I think I realize nothing could possibly be permanent.
The claim that “emptiness means things exist without self nature” does not mean that substantial “things” have real “existence”. It is meant to help people distinguish artificially imposed inherency from the mere fact that our very awareness, which can’t be refuted, presents us with apparent objects, even though those objects have no substantial existence whatsoever.
The Gelug term “mere existence” refers to the nominal appearance of dependently arisen phenomena; it absolutely does not posit any “real” existence.
What do you mean by this?But in studying and meditating on Tsongkhapa’s distinction between inherent existence and mere existence, I eventually came to recognize how it is that I superimpose permanence even while I think I realize nothing could possibly be permanent.
Edit: I'm the same poster as OP, I lost the password for that account but is still logged in on my ipad where I made the post.
In order to teach that, Tsongkhapa made a distinction between mere existence, which is the appearance to awareness, and inherent existence, which is the reification of appearances. First, he said, identify this fictional inherency which you created, then thoroughly negate it with reason, and then recognize the dreamlike quality of appearances whose only mode of being is nominal.
There is a common pitfall of learning that nothing exists, and perhaps feeling rather fearful of that. Then, upon understanding that, regardless, the conventions of samsara carry on as before, there can be a sense of relief such as, “ah, so things are basically just as they’ve always been.” That fallacy is like applying permanence subconsciously while thinking everything is impermanent. Once dependent arising is applied, things are not “the same”.
Where now is my mind engaged? - Shantideva
Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
Arising from conditions means nothing arises inherently, that is, without a cause. Arising from causes is imputed upon parts. Things exist as dependent designations, thus, they are still nonarising.thecowisflying wrote: ↑Mon Feb 12, 2018 8:15 amSo from what I Kbow about TB much of it is focused on Nāgārjuna so how does Tsongkhapa explain non-arising as only the absence of inheritent existence? If something is non-arisen how can it exist at all even if it does so without inherent existence?Malcolm wrote: ↑Sun Feb 11, 2018 7:23 pmThey do not claim that things exist without self-nature. They claim that things exist dependent on imputations made upon a collections of parts.
They claim that the emptiness taught by the Buddha is simply the emptiness of true existence that is the absence of the inherent existence of things.
M
Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
There is a controversy here. Tsongkhapa maintains that it is very important to identify what he terms the subtle object of negation, inherent existence, because the coarse object of negation, existence, is an over-negation.ItsRaining wrote: ↑Mon Feb 12, 2018 10:34 am
Thanks for clearing things up. But when someone perceives something to be existent like a cup, normally they wouldn't be projecting inherent existence but rather just existence in general. Or am I getting them mixed up somehow?
In other words, the cup is designated dependent on its parts. If you negate the existence of the cup, you are contradicting your own perception of the cup. If you negate only the cup's inherent existence however, you can maintain the conventional value of the cup that you perceive, but by understanding its lack of inherent existence, you can also acknowledge the cup is something which arises from conditions, since nothing that arises from conditions can be held to inherently exist—arising from conditions is simply a convention.
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Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
Thanks!Jeff H wrote: ↑Mon Feb 12, 2018 3:31 pmPhenomena, including things, feelings, thoughts, etc., come into our awareness and interact with each other through dependent arising. That is the sole nature of their existence, but it is not existence in the sense that we usually mean it. There is absolutely nothing about any phenomenon that exists independently of its confluence of dependencies. Most of us hear that and think, “so you’re saying it doesn’t exist because phenomena have no sustaining substance.” Gelugpas respond, “phenomena don’t exist substantially, as they appear, but neither can their apparent presence and effectiveness be denied.”ItsRaining wrote: ↑Mon Feb 12, 2018 10:34 amThanks for clearing things up. But when someone perceives something to be existent like a cup, normally they wouldn't be projecting inherent existence but rather just existence in general. Or am I getting them mixed up somehow?Jeff H wrote: ↑Sun Feb 11, 2018 5:32 pm
Coming from Gelug training and now (for about a year) transitioning to Dzogchen, here's my understanding of it.
The Gelug lamrim is a Sutrayana path from the perspective of ordinary beings, whereas Vajrayana paths take the perspective of enlightened beings. Tsongkhapa's lamrim always points directly to Vajrayana, as expressed in the Foundation of All Good Qualities prayer:
In Sutrayana one considers all the groundwork necessary to prepare oneself for Vajrayana. It is said that following the Sutrayana path to completion requires 3 great eons whereas in Vajrayana enlightenment is possible in one lifetime. My own take on that is that whoever achieves enlightenment in one lifetime necessarily spent many prior lifetimes preparing for it.
Regardless, the teaching of inherent existence in Gelug is intended to help people like me, who come to Buddhism thinking they already, and naturally, understand impermanence. In learning about inherent existence, the problem I encountered was understanding that, in fact, I do reify the phenomena I perceive. I thought, “Of course everything changes! What’s the big deal?” But in studying and meditating on Tsongkhapa’s distinction between inherent existence and mere existence, I eventually came to recognize how it is that I superimpose permanence even while I think I realize nothing could possibly be permanent.
The claim that “emptiness means things exist without self nature” does not mean that substantial “things” have real “existence”. It is meant to help people distinguish artificially imposed inherency from the mere fact that our very awareness, which can’t be refuted, presents us with apparent objects, even though those objects have no substantial existence whatsoever.
The Gelug term “mere existence” refers to the nominal appearance of dependently arisen phenomena; it absolutely does not posit any “real” existence.
What do you mean by this?But in studying and meditating on Tsongkhapa’s distinction between inherent existence and mere existence, I eventually came to recognize how it is that I superimpose permanence even while I think I realize nothing could possibly be permanent.
Edit: I'm the same poster as OP, I lost the password for that account but is still logged in on my ipad where I made the post.
In order to teach that, Tsongkhapa made a distinction between mere existence, which is the appearance to awareness, and inherent existence, which is the reification of appearances. First, he said, identify this fictional inherency which you created, then thoroughly negate it with reason, and then recognize the dreamlike quality of appearances whose only mode of being is nominal.
There is a common pitfall of learning that nothing exists, and perhaps feeling rather fearful of that. Then, upon understanding that, regardless, the conventions of samsara carry on as before, there can be a sense of relief such as, “ah, so things are basically just as they’ve always been.” That fallacy is like applying permanence subconsciously while thinking everything is impermanent. Once dependent arising is applied, things are not “the same”.
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Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
Thank you. What are the other points of view on this controversy? Do say Nyingmas present a different view?Malcolm wrote: ↑Mon Feb 12, 2018 4:50 pmThere is a controversy here. Tsongkhapa maintains that it is very important to identify what he terms the subtle object of negation, inherent existence, because the coarse object of negation, existence, is an over-negation.ItsRaining wrote: ↑Mon Feb 12, 2018 10:34 am
Thanks for clearing things up. But when someone perceives something to be existent like a cup, normally they wouldn't be projecting inherent existence but rather just existence in general. Or am I getting them mixed up somehow?
In other words, the cup is designated dependent on its parts. If you negate the existence of the cup, you are contradicting your own perception of the cup. If you negate only the cup's inherent existence however, you can maintain the conventional value of the cup that you perceive, but by understanding its lack of inherent existence, you can also acknowledge the cup is something which arises from conditions, since nothing that arises from conditions can be held to inherently exist—arising from conditions is simply a convention.
Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
The nuance in argument is so subtle that I can't stop wondering if the point of dispute is simply semantic.Malcolm wrote: ↑Mon Feb 12, 2018 4:50 pmThere is a controversy here. Tsongkhapa maintains that it is very important to identify what he terms the subtle object of negation, inherent existence, because the coarse object of negation, existence, is an over-negation.ItsRaining wrote: ↑Mon Feb 12, 2018 10:34 am
Thanks for clearing things up. But when someone perceives something to be existent like a cup, normally they wouldn't be projecting inherent existence but rather just existence in general. Or am I getting them mixed up somehow?
In other words, the cup is designated dependent on its parts. If you negate the existence of the cup, you are contradicting your own perception of the cup. If you negate only the cup's inherent existence however, you can maintain the conventional value of the cup that you perceive, but by understanding its lack of inherent existence, you can also acknowledge the cup is something which arises from conditions, since nothing that arises from conditions can be held to inherently exist—arising from conditions is simply a convention.
Did the traditional interpretation before Tzong Khapa negates relative truth i.e. the cup? Or Tzong Khapa's point is that the traditional interpretation self contradicts by maintaining that there is a relative yet it does not exist?
Thankyou Malcohm for your clear synopsis.
Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
I've always found Tsongkhapa's points on this not to be in any kind of actual contradiction to the traditional interpretation of emptiness but rather an additional detail that may help some people avoid the extreme of nihilism. Basically, it can be useful but is unnecessary.WeiHan wrote: ↑Wed Feb 28, 2018 5:44 amThe nuance in argument is so subtle that I can't stop wondering if the point of dispute is simply semantic.Malcolm wrote: ↑Mon Feb 12, 2018 4:50 pmThere is a controversy here. Tsongkhapa maintains that it is very important to identify what he terms the subtle object of negation, inherent existence, because the coarse object of negation, existence, is an over-negation.ItsRaining wrote: ↑Mon Feb 12, 2018 10:34 am
Thanks for clearing things up. But when someone perceives something to be existent like a cup, normally they wouldn't be projecting inherent existence but rather just existence in general. Or am I getting them mixed up somehow?
In other words, the cup is designated dependent on its parts. If you negate the existence of the cup, you are contradicting your own perception of the cup. If you negate only the cup's inherent existence however, you can maintain the conventional value of the cup that you perceive, but by understanding its lack of inherent existence, you can also acknowledge the cup is something which arises from conditions, since nothing that arises from conditions can be held to inherently exist—arising from conditions is simply a convention.
Did the traditional interpretation before Tzong Khapa negates relative truth i.e. the cup? Or Tzong Khapa's point is that the traditional interpretation self contradicts by maintaining that there is a relative yet it does not exist?
Thankyou Malcohm for your clear synopsis.
"All phenomena of samsara depend on the mind, so when the essence of mind is purified, samsara is purified. Since the phenomena of nirvana depend on the pristine consciousness of vidyā, because one remains in the immediacy of vidyā, buddhahood arises on its own. All critical points are summarized with those two." - Longchenpa
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Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/colle ... _22_05.pdfWeiHan wrote: ↑Wed Feb 28, 2018 5:44 amThe nuance in argument is so subtle that I can't stop wondering if the point of dispute is simply semantic.Malcolm wrote: ↑Mon Feb 12, 2018 4:50 pm There is a controversy here. Tsongkhapa maintains that it is very important to identify what he terms the subtle object of negation, inherent existence, because the coarse object of negation, existence, is an over-negation.
In other words, the cup is designated dependent on its parts. If you negate the existence of the cup, you are contradicting your own perception of the cup. If you negate only the cup's inherent existence however, you can maintain the conventional value of the cup that you perceive, but by understanding its lack of inherent existence, you can also acknowledge the cup is something which arises from conditions, since nothing that arises from conditions can be held to inherently exist—arising from conditions is simply a convention.
Did the traditional interpretation before Tzong Khapa negates relative truth i.e. the cup? Or Tzong Khapa's point is that the traditional interpretation self contradicts by maintaining that there is a relative yet it does not exist?
Thankyou Malcohm for your clear synopsis.
Last edited by Losal Samten on Fri Mar 02, 2018 7:15 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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ཨོཾ་ཧ་ནུ་པྷ་ཤ་བྷ་ར་ཧེ་ཡེ་སྭཱ་ཧཱ།།
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Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
No, but the four-fold negation can make it seem like conventional appearances are being negated.WeiHan wrote: ↑Wed Feb 28, 2018 5:44 am
The nuance in argument is so subtle that I can't stop wondering if the point of dispute is simply semantic.
Did the traditional interpretation before Tzong Khapa negates relative truth i.e. the cup? Or Tzong Khapa's point is that the traditional interpretation self contradicts by maintaining that there is a relative yet it does not exist?
Thankyou Malcohm for your clear synopsis.
Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
There is a difference in that Tsongkhapa's presentation respect human logic a little more. His presentation does not refute both existence and non-existence at the same time unlike traditional approach. Human logic will require that something cannot be both not existing and not non-existing at the same time. However, the traditional approach, by refuting both (actually 4) existing and on-existing is pointing that the mode of reality is beyond concepts (human logic).Josef wrote: ↑Fri Mar 02, 2018 6:18 pm
I've always found Tsongkhapa's points on this not to be in any kind of actual contradiction to the traditional interpretation of emptiness but rather an additional detail that may help some people avoid the extreme of nihilism. Basically, it can be useful but is unnecessary.
If my above conclusion is correct, then in another words, Tsongkhapa is proposing that the mode of reality should/can be understood through conventional human logic while the traditional approach points out, right at the start, that mode of reality is beyond human logic (i.e. a cup can both non existing and not non existing (existing) at the same time).
Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
That makes sense, in that the Gelug view tends to assert that one CAN understand and fully comprehend the mode of reality through intellect and that this can indeed lead to total realization. It is a unique feature of the Gelug view and practice.WeiHan wrote: ↑Fri Mar 02, 2018 7:23 pmThere is a difference in that Tsongkhapa's presentation respect human logic a little more. His presentation does not refute both existence and non-existence at the same time unlike traditional approach. Human logic will require that something cannot be both not existing and not non-existing at the same time. However, the traditional approach, by refuting both (actually 4) existing and on-existing is pointing that the mode of reality is beyond concepts (human logic).Josef wrote: ↑Fri Mar 02, 2018 6:18 pm
I've always found Tsongkhapa's points on this not to be in any kind of actual contradiction to the traditional interpretation of emptiness but rather an additional detail that may help some people avoid the extreme of nihilism. Basically, it can be useful but is unnecessary.
If my above conclusion is correct, then in another words, Tsongkhapa is proposing that the mode of reality should/can be understood through conventional human logic while the traditional approach points out, right at the start, that mode of reality is beyond human logic (i.e. a cup can both non existing and not non existing (existing) at the same time).
"All phenomena of samsara depend on the mind, so when the essence of mind is purified, samsara is purified. Since the phenomena of nirvana depend on the pristine consciousness of vidyā, because one remains in the immediacy of vidyā, buddhahood arises on its own. All critical points are summarized with those two." - Longchenpa
Re: Why does Gelug school claim emptiness means things exist without self nature?
Essential reading. Thanks!Losal Samten wrote: ↑Fri Mar 02, 2018 7:10 pmhttp://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/colle ... _22_05.pdfWeiHan wrote: ↑Wed Feb 28, 2018 5:44 amThe nuance in argument is so subtle that I can't stop wondering if the point of dispute is simply semantic.Malcolm wrote: ↑Mon Feb 12, 2018 4:50 pm There is a controversy here. Tsongkhapa maintains that it is very important to identify what he terms the subtle object of negation, inherent existence, because the coarse object of negation, existence, is an over-negation.
In other words, the cup is designated dependent on its parts. If you negate the existence of the cup, you are contradicting your own perception of the cup. If you negate only the cup's inherent existence however, you can maintain the conventional value of the cup that you perceive, but by understanding its lack of inherent existence, you can also acknowledge the cup is something which arises from conditions, since nothing that arises from conditions can be held to inherently exist—arising from conditions is simply a convention.
Did the traditional interpretation before Tzong Khapa negates relative truth i.e. the cup? Or Tzong Khapa's point is that the traditional interpretation self contradicts by maintaining that there is a relative yet it does not exist?
Thankyou Malcohm for your clear synopsis.