Since you are the one making the assertion, it is up to you to provide evidence for your claim. If you cannot, it is better for you to remain silent.Tsongkhapafan wrote: ↑Sat Jun 02, 2018 3:12 pmGreat, prove me wrong then.Malcolm wrote: ↑Sat Jun 02, 2018 12:37 pm
This is quite false. Please provide a citation from Bhavaviveka, Jñānagarbha, etc., which support this absurd claim.
It's not false, Svantantrikas assert that phenomena lack true existence (true existence is existing wholly independent of conceptual thought) but they still assert inherent existence, as all schools below the Prasangika do.
It is false, and you cannot provide any citation which supports your claim from any Indian Madhyamaka work.
The idea that things have natures is refuted by Nāgārjuna in the MMK, etc., Bhavaviveka, Candrakīrti, etc., in short by all Madhyamakas.Of course things have natures, otherwise you are contradicting the valid cognizers of worldly beings. Valid cognition sees that fire is hot, water is wet, and so forth. If you disagree then as Chandrakirti says, you and worldly should debate on this and we will rely upon the stronger. Things have non-inherent natures.
What do you mean by "nature?" Most people mean something that is intrinsic to a given thing. For example, common people assume the nature of fire is heat, the nature of water is wetness, and so on.
Bhavaviveka, etc., do not accept that things have natures. If they did, they could not be included even in Mahāyāna, let alone Madhyamaka.
Are you saying nothing exists and that nothing can be validly known by worldly people (i.e., people who have not realized emptiness)?
A "non-inherent nature" is a contradiction in terms.
The error of mundane, conventionally-valid perception is to believe that entities have natures, when in fact they do not, being phenomena that arise from conditions. It is quite easy to show a worldly person the contradiction in their thinking. Wetness and water are not two different things; therefore wetness is not the nature of water. Heat and fire are not two different things, therefore, heat is not the nature of fire, etc. For example, one can ask them, "Does wetness depend on water, or water on wetness?" If they claim wetness depends on water, ask them, where is there water that exists without wetness? If they claim the opposite, that water depends on wetness, ask them, where is there wetness that exists without water? If there is no wetness without water nor water without wetness, they can easily be shown that wetness is not a nature of water, but merely a name for the same entity under discussion. Thus, the assertion that wetness is the nature of water cannot survive analysis. The assertion of all other natures can be eliminated in the same way.