What is Dzogchen?

Malcolm
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Re: Mind essence introduced in advaita and TB

Post by Malcolm »

Sherab wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 11:37 pm It is the basis for what? Relative phenomena or ultimate phenomena or both?
It is the basis. You can call it the nature of the mind, if you like, thought that is not perfectly accurate.

Appearance is Nothing in the final analysis.
But Appearance is not Nothing.
Therefore, Nothing is Not Nothing
See the problem in the logic?
Your logic, not mine.

I said appearances were not found, I never said they were nothing. You keep saying that. If appearances were nothing, there would be nothing to search or examine. But if they are not found, there is no basis for asserting them to be nothing, since one could not find them to be something.
Whether you use the adjective "illusory" or not to describe senses and sentient beings, it still does not answer my question.
As usual, according to you, I never answer your questions satisfactorily. It makes me wonder why you bother asking.
"Arising from conditions" too does not answer my question because it is an answer that makes sense only to relative phenomena.
I never said that ultimate phenomena arise. I also never said there were any ultimate phenomena, apart from including "ultimate" to indicate there if there were such phenomena, they wold be included in the state of Dzogchen.
Also since in the final analysis, relative phenomena are nothing, causes and conditions are also nothing.
Again, your language, not mine. I would never said causes and conditions are nothing, since they appear.
Therefore, there are no relative phenomena. Therefore, relative phenomena are illusions.
This is an error in your logic. If you assert there are no relative phenomena, they cannot be illusions since they are nothing. But I never said relative phenomena were nothing. You did.
Therefore, the question remains, namely, how do illusions arise when there is nothing for any senses (illusory senses if you like) to perceive?
I already answered this question.
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Sherab
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Re: Mind essence introduced in advaita and TB

Post by Sherab »

Malcolm wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 11:52 pm
Sherab wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 11:37 pm It is the basis for what? Relative phenomena or ultimate phenomena or both?
It is the basis. You can call it the nature of the mind, if you like, thought that is not perfectly accurate.

Appearance is Nothing in the final analysis.
But Appearance is not Nothing.
Therefore, Nothing is Not Nothing
See the problem in the logic?
Your logic, not mine.

I said appearances were not found, I never said they were nothing. You keep saying that. If appearances were nothing, there would be nothing to search or examine. But if they are not found, there is no basis for asserting them to be nothing, since one could not find them to be something.
Whether you use the adjective "illusory" or not to describe senses and sentient beings, it still does not answer my question.
As usual, according to you, I never answer your questions satisfactorily. It makes me wonder why you bother asking.
"Arising from conditions" too does not answer my question because it is an answer that makes sense only to relative phenomena.
I never said that ultimate phenomena arise. I also never said there were any ultimate phenomena, apart from including "ultimate" to indicate there if there were such phenomena, they wold be included in the state of Dzogchen.
Also since in the final analysis, relative phenomena are nothing, causes and conditions are also nothing.
Again, your language, not mine. I would never said causes and conditions are nothing, since they appear.
Therefore, there are no relative phenomena. Therefore, relative phenomena are illusions.
This is an error in your logic. If you assert there are no relative phenomena, they cannot be illusions since they are nothing. But I never said relative phenomena were nothing. You did.
Therefore, the question remains, namely, how do illusions arise when there is nothing for any senses (illusory senses if you like) to perceive?
I already answered this question.
Nothing that appears in the relative can be found in the final analysis, including the causes and conditions themselves. Agree? It is the causes and conditions that give rise to appearances. Since the causes and conditions themselves cannot be found, therefore it is accurate to say that there is nothing, truly nothing. Disagree?
Schrödinger’s Yidam
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Re: What is Dzogchen?

Post by Schrödinger’s Yidam »

...therefore it is accurate to say that there is nothing, truly nothing. Disagree?
That’s the problem with Madhyamaka (not including Tsongkhapa’s version).
Yet appearances do appear.
Hence the need for Yogacara.
1.The problem isn’t ‘ignorance’. The problem is the mind you have right now. (H.H. Karmapa XVII @NYC 2/4/18)
2. I support Mingyur R and HHDL in their positions against lama abuse.
3. Student: Lama, I thought I might die but then I realized that the 3 Jewels would protect me.
Lama: Even If you had died the 3 Jewels would still have protected you. (DW post by Fortyeightvows)
Pema Rigdzin
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Re: What is Dzogchen?

Post by Pema Rigdzin »

smcj wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 1:09 am
...therefore it is accurate to say that there is nothing, truly nothing. Disagree?
That’s the problem with Madhyamaka.
Yet appearances do appear.
Hence the need for Yogacara.
I don't think Madhyamaka denies appearances. If I'm not mistaken, it just prefers not to make much in the way of positive assertions about them, sticking instead to reductive statements about them. Maybe we need the yogacara element of yogacara-madhyamaka if we want to be able to speak more positively about the rich qualities of the true nature in the context of the sutra level.
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Re: What is Dzogchen?

Post by Schrödinger’s Yidam »

Pema Rigdzin wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 1:36 am
smcj wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 1:09 am
...therefore it is accurate to say that there is nothing, truly nothing. Disagree?
That’s the problem with Madhyamaka.
Yet appearances do appear.
Hence the need for Yogacara.
I don't think Madhyamaka denies appearances. If I'm not mistaken, it just prefers not to make much in the way of positive assertions about them, sticking instead to reductive statements about them. Maybe we need the yogacara element of yogacara-madhyamaka if we want to be able to speak more positively about the rich qualities of the true nature in the context of the sutra level.
Bingo.
1.The problem isn’t ‘ignorance’. The problem is the mind you have right now. (H.H. Karmapa XVII @NYC 2/4/18)
2. I support Mingyur R and HHDL in their positions against lama abuse.
3. Student: Lama, I thought I might die but then I realized that the 3 Jewels would protect me.
Lama: Even If you had died the 3 Jewels would still have protected you. (DW post by Fortyeightvows)
Malcolm
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Re: Mind essence introduced in advaita and TB

Post by Malcolm »

Sherab wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 12:41 am
Malcolm wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 11:52 pm
Sherab wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 11:37 pm It is the basis for what? Relative phenomena or ultimate phenomena or both?
It is the basis. You can call it the nature of the mind, if you like, thought that is not perfectly accurate.

Appearance is Nothing in the final analysis.
But Appearance is not Nothing.
Therefore, Nothing is Not Nothing
See the problem in the logic?
Your logic, not mine.

I said appearances were not found, I never said they were nothing. You keep saying that. If appearances were nothing, there would be nothing to search or examine. But if they are not found, there is no basis for asserting them to be nothing, since one could not find them to be something.
Whether you use the adjective "illusory" or not to describe senses and sentient beings, it still does not answer my question.
As usual, according to you, I never answer your questions satisfactorily. It makes me wonder why you bother asking.
"Arising from conditions" too does not answer my question because it is an answer that makes sense only to relative phenomena.
I never said that ultimate phenomena arise. I also never said there were any ultimate phenomena, apart from including "ultimate" to indicate there if there were such phenomena, they wold be included in the state of Dzogchen.
Also since in the final analysis, relative phenomena are nothing, causes and conditions are also nothing.
Again, your language, not mine. I would never said causes and conditions are nothing, since they appear.
Therefore, there are no relative phenomena. Therefore, relative phenomena are illusions.
This is an error in your logic. If you assert there are no relative phenomena, they cannot be illusions since they are nothing. But I never said relative phenomena were nothing. You did.
Therefore, the question remains, namely, how do illusions arise when there is nothing for any senses (illusory senses if you like) to perceive?
I already answered this question.
Nothing that appears in the relative can be found in the final analysis, including the causes and conditions themselves. Agree? It is the causes and conditions that give rise to appearances. Since the causes and conditions themselves cannot be found, therefore it is accurate to say that there is nothing, truly nothing. Disagree?
Disagree.
PeterC
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Re: What is Dzogchen?

Post by PeterC »

Pema Rigdzin wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 1:36 am
smcj wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 1:09 am
...therefore it is accurate to say that there is nothing, truly nothing. Disagree?
That’s the problem with Madhyamaka.
Yet appearances do appear.
Hence the need for Yogacara.
I don't think Madhyamaka denies appearances. If I'm not mistaken, it just prefers not to make much in the way of positive assertions about them, sticking instead to reductive statements about them. Maybe we need the yogacara element of yogacara-madhyamaka if we want to be able to speak more positively about the rich qualities of the true nature in the context of the sutra level.
The problems that our friend Sherab is encountering in this discussion seem to arise from trying to take madhyamaka as a position, rather than a method. It is hard to find inconsistencies in argumentation that makes no positive assertions.
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Sherab
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Re: Mind essence introduced in advaita and TB

Post by Sherab »

Malcolm wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 2:55 am
Sherab wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 12:41 am Nothing that appears in the relative can be found in the final analysis, including the causes and conditions themselves. Agree? It is the causes and conditions that give rise to appearances. Since the causes and conditions themselves cannot be found, therefore it is accurate to say that there is nothing, truly nothing. Disagree?
Disagree.
Since you disagree that in the final analysis, causes and conditions themselves cannot be found, therefore you are holding the position that in the final analysis that causes and conditions themselves can be found. Therefore causes and conditions are real, not illusions. And because you say that causes and conditions can be found, appearances are therefore not nothing and also not illusions.
Malcolm
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Re: Mind essence introduced in advaita and TB

Post by Malcolm »

Sherab wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 9:46 am
Malcolm wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 2:55 am
Sherab wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 12:41 am Nothing that appears in the relative can be found in the final analysis, including the causes and conditions themselves. Agree? It is the causes and conditions that give rise to appearances. Since the causes and conditions themselves cannot be found, therefore it is accurate to say that there is nothing, truly nothing. Disagree?
Disagree.
Since you disagree that in the final analysis
Thus is why it is pointless to discuss anything with you, you run off half-cocked and don’t really pay attention to what is actually being said. The corrrc response would have been “why.”
Last edited by Malcolm on Thu Jan 17, 2019 2:16 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Malcolm
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Re: What is Dzogchen?

Post by Malcolm »

PeterC wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 7:28 am
Pema Rigdzin wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 1:36 am
smcj wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 1:09 am
That’s the problem with Madhyamaka.
Yet appearances do appear.
Hence the need for Yogacara.
I don't think Madhyamaka denies appearances. If I'm not mistaken, it just prefers not to make much in the way of positive assertions about them, sticking instead to reductive statements about them. Maybe we need the yogacara element of yogacara-madhyamaka if we want to be able to speak more positively about the rich qualities of the true nature in the context of the sutra level.
The problems that our friend Sherab is encountering in this discussion seem to arise from trying to take madhyamaka as a position, rather than a method. It is hard to find inconsistencies in argumentation that makes no positive assertions.
Yes. This is Sherab”s error.
Schrödinger’s Yidam
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Re: What is Dzogchen?

Post by Schrödinger’s Yidam »

The problems that our friend Sherab is encountering in this discussion seem to arise from trying to take madhyamaka as a position, rather than a method. It is hard to find inconsistencies in argumentation that makes no positive assertions.
It may be hard to find inconsistencies, but you can still find fault. In normal conversation refusing to take any position as a way to avoid criticism is usually thought of as straight up cowardice.

Rather, with Madhyamaka as a method, you’re still supposed to come to a conclusion of sorts; the logical/empirical mind is supposed to see, on its own terms it can accept, that there is no possible way to logically account for how phenomena abide. Having thus brought the impulse to intelectualize Dharma to its fullest fruition, a person can then let go of it.

Zen just dismisses the intellect as ineffectual.
Madhyamaka indulges the intellectual impulse, brings it to full expression in Dharma, and then checkmates the intellect. At least that way the intellect is satisfied and is no longer an obstacle.
Last edited by Schrödinger’s Yidam on Thu Jan 17, 2019 3:34 pm, edited 1 time in total.
1.The problem isn’t ‘ignorance’. The problem is the mind you have right now. (H.H. Karmapa XVII @NYC 2/4/18)
2. I support Mingyur R and HHDL in their positions against lama abuse.
3. Student: Lama, I thought I might die but then I realized that the 3 Jewels would protect me.
Lama: Even If you had died the 3 Jewels would still have protected you. (DW post by Fortyeightvows)
Malcolm
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Re: Mind essence introduced in advaita and TB

Post by Malcolm »

Sherab wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 9:46 am
Since you disagree that in the final analysis, causes and conditions themselves cannot be found, therefore you are holding the position that in the final analysis that causes and conditions themselves can be found. Therefore causes and conditions are real, not illusions. And because you say that causes and conditions can be found, appearances are therefore not nothing and also not illusions.
This is what I am disagreeing with:
Sherab wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 9:46 am ...therefore it is accurate to say that there is nothing, truly nothing. Disagree?
I disagree with your conclusion that there IS truly nothing as a consequence of causes and conditions being unfindable upon analysis. All we can say is that causes and conditions appear, when that appearance is subject to analysis, it cannot be found. It does not mean one has destroyed the appearance of causes and conditions. Therefore, it is as wrong to say that "causes and conditions are nothing because they cannot be found on analysis" as it is to say that "causes and conditions are something because there is an appearance to investigate."
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Sherab
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Re: Mind essence introduced in advaita and TB

Post by Sherab »

Malcolm wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 3:33 pm
Sherab wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 9:46 am
Since you disagree that in the final analysis, causes and conditions themselves cannot be found, therefore you are holding the position that in the final analysis that causes and conditions themselves can be found. Therefore causes and conditions are real, not illusions. And because you say that causes and conditions can be found, appearances are therefore not nothing and also not illusions.
This is what I am disagreeing with:
Sherab wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 9:46 am ...therefore it is accurate to say that there is nothing, truly nothing. Disagree?
I disagree with your conclusion that there IS truly nothing as a consequence of causes and conditions being unfindable upon analysis. All we can say is that causes and conditions appear, when that appearance is subject to analysis, it cannot be found. It does not mean one has destroyed the appearance of causes and conditions. Therefore, it is as wrong to say that "causes and conditions are nothing because they cannot be found on analysis" as it is to say that "causes and conditions are something because there is an appearance to investigate."
Yes, but why when causes and conditions are not found (and therefore appearances are not found as well since there are appearances only because of causes and conditions) they are not "destroyed"?

For you, since you have in the past argued that the relative is the ultimate and vice versa, it would logically follow that causes and conditions when not found have to be nothing.

I however, argue that there is an foundational or ultimate regime where directional cause and effect makes no sense because time is not present. The relative regime where time is present (the appearance of unidirectional cause to effect) is subsumed within the ultimate regime which is the regime beyond the two extremes. The regime that is beyond the two extremes could be equated with the regime of dependent origination if you like (since dependent origination subsumes causality) although logically speaking, it need not be so. In this context, causes and conditions themselves are, in the final analysis, illusions of the ultimate and therefore are not destroyed when causes and conditions are not found in the relative.
Malcolm
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Re: Mind essence introduced in advaita and TB

Post by Malcolm »

Sherab wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 11:06 pm
Yes, but why when causes and conditions are not found (and therefore appearances are not found as well since there are appearances only because of causes and conditions) they are not "destroyed"?
Because unlike shattering a pot with a hammer, the appearance under analysis do not vanish.
For you, since you have in the past argued that the relative is the ultimate and vice versa...
I have never made such a silly argument in my life.
The regime that is beyond the two extremes...
Whoever argues there is something beyond freedom from extremes is arguing for an extreme.
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Re: What is Dzogchen?

Post by haha »

Isn't the appearance the aggregate?
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Sherab
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Re: Mind essence introduced in advaita and TB

Post by Sherab »

Malcolm wrote: Fri Jan 18, 2019 12:56 am
Sherab wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 11:06 pm For you, since you have in the past argued that the relative is the ultimate and vice versa...
I have never made such a silly argument in my life.
What then is your definition of the relative and your definition of the ultimate?
Malcolm wrote: Fri Jan 18, 2019 12:56 am
Sherab wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 11:06 pm The regime that is beyond the two extremes...
Whoever argues there is something beyond freedom from extremes is arguing for an extreme.
I misspoke. It should have been "The regime that avoids the two extremes..."
Malcolm
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Re: Mind essence introduced in advaita and TB

Post by Malcolm »

Sherab wrote: Fri Jan 18, 2019 1:58 pm
What then is your definition of the relative and your definition of the ultimate?
Consult Candrakīrti. But in brief, an ultimate truth is the object of a veridical cognition; a relative truth is the object of a nonveridical cognition.

Sherab wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 11:06 pm
I misspoke. It should have been "The regime that avoids the two extremes..."
How can there be something, no matter what noun you want to use, that avoids the two extremes? If there is something that avoids the two extremes, it is an extreme.

Your use here is an affirming negation. But freedom from extremes is by design a nonaffirming negation. In other words, when one negates existence, nonexistence is not being confirmed. When one negates nonexistence, existence is not being confirmed, and likewise, the same applies to the remaining two extremes. This is the reason why all four extremes are to be negated, not just the first two, otherwise, the fault of being an affirming negation also applies.
Malcolm
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Re: What is Dzogchen?

Post by Malcolm »

haha wrote: Fri Jan 18, 2019 6:58 am Isn't the appearance the aggregate?
There are all kinds of appearances: internal, external, pure, impure, nonafflicted, afflicted, and so on.
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Sherab
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Re: Mind essence introduced in advaita and TB

Post by Sherab »

Malcolm wrote: Fri Jan 18, 2019 4:42 pm
Sherab wrote: Fri Jan 18, 2019 1:58 pm
What then is your definition of the relative and your definition of the ultimate?
Consult Candrakīrti. But in brief, an ultimate truth is the object of a veridical cognition; a relative truth is the object of a nonveridical cognition.
What is this object? For example, consider a table.

Is the object the table itself?
Or is the object the parts of the table, namely, its top and legs?
Or is the object the molecules that comprise the table top and table legs?
Or is the object the atoms that made up the said molecules?
... and so on.

If the above is not to your liking, then consider the following questions:
Is the object the table itself?
Or is the object the parts of the table, namely, its top and legs?
Or is the object the elements (earth, water, air, fire, space) upon which the table top and table legs are based?
Are the elements the final objects in that they are unsupported, i.e., independent of anything else?

Furthermore, is the object referred to the object itself or the mental representation of the object?

Sherab wrote: Thu Jan 17, 2019 11:06 pm
I misspoke. It should have been "The regime that avoids the two extremes..."
How can there be something, no matter what noun you want to use, that avoids the two extremes? If there is something that avoids the two extremes, it is an extreme.

Your use here is an affirming negation. But freedom from extremes is by design a nonaffirming negation. In other words, when one negates existence, nonexistence is not being confirmed. When one negates nonexistence, existence is not being confirmed, and likewise, the same applies to the remaining two extremes. This is the reason why all four extremes are to be negated, not just the first two, otherwise, the fault of being an affirming negation also applies.
[/quote]
I am using the concepts of sets.

One set is the set of all objects that are eternal, namely permanent and unchanging. The other is the set of all objects that cannot be a continuum because they are annihilated. The set that avoid the two extremes is merely that set for any object that don't fall into either of the two other sets.

Organizing objects in this way neither affirm or deny their existence. You need another layer of reasoning to do that.

For example, to negate objects in the eternal set, one can argue that because such an object is by definition permanent and unchanging, it cannot be the reality because we see changes all the time and how can something that is permanent and unchanging produce something impermanent and changing?
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Re: What is Dzogchen?

Post by Wayfarer »

One question that often occurs to me in these debates is, from whence arises the 'energy of bodhicitta' in all of this? After all bodhicitta-compassion is the fundamental driving motivation of the bodhisattva. But it's not something that can be intellectually contrived, in my experience, nor is it necessarily something under one's control. So how does bodhicitta emerge or fit into this understanding of the 'negation of appearances'?
'Only practice with no gaining idea' ~ Suzuki Roshi
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