Gorampa & Tsongkhapa

[BuddhaFollower]

Here are some actual genuine quotes of Candrakirti:

"Nagarjuna taught , "bereft of beginning, middle, and end," meaning that the world is free from creation, duration, and destruction."
-Candrakirti

"Once one asserts things, one will succumb to the view of seeing such by imagining their beginning, middle and end; hence that grasping at things is the cause of all views."
-Candrakirti

"the perfectly enlightened buddhas-proclaimed, "What is dependently created is uncreated."
-Candrakirti

"Likewise, here as well, the Lord Buddha’s pronouncement that "What is dependently created is objectively uncreated," is to counteract insistence on the objectivity of things."
-Candrakirti

"Since relativity is not objectively created, those who, through this reasoning, accept dependent things as resembling the moon in water and reflections in a mirror, understand them as neither objectively true nor false. Therefore, those who think thus regarding dependent things realize that what is dependently arisen cannot be substantially existent, since what is like a reflection is not real. If it were real, that would entail the absurdity that its transformation would be impossible. Yet neither is it unreal, since it manifests as real within the world."
-Candrakirti

"I do not say that entities do not exist, because I say that they originate in dependence. “So are you a realist then?” I am not, because I am just a proponent of dependent origination. “What sort of nature is it then that you [propound]?” I propound dependent origination. “What is the meaning of dependent origination?” It has the meaning of the lack of a nature and the meaning of nonarising through a nature [of its own]. It has the meaning of the origination of results with a nature similar to that of illusions, mirages, reflections, cities of scent-eaters, magical creations, and dreams. It has the meaning of emptiness and identitylessness."
-Candrakirti

Candrakīrti, in ''Madhyamakāvatāra'' VI.14., comments:
"If something were to originate in dependence on something other than it,
Well, then utter darkness could spring from flames
And everything could arise from everything,
Because everything that does not produce [a specific result] is the same in being other [than it]."

Candrakīrti, in the ''Prasannapadā'', comments:
"Entities also do not arise from something other, because there is nothing other."

Candrakīrti, in the ''Prasannapadā'', comments:
"Nor do entities arise from both [themselves and others], because this would entail [all] the flaws that were stated for both of these theses and because none of these [disproved possibilities] have the capacity to produce [entities]."

[Tsongkhapafan]

Saying phenomena exist is exactly the definition of Hinayana. Theravadins today still claim phenomena exist. No Mahayana school besides some Gelugpas claim phenomena exist.

Is there an apple at the subatomic level? No.

I think you've forgotten what apples are! You should try one, they're really tasty for being non-existents.

[Tsongkhapafan]

Here are some actual genuine quotes of Candrakirti:

"Nagarjuna taught , "bereft of beginning, middle, and end," meaning that the world is free from creation, duration, and destruction."
-Candrakirti

"Once one asserts things, one will succumb to the view of seeing such by imagining their beginning, middle and end; hence that grasping at things is the cause of all views."
-Candrakirti

"the perfectly enlightened buddhas-proclaimed, "What is dependently created is uncreated."
-Candrakirti

"Likewise, here as well, the Lord Buddha’s pronouncement that "What is dependently created is objectively uncreated," is to counteract insistence on the objectivity of things."
-Candrakirti

"Since relativity is not objectively created, those who, through this reasoning, accept dependent things as resembling the moon in water and reflections in a mirror, understand them as neither objectively true nor false. Therefore, those who think thus regarding dependent things realize that what is dependently arisen cannot be substantially existent, since what is like a reflection is not real. If it were real, that would entail the absurdity that its transformation would be impossible. Yet neither is it unreal, since it manifests as real within the world."
-Candrakirti

"I do not say that entities do not exist, because I say that they originate in dependence. “So are you a realist then?” I am not, because I am just a proponent of dependent origination. “What sort of nature is it then that you [propound]?” I propound dependent origination. “What is the meaning of dependent origination?” It has the meaning of the lack of a nature and the meaning of nonarising through a nature [of its own]. It has the meaning of the origination of results with a nature similar to that of illusions, mirages, reflections, cities of scent-eaters, magical creations, and dreams. It has the meaning of emptiness and identitylessness."
-Candrakirti

Candrakīrti, in ''Madhyamakāvatāra'' VI.14., comments:
"If something were to originate in dependence on something other than it,
Well, then utter darkness could spring from flames
And everything could arise from everything,
Because everything that does not produce [a specific result] is the same in being other [than it]."

Candrakīrti, in the ''Prasannapadā'', comments:
"Entities also do not arise from something other, because there is nothing other."

Candrakīrti, in the ''Prasannapadā'', comments:
"Nor do entities arise from both [themselves and others], because this would entail [all] the flaws that were stated for both of these theses and because none of these [disproved possibilities] have the capacity to produce [entities]."

So? We have different translations. The meaning doesn't change - phenomena are mere appearances whose real nature is emptiness.

[BuddhaFollower]

Which translation did you use specifically?

[Tsongkhapafan]

[EDIT by Ayu]

That's quite an accusation friend. So here's another translation for you from Venerable Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche

• [170] Now what? The cause you propose gives no result,
  So nothing is there to call the result. A cause that lacks
  A result could not be a cause; it would just not occur at all
  And thus we conclude that both are like illusions;
  And that is why we do not fall into error,
  And the things experienced by beings in the world exist!

I think you'll agree that the meaning is the same as the first one I quoted. Worldly being's things exist.

[conebeckham]

I'm not allowed to tell you my translation.

Yeah, because you made up the quote.

Madhyamakavatara is a well known easy text.

No, it's because his translation is likely Geshe Kelsang Gyatso's or one of his "writers." We'll just leave it at that for now.

[BuddhaFollower]

Actual genuine published translations of Candrakirti which I cited from Nagarjuna's Reason Sixty and Center of the Sunlit Sky say the exact opposite of Tsongkhapafan's "translations".

Tsongkhapafan should also absorb the following from Center of the Sunlit Sky, page 587:

Moreover, since both Nagarjuna and Candrakırti emphasize again and again that
all phenomena are without arising and ceasing, how could their having ceased or
disintegrated exist, let alone perform a function? As Nagarjuna says:

If the arising
Of all phenomena is unjustified,
Then the ceasing
Of all phenomena is not justified [either].

Since arising, abiding, and disintegrating
Are not established, there are no conditioned phenomena.
Since conditioned phenomena are not established,
How could unconditioned phenomena be established?

This is exactly what Malcolm has been saying.

[Bakmoon]

I'm going to go out on a bit of a limb here and say that I think that arguing over Je Tsongkhapa's acceptance of mere existence won't really take us to the heart of the matter. At the end of the day that issue stands or falls on the basis of semantic definitions of the word existence which in the end doesn't illuminate much. If the term is understood to simply refer to something being present as an appearance then I personally can't see much fault in it.

I think that the more serious issue is that Je Tsongkhapa's understanding of Madhyamaka goes much farther than just a semantic difference with the word existence but redefines the fourfold negation, what it means to hold a position, valid cognition, and a host of other issues, and these are not semantic issues, and are arguably evidence that Je Tsongkhapa understood mere existence to be more than just appearance.

[Malcolm]

And worldly people's things exist. [/list] [/i]

Not so fast, Kimosabe:

Chandra himself states this passage means:

• Since the existence of mundane entities is also established without investigation, everything is established.

In other words, we only accept unexamined mundane entities as "existent". Once they have been examined, we cannot find their existence in anyway, inherently or otherwise.

[Tsongkhapafan]

Actual genuine published translations of Candrakirti which I cited from Nagarjuna's Reason Sixty and Center of the Sunlit Sky say the exact opposite of Tsongkhapafan's "translations".

Tsongkhapafan should also absorb the following from Center of the Sunlit Sky, page 587:

Moreover, since both Nagarjuna and Candrakırti emphasize again and again that
all phenomena are without arising and ceasing, how could their having ceased or
disintegrated exist, let alone perform a function? As Nagarjuna says:

If the arising
Of all phenomena is unjustified,
Then the ceasing
Of all phenomena is not justified [either].

Since arising, abiding, and disintegrating
Are not established, there are no conditioned phenomena.
Since conditioned phenomena are not established,
How could unconditioned phenomena be established?

This is exactly what Malcolm has been saying.

This is exactly what I've been saying. 'established' = inherently existent. Nothing is inherently existent, therefore nothing is established, i.e., found upon investigation. This does not negate arising, abiding, disintegration which exist and function as dreamlike appearances and objects of valid cognition.

If you do negate this, it's nihilism.

[Tsongkhapafan]

And worldly people's things exist. [/list] [/i]

Not so fast, Kimosabe:

Chandra himself states this passage means:

• Since the existence of mundane entities is also established without investigation, everything is established.

In other words, we only accept unexamined mundane entities as "existent". Once they have been examined, we cannot find their existence in anyway, inherently or otherwise.

That's your interpretation. This passage does not say that we cannot find their existence otherwise.

If they didn't exist in any way, there would be no appearances and karma wouldn't function. I don't know why you're so keen to deny valid karmic appearances to mind.

[conebeckham]

Actual genuine published translations of Candrakirti which I cited from Nagarjuna's Reason Sixty and Center of the Sunlit Sky say the exact opposite of Tsongkhapafan's "translations".

Tsongkhapafan should also absorb the following from Center of the Sunlit Sky, page 587:

Moreover, since both Nagarjuna and Candrakırti emphasize again and again that
all phenomena are without arising and ceasing, how could their having ceased or
disintegrated exist, let alone perform a function? As Nagarjuna says:

If the arising
Of all phenomena is unjustified,
Then the ceasing
Of all phenomena is not justified [either].

Since arising, abiding, and disintegrating
Are not established, there are no conditioned phenomena.
Since conditioned phenomena are not established,
How could unconditioned phenomena be established?

This is exactly what Malcolm has been saying.

This is exactly what I've been saying. 'established' = inherently existent. Nothing is inherently existent, therefore nothing is established, i.e., found upon investigation. This does not negate arising, abiding, disintegration which exist and function as dreamlike appearances and objects of valid cognition.

If you do negate this, it's nihilism.

Not establishing or imposing any ontological status on mere appearances does not deny mere appearances. It is simply that appearances are utterly beyond concepts.

[Bakmoon]

And worldly people's things exist. [/list] [/i]

Not so fast, Kimosabe:

Chandra himself states this passage means:

• Since the existence of mundane entities is also established without investigation, everything is established.

In other words, we only accept unexamined mundane entities as "existent". Once they have been examined, we cannot find their existence in anyway, inherently or otherwise.

That's your interpretation. This passage does not say that we cannot find their existence otherwise.

If they didn't exist in any way, there would be no appearances and karma wouldn't function. I don't know why you're so keen to deny valid karmic appearances to mind.

It seems fairly clear to me that this passage is a reductio ad absurdum argument against the initial premise that things exist. Chandrakirti is basically saying here that if one accepts that it were possible to conclude existence without engaging in rational analysis, then one would be able to establish the existence of anything you want. The point being that because obviously you can't establish the existence of anything you want the initial premise that existence can be concluded without rational analysis (i.e. conventionally) must be rejected.

And Malcom is most definately not asserting things simply don't exist. non-existence is also something refuted in the fourfold negation.

[BuddhaFollower]

That's your interpretation. This passage does not say that we cannot find their existence otherwise.

If they didn't exist in any way, there would be no appearances and karma wouldn't function. I don't know why you're so keen to deny valid karmic appearances to mind.

Read my signature

[BuddhaFollower]

If you do negate this, it's nihilism.

For the love of Buddha, try to absorb this:

Annihilationism is the assertion that something existent becomes non-existent.

To discover whether the view above is annihilationism, we have examine how appearances arise. First, if an appearance is an existent, can it arise from another existent? Or does it arise from a non-existent? As for the first, an existent does not arise from another existent because the arising of something existent is a contradiction in terms; and the arising of an existent from a non-existent is impossible. To address this, Nāḡrjuna writes:

An existent does not arise from an existent;
an existent does not arise from a non-existent;
a non-existent does arise from an existent;
a non-existent does not arise from a non-existent —
where then can there be an instance of arising?

If the arising of existents is not established, the arising of appearances is not established. If arising is not established, remaining is not established, and likewise, perishing is not established. If the three, arising, remaining and perishing, are not established, then there is no reason to accept the charge of annihilationism since I never suggested that there was an existent entity that could perish.

All we are left with is empty appearances: they are not real because no existence, etc., can be ascertained regarding them; they are not unreal since they appear.

[cloudburst]

And worldly people's things exist. [/list] [/i]

Not so fast, Kimosabe:

Chandra himself states this passage means:

• Since the existence of mundane entities is also established without investigation, everything is established.

In other words, we only accept unexamined mundane entities as "existent". Once they have been examined, we cannot find their existence in anyway, inherently or otherwise.

Fantastic.
What is the purpose of adding quotation marks to the word existence? Chandrakirti did not use any special grammatical marking when he said as much, did he?

He simply quoted Buddha in many places in many ways, differentiating between inherent production and production, inherent existence and existence. Then trusting that the intelligent reader could understand his meaning by context he proceeded to use the word existence without qualification. He was not a crypto-realist for doing so, neither are Gelukpas.

After all the twisting and turning to avoid qualifying, the praising of the misguided Gendun Choepel quotation about Gelugpa "patching" original sources.... Malcolm himself has to use quotation marks to indicate that he means to use the term existence in specialized way. Oh, the irony.

Since there is also no coming and going, no decrease no increase etc., I wonder if Malcolm will start "using" quotations when he "uses" these "words." In fact, since there's no difference between mundane entities existing and anything else, I suppose we can "expect" to use quotation marks for everything! "Malcolm" has "come" to the "end" of "his" rhetorical "rope."

In any case, there you have it.
Prasangikas such as Chandrakirti and Je Tsongkhapa accept unexamined mundane entities as existent.

As Malcolm correctly points out, once they have been examined, we cannot find their existence in any way, inherently or otherwise.
This is the position of Chandrakirti and Je Tsongkhapa, Atisha, Buddha and Nagarjuna.

[BuddhaFollower]

It is true Candrakirti defends the use of consequentialist (prasanga) argumentation in the Prasannapadā.

But I would not classify him as a "Prasangika".

Prasangika is a Tibetan rhetorical device.

[Tsongkhapafan]

I'm going to go out on a bit of a limb here and say that I think that arguing over Je Tsongkhapa's acceptance of mere existence won't really take us to the heart of the matter. At the end of the day that issue stands or falls on the basis of semantic definitions of the word existence which in the end doesn't illuminate much. If the term is understood to simply refer to something being present as an appearance then I personally can't see much fault in it.

I think that the more serious issue is that Je Tsongkhapa's understanding of Madhyamaka goes much farther than just a semantic difference with the word existence but redefines the fourfold negation, what it means to hold a position, valid cognition, and a host of other issues, and these are not semantic issues, and are arguably evidence that Je Tsongkhapa understood mere existence to be more than just appearance.

Firstly, there's no point arguing semantics which is what this is all about. I see apple, I pick up apple, I eat apple, apple exists as mere appearance. You don't have to twist it into some bizarre abstract tetralemma. It seems to me that people have forgotten the basics - that Buddha wouldn't argue with the valid cognitions of worldly people. (unlike people on this thread!)

Secondly, Tsongkhapa asserts that things are just mere appearance. That's what I've been saying all along.