"One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

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krodha
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by krodha »

Wayfarer wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 4:58 am
Ogyen wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 3:36 am And what are the implications of the quasi-Vedanta usage?
There is a Buddhist term for non-dual, which is ‘advaya’. It is similar, but different, to the Hindu ‘advaita’. They’re different forms of non-dualism. And in this thread I think the distinction is being blurred. Here are some sources on the distinction between ‘Buddhist Advaya’ and ‘Hindu Advaita’. They’re pretty academic, but then it’s a pretty academic question. (Actually the fourth ref is from DharmaWheel!)
T.R.V. Murti's Advayavada is the first hit on that search, I don't find his exposition to be all that clear.

I wrote this some time ago which goes over the difference:

Non-duality in Hinduism and sanatanadharma in general is a view that promulgates an ontological, transpersonal, homogenous, unconditioned existent. Which means that non-duality in the sanatanadharma is a substantial and reductive non-duality.

Whereas one's (ultimate) nature in the buddhadharma is epistemic, personal, heterogeneous and free from the extremes of existence and non-existence. This means that one's so-called "non-dual" nature in Buddhism is an insubstantial and non-reductive non-duality.

An ontological non-duality [sanatanadharma] is where everything is reduced to a single substance that exists alone by itself. For example if subject and object were merged and we then held a view that the union of the two as a single X is truly substantial and valid.

On the other hand, an epistemological non-duality [buddhadharma] is simply a recognition that the nature of phenomena is free from the dual extremes of existence and non-existence, hence "non-dual". This is a non-reductive non-duality because it does not leave anything in its wake, there is no X left over once the nature of phenomena is recognized.

In epistemic non-duality the nature of a conditioned phenomenon [dharma] and its non-arisen nature [dharmatā] are ultimately neither the same nor different, hence they are "non-dual", because the misconception of a conditioned entity is a byproduct of ignorance, and therefore said entity has never truly come into existence in the first place. This means that the allegedly conditioned entity has truly been unconditioned from the very beginning. And to realize this fact only requires a cessation of cause for the arising of the misconception of a conditioned entity, i.e., a cessation of ignorance. If dharmins and dharmatā were not non-dual then it would be impossible to recognize the unborn nature of phenomena because that nature would be rendered another conditioned entity.

Malcolm also wrote:
Once again, here Advaita and Buddhadharma are absolutely incommensurate, and as I pointed out, it is only Hindus who imagine that Advaita and Buddhadharma are talking about the same thing, i.e., knowledge of Brahman.

The only resemblance between Advaita and Buddhadharma is that we both seek to solve the same problem — avidyā. What we understand vidyā to be is completely different.

First of all, the way the term ["non-dual"] is used in Buddhadharma and Advaita are very different.

For example, the Tarkajvakla, a famous commentary on Nagarjuna 's MMK states:

  • Therefore, that which is the inner earth element, that is is the external earth element, that is the meaning of nondual.

Or:

  • When that yogin dwells in the experience of nonconceptual discerning wisdom [prajñā] and experiences nonduality, at that time, ultimately, the entire reality of objects of knowledge are as follows, of the same characteristics, like space, appearing in the manner of a nonappearance since their characteristics are nonexistent, therefore, there isn't even the slightest thing that is not empty, so where could there be emptiness? Since there are no mental discriminations, there is no conceptual clinging of mutual dependence.

Or the Kaumudī, a famous Buddhist tantric commentary, states:

  • Because of the absence of inherent existence, the nondual essence of all phenomena is emptiness.

It also is understood, as Dzogchungpa point outed, as a consciousness devoid of subject and object, as the Ḍākinīvajrapañjara[-mahā]tantrarājasya pañjikā[-prathamapaṭala-]mukhabandha-nāma:

  • One is a nondual consciousness. Two is an apprehending subject and an apprehended object.
These quotes are not exhaustive, but they show that "nondual" in Buddhadharma is really quite different than Advaita.
krodha
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by krodha »

The crypto-Vedanta view of "one mind" is treating the "singular" aspect of the principle as an entity rather than a quality or characteristic.

"One mind" does not mean there is "one" singular, transpersonal mind. "One" in this context means "same" in the sense that the nature of mind as non-arisen and luminous [aka pure or stainless] is a generic characteristic that all minds share.

In the same sense that all instances of fire share the common and generic characteristic of heat, or all instances of water share the common, generic characteristic of wetness. But all fires do not share the same, transpersonal expression of heat, like a singular field or entity of heat that all fires arise from. The same goes for the nature of mind: all minds share the common generic characteristic of being empty and luminous, but all minds do not share a single, transpersonal nature.

The principle of the Thig le nyag gcig in Dzogchen is the same way, often misconstrued by those with crypto-Vedantin biases as promoting a singular ultimate nature or oneness, but this is not the case.
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by ItsRaining »

krodha wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 7:09 am The crypto-Vedanta view of "one mind" is treating the "singular" aspect of the principle as an entity rather than a quality or characteristic.

"One mind" does not mean there is "one" singular, transpersonal mind. "One" in this context means "same" in the sense that the nature of mind as non-arisen and luminous [aka pure or stainless] is a generic characteristic that all minds share.

In the same sense that all instances of fire share the common and generic characteristic of heat, or all instances of water share the common, generic characteristic of wetness. But all fires do not share the same, transpersonal expression of heat, like a singular field or entity of heat that all fires arise from. The same goes for the nature of mind: all minds share the common generic characteristic of being empty and luminous, but all minds do not share a single, transpersonal nature.

The principle of the Thig le nyag gcig in Dzogchen is the same way, often misconstrued by those with crypto-Vedantin biases as promoting a singular ultimate nature or oneness, but this is not the case.
Finally! Something that's kind of relevant to the topic!
nature of mind as non-arisen and luminous
Huayan says the same of phenomena/dharmas as they arise only in the mind so they are all of the same nature. Being identical in nature is why it is said the "one" (nature) is the same as the "all" (phenomena). But like you said the nature or the one isn't a Vedatin notion of a single monolithic and established entity. It's the nature of the mind.
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by krodha »

ItsRaining wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 10:28 amHuayan says the same of phenomena/dharmas as they arise only in the mind so they are all of the same nature. Being identical in nature is why it is said the "one" (nature) is the same as the "all" (phenomena). But like you said the nature or the one isn't a Vedatin notion of a single monolithic and established entity. It's the nature of the mind.
The one nature is emptiness, which means dharmas do not arise at all.
ItsRaining
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by ItsRaining »

krodha wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:09 am
ItsRaining wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 10:28 amHuayan says the same of phenomena/dharmas as they arise only in the mind so they are all of the same nature. Being identical in nature is why it is said the "one" (nature) is the same as the "all" (phenomena). But like you said the nature or the one isn't a Vedatin notion of a single monolithic and established entity. It's the nature of the mind.
The one nature is emptiness, which means dharmas do not arise at all.
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Ogyen »

Very helpful exposition. I had indeed often heard advaya and advaita as discussed as interchangeable by some people, so this makes it clear ... The difference is subtle and undeniable.

GREAT example of the fires :good:
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Simon E. »

Sadhu! :namaste:
“You don’t know it. You just know about it. That is not the same thing.”

Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche to me.
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Sherab
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab »

Matt J wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 1:58 am Language is not quite as susceptible to formal logic, especially English. I think combining statement #1 and statement #2 is a category error.

Consider the following statements:

1. A "pipe" is just an English word.

2. A "pipe" is a wooden tube with a bowl at the end used to smoke tobacco.

Therefore, something which is just an English word is a wooden tube with a bowl at the end used to smoke tobacco. Obviously, one cannot smoke tobacco with the English word "pipe".

Similarly, your statement #1 is referring to the limits of conception. Ultimate truth is just a concept. On the other hand, as a concept, it refers to the veridical perception. The term "ultimate truth" is being used in two different ways, so it doesn't make sense to combine them.

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Sherab wrote: Sat Mar 24, 2018 11:50 pm
No, the problem is actually this problem of position 2: (you should be able to find two instances (I think) in this thread where I made the argument.)

Statement 1: "ultimate truth is merely a conventional truth"
Statement 2: "An ultimate truth is the veridical perception of a given entity, a relative (i.e. conventional) truth is the non-veridical perception of a given entity. "

Logical representation of the statements:
Statement 1: U = C, where U = ultimate truth and C = conventional truth
Statement 2: U = V, C = not V, where V = veridical perception of a given entity.
Substituting 2 into 1: V = not V, which is incoherent.
Your logic is flawed. It is a mistake that should not be made by someone legally trained.

A -> X
A -> Y
Therefore X -> Y is incorrect.

The correct form is this:
X -> A
A -> Y
Therefore X -> Y

An English word implies pipe. Pipe implies a wooden tube with a bowl at the end used to smoke tobacco. Therefore an English word implies a wooden tube with a bowl at the end used to smoke tobacco. This form is correct but the first premise is incorrect. Hence, the conclusion is incorrect.

A pipe implies an English word. A pipe implies a wooden tube with a bowl at the end used to smoke tobacco. Therefore an English word implies a tube with a bowl at the end used to smoke tobacco. This form is incorrect but the premises are correct. Hence, the conclusion is incorrect.
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab »

Malcolm wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 3:24 am
Matt J wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 1:58 am Language is not quite as susceptible to formal logic, especially English. I think combining statement #1 and statement #2 is a category error.
I have tried to explain this several times, but he doesn't listen.
Did you spot the flaw in his logic? It was one that is made by most people who are not trained in logical fallacies. But you? I don't know what to say.
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab »

krodha wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 7:01 am An ontological non-duality [sanatanadharma] is where everything is reduced to a single substance that exists alone by itself. For example if subject and object were merged and we then held a view that the union of the two as a single X is truly substantial and valid.
This cannot be true as it implies that once an individual is enlightened, all will be enlightened immediately thereafter.
krodha wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 7:01 am On the other hand, an epistemological non-duality [buddhadharma] is simply a recognition that the nature of phenomena is free from the dual extremes of existence and non-existence, hence "non-dual". This is a non-reductive non-duality because it does not leave anything in its wake, there is no X left over once the nature of phenomena is recognized.
This too is problematic because if the recognition is dualistic, it is not amenable to any explanation of how external phenomena arise and yet do not arise in reality. If the recognition is non-dualistic and individual, then it implies an ontology which can only be described as neither one nor many. In this case, the word "epistemological" is an inadequate adjective for that ontology.
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Malcolm »

Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:10 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 3:24 am
Matt J wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 1:58 am Language is not quite as susceptible to formal logic, especially English. I think combining statement #1 and statement #2 is a category error.
I have tried to explain this several times, but he doesn't listen.
Did you spot the flaw in his logic? It was one that is made by most people who are not trained in logical fallacies. But you? I don't know what to say.
I have already explained to you that Richardson already proved Madhyamaka does not stand up when cast in the language of Quine. Why you ignore me when I make such observations is anyone's guess. Therefore, you should understand that your equations are flawed since they do not each the point of Madhyamaka. But if you prefer to spend your time trying to match major and minor premises, please go ahead.
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by krodha »

Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:48 pm
krodha wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 7:01 am An ontological non-duality [sanatanadharma] is where everything is reduced to a single substance that exists alone by itself. For example if subject and object were merged and we then held a view that the union of the two as a single X is truly substantial and valid.
This cannot be true as it implies that once an individual is enlightened, all will be enlightened immediately thereafter.
That is one implication, yes. But since this is a tirthika position and has nothing to do with the buddhadharma it does not really matter.
Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:48 pm
krodha wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 7:01 am On the other hand, an epistemological non-duality [buddhadharma] is simply a recognition that the nature of phenomena is free from the dual extremes of existence and non-existence, hence "non-dual". This is a non-reductive non-duality because it does not leave anything in its wake, there is no X left over once the nature of phenomena is recognized.
This too is problematic because if the recognition is dualistic,
The recognition is conventional, therefore diversity and dualities are acceptable. For instance, a conventional subject recognizing a conventional object.

Constructs of that nature are acceptable because we know that conventions are merely nominal inferences that cannot withstand keen scrutiny nor bear ultimate analysis. We only implement said conventions for purposes of communication, knowing full well they do not reference substantial entities or processes.
Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:48 pmit is not amenable to any explanation of how external phenomena arise and yet do not arise in reality.
The misconception of arising is an error in cognition that manifests as a direct result of ignorance regarding the way things really are.
Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:48 pmIf the recognition is non-dualistic and individual
Recognitions are always individual.
Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:48 pmthen it implies an ontology which can only be described as neither one nor many.
The principle of "neither one nor many" is illustrated in the above entry which discusses fires and heat.

Heat is not one because it is found wherever fire occurs, yet it is not many because heat is identical in expression wherever it is found.
Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:48 pmIn this case, the word "epistemological" is an inadequate adjective for that ontology.
"Epistemic" is referencing knowledge. The cause of the misconception of conditioned entities and processes is the result of a knowledge obscuration and is overturned through knowledge [vidyā] of the actual nature of mind and phenomena.
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Matt J »

Actually, you just disproved your own logic.

I just took the form of your argument and simply changed the terms. I substituted the term "pipe" for ultimate truth, the definition of a "pipe" for the definition of ultimate reality as "veridical perception of a given entity." I also used the term "just an English word" for "merely a conventional truth." For simplicity, I left off the last part of your statement #2. So if you have an issue with the form, it is your form you have an issue with.

When you evaluated your own example, you turned both statements into definitions, a=b. For mine, you turned both statements into inferences, a->b.

And you missed the category error--- it is impossible to say whether a "pipe" is just an English word based on the statement given. It is an ambiguous statement. The word "pipe" may refer to the symbol, or it may refer to a functional pipe you can hold in your hand.

Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:09 pm Your logic is flawed. It is a mistake that should not be made by someone legally trained.

A -> X
A -> Y
Therefore X -> Y is incorrect.

The correct form is this:
X -> A
A -> Y
Therefore X -> Y

An English word implies pipe. Pipe implies a wooden tube with a bowl at the end used to smoke tobacco. Therefore an English word implies a wooden tube with a bowl at the end used to smoke tobacco. This form is correct but the first premise is incorrect. Hence, the conclusion is incorrect.

A pipe implies an English word. A pipe implies a wooden tube with a bowl at the end used to smoke tobacco. Therefore an English word implies a tube with a bowl at the end used to smoke tobacco. This form is incorrect but the premises are correct. Hence, the conclusion is incorrect.
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Sherab
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab »

Malcolm wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 12:23 am
Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:10 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 3:24 am

I have tried to explain this several times, but he doesn't listen.
Did you spot the flaw in his logic? It was one that is made by most people who are not trained in logical fallacies. But you? I don't know what to say.
I have already explained to you that Richardson already proved Madhyamaka does not stand up when cast in the language of Quine. Why you ignore me when I make such observations is anyone's guess. Therefore, you should understand that your equations are flawed since they do not each the point of Madhyamaka. But if you prefer to spend your time trying to match major and minor premises, please go ahead.
You did not explain tome that Richardson already proved Madhyamaka does not stand up when cast in the language of Quine. You made a statement to that effect only if I remember correctly. I did say that I cannot comment on Richardson as I have not read it. I only concentrated on YOUR very own statements to show that they are incoherent. Since you understood Richardson and his approach, please use it to argue against my logical argument of your very own statements. Educate me.
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Sherab
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab »

Matt J wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 3:17 am Actually, you just disproved your own logic.

I just took the form of your argument and simply changed the terms. I substituted the term "pipe" for ultimate truth, the definition of a "pipe" for the definition of ultimate reality as "veridical perception of a given entity." I also used the term "just an English word" for "merely a conventional truth." For simplicity, I left off the last part of your statement #2. So if you have an issue with the form, it is your form you have an issue with.

When you evaluated your own example, you turned both statements into definitions, a=b. For mine, you turned both statements into inferences, a->b.

And you missed the category error--- it is impossible to say whether a "pipe" is just an English word based on the statement given. It is an ambiguous statement. The word "pipe" may refer to the symbol, or it may refer to a functional pipe you can hold in your hand.

Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:09 pm Your logic is flawed. It is a mistake that should not be made by someone legally trained.

A -> X
A -> Y
Therefore X -> Y is incorrect.

The correct form is this:
X -> A
A -> Y
Therefore X -> Y

An English word implies pipe. Pipe implies a wooden tube with a bowl at the end used to smoke tobacco. Therefore an English word implies a wooden tube with a bowl at the end used to smoke tobacco. This form is correct but the first premise is incorrect. Hence, the conclusion is incorrect.

A pipe implies an English word. A pipe implies a wooden tube with a bowl at the end used to smoke tobacco. Therefore an English word implies a tube with a bowl at the end used to smoke tobacco. This form is incorrect but the premises are correct. Hence, the conclusion is incorrect.
Put your argument in full in a sentence or two. Or better still, put it in syllogistic form. Then we will see if it makes sense.

I switch from -> to = because you said you were not trained in formal logic so as to make it easier for someone like you. You can switch the = back to -> and it would not make a difference to my argument. It will just make it more precise actually.
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Sherab
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab »

krodha wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 2:27 am
Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:48 pm
krodha wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 7:01 am An ontological non-duality [sanatanadharma] is where everything is reduced to a single substance that exists alone by itself. For example if subject and object were merged and we then held a view that the union of the two as a single X is truly substantial and valid.
This cannot be true as it implies that once an individual is enlightened, all will be enlightened immediately thereafter.
That is one implication, yes. But since this is a tirthika position and has nothing to do with the buddhadharma it does not really matter.
Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:48 pm
krodha wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 7:01 am On the other hand, an epistemological non-duality [buddhadharma] is simply a recognition that the nature of phenomena is free from the dual extremes of existence and non-existence, hence "non-dual". This is a non-reductive non-duality because it does not leave anything in its wake, there is no X left over once the nature of phenomena is recognized.
This too is problematic because if the recognition is dualistic,
The recognition is conventional, therefore diversity and dualities are acceptable. For instance, a conventional subject recognizing a conventional object.

Constructs of that nature are acceptable because we know that conventions are merely nominal inferences that cannot withstand keen scrutiny nor bear ultimate analysis. We only implement said conventions for purposes of communication, knowing full well they do not reference substantial entities or processes.
Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:48 pmit is not amenable to any explanation of how external phenomena arise and yet do not arise in reality.
The misconception of arising is an error in cognition that manifests as a direct result of ignorance regarding the way things really are.
Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:48 pmIf the recognition is non-dualistic and individual
Recognitions are always individual.
Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:48 pmthen it implies an ontology which can only be described as neither one nor many.
The principle of "neither one nor many" is illustrated in the above entry which discusses fires and heat.

Heat is not one because it is found wherever fire occurs, yet it is not many because heat is identical in expression wherever it is found.
Sherab wrote: Sun Mar 25, 2018 11:48 pmIn this case, the word "epistemological" is an inadequate adjective for that ontology.
"Epistemic" is referencing knowledge. The cause of the misconception of conditioned entities and processes is the result of a knowledge obscuration and is overturned through knowledge [vidyā] of the actual nature of mind and phenomena.
The basic problem is this: when recognition is convention, it is non-veridical. If it is non-veridical, it cannot be relied upon for what is the real truth but only what is conventionally accepted as truth. In other words, there can be no certainty that a conventional truth is really true.

To put it in another way, if conventional truth is all there is, then all there is is non-veridical. If there is a real truth, it cannot be reached. If there is no real truth, that is fine. But you cannot rely on conventional truth to tell you that.

All dualistic cognitions are cognition of conventional truths. Ultimate truth is cognized non-dualistically. Therefore there is a distinction between what is conventional and what is ultimate and there is a distinction between what is conventional truth and what is ultimate truth. In this regard, "epistemic" is not an adequate adjective for the ultimate if it makes no distinction between dualistic and non-dualistic cognitions.
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Malcolm »

Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:07 pm
You did not explain tome that Richardson already proved Madhyamaka does not stand up when cast in the language of Quine. You made a statement to that effect only if I remember correctly. I did say that I cannot comment on Richardson as I have not read it.
Early Madhyamaka in China. That is your assignment.

"Not 1; not 0; not 1 and 0; and neither 1 nor 0." These are the four non affirming negations. They have no implication other than what they directly negate. They do not affirm anything.
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab »

Malcolm wrote: Tue Mar 27, 2018 2:27 pm
Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:07 pm
You did not explain tome that Richardson already proved Madhyamaka does not stand up when cast in the language of Quine. You made a statement to that effect only if I remember correctly. I did say that I cannot comment on Richardson as I have not read it.
Early Madhyamaka in China. That is your assignment.

"Not 1; not 0; not 1 and 0; and neither 1 nor 0." These are the four non affirming negations. They have no implication other than what they directly negate. They do not affirm anything.
Is this what Richardson boils down to? Or is this your interpretation of Richardson? It would be good if you make this clear.

Anyway, if something is indescribable, affirmation with descriptions is not possible by definition, but does it also mean that it cannot be pointed to? What do you think?

By the way, I mention this in a previous post:
Here's a note to the Mahatanhasankhaya Sutta in Access to Insight:
The Buddha, knowing that there are two types of consciousness — the consciousness aggregate (viññāṇakkhandha), which is experienced in conjunction with the six sense media, and consciousness without surface (viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ), which is experienced independently of the six sense media (MN 49) — is here giving Sāti the chance to identify which of the two types he has interpreted as running and wandering on. Sāti's answer shows that he is talking about the first type. The remaining discussion of consciousness throughout this sutta is thus directed at this first type. It would have been interesting to see how the Buddha would have attacked Sāti's misunderstanding had Sāti stated that he was talking about the second.


What do you make of this? Why was the Buddha so harsh with Sati?
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by krodha »

Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:27 pmThe basic problem is this: when recognition is convention, it is non-veridical.
Recognition is a conventional occurrence. What are we ideally recognizing? The dharmatā of phenomena, which is their non-arising. We present that non-arising as the ultimate truth of the given dharma in question, but even that ultimate truth is in the end, a convention.
Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:27 pmIf it is non-veridical, it cannot be relied upon
Sure it can, and in fact the very definition of a correct convention [tathyasaṃvṛti] is that it can be relied upon to function consistently with the caveat that in order to be acceptable, it must be unable to withstand ultimate analysis.
Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:27 pmfor what is the real truth but only what is conventionally accepted as truth.
The real truth is that any and all processes and entities perceived from the standpoint of ignorance cannot withstand scrutiny. Therefore what is conventionally accepted as true is essentially all that you have, and not even it is true.
Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:27 pmIn other words, there can be no certainty that a conventional truth is really true.
No conventional truths are "really true."
Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:27 pmTo put it in another way, if conventional truth is all there is, then all there is is non-veridical.
Precisely, and recognizing this, experientially, is a cognition of ultimate truth.
Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:27 pmIf there is a real truth, it cannot be reached.
The real truth is reached via a failure to locate the entities and processes inferred by imputation and perceived through the veil of afflicted cognition.
Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:27 pmIf there is no real truth, that is fine. But you cannot rely on conventional truth to tell you that.
You have no other choice.
Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:27 pmAll dualistic cognitions are cognition of conventional truths. Ultimate truth is cognized non-dualistically.
Ultimate truth is a cognition of non-arising. It is "non-dual" because the purported entities that are known to be non-arisen are free from the dual extremes of existence and non-existence.

They are free from existence because to exist an entity must first arise. They are free from non-existence because for an entity to cease to exist it must first exist.

Therefore in cognizing ultimate truth we come to know that appearances are non-dual.
Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:27 pmTherefore there is a distinction between what is conventional and what is ultimate and there is a distinction between what is conventional truth and what is ultimate truth.
Sure, conventionally.
Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:27 pmIn this regard, "epistemic" is not an adequate adjective for the ultimate if it makes no distinction between dualistic and non-dualistic cognitions.
Epistemic is perfectly adequate, as it is through knowledge that we apprehend the actual way of things. We can also make an argument for phenomenology, but never ontology in the context of the buddhadharma because the ultimate truth of phenomena is that they lack an ontological status.
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Sherab
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

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krodha wrote: Wed Mar 28, 2018 12:54 am
Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:27 pmThe basic problem is this: when recognition is convention, it is non-veridical.
Recognition is a conventional occurrence. What are we ideally recognizing? The dharmatā of phenomena, which is their non-arising. We present that non-arising as the ultimate truth of the given dharma in question, but even that ultimate truth is in the end, a convention.
You hold the view that there is only cognition that is conventional, i.e. cognition that goes through a sense media. I hold that there is cognition which goes through an intermediary and a cognition which does not. This is a point of disagreement.
krodha wrote: Wed Mar 28, 2018 12:54 am
Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:27 pmIf it is non-veridical, it cannot be relied upon
Sure it can, and in fact the very definition of a correct convention [tathyasaṃvṛti] is that it can be relied upon to function consistently with the caveat that in order to be acceptable, it must be unable to withstand ultimate analysis.
Veridical means truthful or veracious. By definition something that is non-veridical cannot be relied upon for the truth. So if you accept Malcolm's definition of conventional truth as a non-veridical cognition of an entity, then you also have to accept that conventional truth is not truthful and therefore cannot be relied upon for truth.
krodha wrote: Wed Mar 28, 2018 12:54 am
Sherab wrote: Mon Mar 26, 2018 11:27 pmAll dualistic cognitions are cognition of conventional truths. Ultimate truth is cognized non-dualistically.
Ultimate truth is a cognition of non-arising. It is "non-dual" because the purported entities that are known to be non-arisen are free from the dual extremes of existence and non-existence.

They are free from existence because to exist an entity must first arise. They are free from non-existence because for an entity to cease to exist it must first exist.

Therefore in cognizing ultimate truth we come to know that appearances are non-dual.
This is another point of disagreement. For me, non-duality refers to no distinction of "self" and "other". Hence, dualistic cognition always involve a subject and an object. In non-dualistic cognition, there is no distinction of subject and object.
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