"One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

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krodha
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by krodha » Sat Mar 10, 2018 12:33 am

Sherab wrote:
Sat Mar 10, 2018 12:09 am
krodha wrote:
Fri Mar 09, 2018 12:00 am

To completely exhaust all possible landing points, Candrakīrti demonstrates:

(i) There is no chariot which is other than its parts

(ii) There is no chariot which is the same as its parts

(iii) There is no chariot which possesses its parts

(iv) There is no chariot which depends on its parts

(v) There is no chariot upon which the parts depend

(vi) There is no chariot which is the collection of its parts

(vii) There is no chariot which is the shape of its parts
There is no chariot other than the parts and the relation of the parts to one another.

So do the parts and the relation of the parts to one another truly exist then and is therefore the ultimate?

To answer this, you have to continue with the analysis at the level of the parts, and so on.
Or so you think.

But these teachings argue otherwise... gcig shes kun grol.

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Coëmgenu
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Coëmgenu » Sat Mar 10, 2018 4:26 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Fri Mar 09, 2018 5:59 pm
Coëmgenu wrote:
Fri Mar 09, 2018 9:14 am
krodha wrote:
Fri Mar 09, 2018 1:01 am
And Candrakīrti isn't suggesting one break down the chariot, rather he is challenging you to locate the chariot in general.
By having us look at the suggested chariot at the level of its constituents rather than at the level of the suggested compounded object.

Quite literally deconstructing the suggestion.
The question is, where is the chariot?
That may be how Ven Candrakīrti frames it, but, in the Nāgasenabhikṣusūtra, Nāgasenabhikṣu inquires how Milindarāja came be where it is. By chariot, is the responce.

Nāgasenabhikṣu asks: And what is that?

He gives Milindarāja a list of proposals only somewhat similar to Ven Candrakīrti's seven propositions outlined earlier, similar mostly only because there are seven:

1. The chariot is the axle.
2. The chariot is the wheels.
3-5. The chariot is the chassis/reins/yoke.
6. The chariot is the sum of its parts.
7. The chariot is other than its parts.


All of these are negated. Milindarāja proposes that "it is because it has all these parts that it comes under the term chariot" (from the Pāli parallel trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi) and Nāgasenabhikṣu commends Milindarāja, saying that he is correct.

He is not, however, quite correct, but perhaps it is understandable that Nāgasenabhikṣu would say "correct", given that Nāgasenabhikṣu is giving a simple introductory lesson to a non-Buddhist. Nāgasenabhikṣu goes on to clarify that the dialogue is like when *Śailabhikṣuṇī (Shíshì the mendicant, 石室比丘, *Selābhikkhunī after Marcus Bingenheimer, Vajirābhikkhunī in the Pāli parallel) speaks to the evil one Māra:
「眾魔生邪見, 謂有眾生想,假空以聚會, 都無有眾生。 譬如因眾緣, 和合有車用, 陰界入亦爾, [...] 」
"You Māra live with demonic view, speaking of the existence of all sentient beings and believing it, the conventional is empty as well as compounded, ultimately there are no sentient beings. It is like how causes and myriad conditions, fuse and there is "chariot-function" (車用)***, the five skandhāḥ the eighteen dhātavaḥ and the twelve āyatanāni are also thus so like this[...]"

***alternatively, Marcus Bingenheimer renders this as "causes and various conditions converge and yield the use of a ‘chariot’"

(Shorter Saṃyuktāgama 別譯雜阿含經 T100 Scroll 12 454c24)
In the Pāli parallel, Vajirābhikkhunī is more direct about the non-existence of the "parts" that the chariot/self is broken down into: "Suddhasaṅkhārapuñjoyaṃ, nayidha sattupalabbhati. [...] Dukkhameva hi sambhoti, dukkhaṃ tiṭṭhati veti ca; nāññatra dukkhā sambhoti, nāññaṃ dukkhā nirujjhatī”ti." ("This is a mere pile of conditions, you wont find a sentient being here. [... it is] only suffering that comes to be, lasts a while, then disappears, naught but suffering comes to be, naught but suffering ceases.", Translation Ven Sujato. Jayarava's Raves has suddhasaṅkhārapuñjoyaṃ rendered as "a mere heap of fabrication.")

As I see it: "where is the chariot" is an instruction to "define the location of the chariot", and "what is the chariot" is a more general instruction, as in, "define 'chariot'".

Before I end this post it should be also clarified that the āgama above is Sarvāstivāda śrāvaka literature. Furthermore, the aforementioned Nāgasenabhikṣusūtra is also śrāvaka literature, preserved in two recenions: Sarvāstivāda & Theravāda.

This śrāvaka literature is interesting and compelling Buddhavacana in its right, but is generally neyartha from the POV of the Mahāyāna.

@Malcolm, @krodha, or anyone else, if you are so inclined, for the sake of a shared inquiry into this simile, shared as it is by the śrāvakāḥ & the bodhisattvāḥ with differing interpretations and presentations, how does Ven Candrakirtī build on these earlier accounts of the chariot simile? How does the framing of the question on terms of "where is X" (regardless of if 'X' is a chariot, the self, or the 'scent of a flower') instead of "what is X" change the question & the answer?
佛子。如來智慧。無相智慧。無閡智慧。具足在於眾生身中。但愚癡眾生顛倒想覆。不知不見不生信心。
O, sons and daughters. The Thus-Gone's wisdom. The signless wisdom. The unobstructed wisdom. It perfectly dwells within all sentient beings’ minds. Yet in ignorance, sentient beings err and think it covered. Not knowing, not seeing, not giving rise to faith.
Āryamaitreyanāthasyottarekayānaratnagotraśāstra T1611.827b20

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Malcolm
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Malcolm » Sat Mar 10, 2018 5:18 pm

Coëmgenu wrote:
Sat Mar 10, 2018 4:26 pm

How does the framing of the question on terms of "where is X" (regardless of if 'X' is a chariot, the self, or the 'scent of a flower') instead of "what is X" change the question & the answer?

"Chariot" is a conventional truth, meaning when we hitch it up to horses, etc., we can go places. We know what a chariot is. No one has doubts about what a chariot is.

But where the chariot is, this another issue altogether. Things are designated on a collection of parts. But a given thing cannot be found in any of the parts, all the parts together, or separate from the parts. So where is that given thing? The thing is found in our imputation and no where else. This is why the question of identity is what is this given thing, but where is this given thing. The purpose of this analysis, naturally, is to show that the self is merely an imputation on a collection of aggregates and that is all.

Sherab's analysis merely indicates that ultimate truth is cognition, not that it is an independent reality. In Abhidharma, Vasubandhu says the perception of water is relative truth, the perception of its wetness, coolness, and limpidity is ultimate truth.

Finally, if the ultimate truth of emptiness is not a conventional truth, it will not be effective in bringing about elimination of clinging, etc. Therefore, we say that ultimate truth is part of conventional truth.
Buddhahood in This Life
འ༔ ཨ༔ ཧ༔ ཤ༔ ས༔ མ༔


[A]nything at all that is well spoken is the word of the Buddha.

-- Ārya-adhyāśaya-sañcodana-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra

The different sūtras in accord with the emptiness
taught by the Sugata are definitive in meaning;
One can understand that all of those Dharmas in
which a sentient being, individual, or person are taught are provisional in meaning.

-- Samadhirāja Sūtra

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Coëmgenu
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Coëmgenu » Sat Mar 10, 2018 6:42 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Sat Mar 10, 2018 5:18 pm
Coëmgenu wrote:
Sat Mar 10, 2018 4:26 pm

How does the framing of the question on terms of "where is X" (regardless of if 'X' is a chariot, the self, or the 'scent of a flower') instead of "what is X" change the question & the answer?

"Chariot" is a conventional truth, meaning when we hitch it up to horses, etc., we can go places. We know what a chariot is. No one has doubts about what a chariot is.
Nāgasenabhikṣu certainly thought that Milindarāja may not know what a chariot "is".

I couldn't help but notice that the 7 negated propositions of Ven Candrakirtī (related or unrelated to the 7 propositions of Nāgasenabhikṣu) mirror the Discourse on the Flower's Scent by Chà Mó Bhikṣu, which also, in its way, challenges the listener to "locate" or "define" the origination of a flower's scent through 6 propositions and one additional question:

1. The scent of the flower either belongs to or is other than the roots of the flower.
2. The scent of the flower either belongs to or is other than the stem of the flower.
3. The scent of the flower either belongs to or is other than the leaf [i.e. petals?] of the flower.
4. The scent of the flower either belongs to or is other than the whiskers [i.e. stamens] of the flower.
5. The scent of the flower either belongs to or is other than the fine constituents of the flower.
6. The scent of the flower either belongs to or is other than the coarse constituents of the flower.
& 7. Are the fine constituents other than the coarse constituents of the flower?

These can be further broken down into more general questions, if we omit 7:

1. Does the scent of the flower belong to X?
2. Is the scent other than X?

As usual, all is negated.

譬如優鉢羅、鉢曇摩、拘牟頭、分陀利華香,為即根香耶?為香異根耶?為莖葉鬚精麤香耶?為香異精麤耶?為等說不?」
Analogy thus: the utpala, paduma, kumuda, or puṇḍarīka flower's scent, is it the root's scent? Is the scent other than the roots? Is it the stem's, the leaf's, the whiskers' [i.e. "stamen's"], the fine constituents', or the coarse constituents' scent? Are the fine constituents other than the coarse constituents? It is so said, no?"

諸上座答言:「不也,差摩比丘!非優鉢羅、鉢曇摩、拘牟頭、分陀利根即是香、非香異根,亦非莖葉鬚精麤是香,亦非香異精麤也。」
The myriad sthavirāḥ responded: "No, resolutely, Chà Mó Bhikṣu! It is not the utpala's, the paduma's, the kumuda's, the puṇḍarīka's root’s scent, but it is not that the scent is other than root, so too also it is not the stem's, the leaf's, the whiskers', the fine constituents', or the coarse constituents' scent, so too also it is not that the fine constituents are other than the coarse constituents resolutely."

差摩比丘復問:「彼何等香?」
Chà Mó Bhikṣu again asked: "It is what's scent?"

上座答言:「是華香。」
The sthavirāḥ replied: "It is the flower's."

差摩比丘復言:「我亦如是。非色即我,我不離色;非受、想、行識即我,我不離識。
Chà Mó Bhikṣu again replied: "I, too, am thus so. It is not that my form is me, yet I am not other than form; there is no feeling, thought, formation, or consciousness that is resolutely mine, yet I am not apart from consciousness.

然我於五受陰見非我、非我所,而於我慢、我欲、我使,未斷、未知、未離、未吐。
So I in these five aggregates of binding see no me, and they are nothing I own, as such is self-conceit, self-desiring, self-causation, not yet resolute, not yet knowing, not yet having severed, not yet having vomited.

(Saṃyuktāgama 雜阿含經 T99 Scroll 5 30b10)


---------
---------
---------
然我於五受陰見非我、非我所,而於我慢、我欲、我使,未斷、未知、未離、未吐。
So I in these five aggregates of binding see no me, and they are nothing I own, as such is self-conceit, self-desiring, self-causation, not yet resolute, not yet knowing, not yet having severed, not yet having vomited.
This is an abridging-and-expanding of a longer repeating refrain from the āgama:

「我觀五受陰非我、非我所,非漏盡阿羅漢也。」
“I observe these five aggregates of binding and find no me, and they are nothing I own, but it is not that my āsravāḥ are all ended [and it is not] that I am an arhat resolutely.”
佛子。如來智慧。無相智慧。無閡智慧。具足在於眾生身中。但愚癡眾生顛倒想覆。不知不見不生信心。
O, sons and daughters. The Thus-Gone's wisdom. The signless wisdom. The unobstructed wisdom. It perfectly dwells within all sentient beings’ minds. Yet in ignorance, sentient beings err and think it covered. Not knowing, not seeing, not giving rise to faith.
Āryamaitreyanāthasyottarekayānaratnagotraśāstra T1611.827b20

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Sherab
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab » Sat Mar 10, 2018 11:21 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Sat Mar 10, 2018 5:18 pm
Sherab's analysis merely indicates that ultimate truth is cognition, not that it is an independent reality....
You are putting words in my mouth. That is misrepresentation. So far, I only claim that there is an ultimate and that ultimate is indescribable.

You could not have taken the analysis that I mentioned to its logical end since you did not response to my last two posts that were addressed to you. How then you even claim to know what the analysis indicates?

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Malcolm
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Malcolm » Sat Mar 10, 2018 11:46 pm

Sherab wrote:
Sat Mar 10, 2018 11:21 pm
Malcolm wrote:
Sat Mar 10, 2018 5:18 pm
Sherab's analysis merely indicates that ultimate truth is cognition, not that it is an independent reality....
You are putting words in my mouth. That is misrepresentation. So far, I only claim that there is an ultimate and that ultimate is indescribable.

Your claim is no different than the claim of Christians, Muslims, Hindus and so on who similarly claim an ineffable absolute.
Buddhahood in This Life
འ༔ ཨ༔ ཧ༔ ཤ༔ ས༔ མ༔


[A]nything at all that is well spoken is the word of the Buddha.

-- Ārya-adhyāśaya-sañcodana-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra

The different sūtras in accord with the emptiness
taught by the Sugata are definitive in meaning;
One can understand that all of those Dharmas in
which a sentient being, individual, or person are taught are provisional in meaning.

-- Samadhirāja Sūtra

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Sherab
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab » Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:00 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Sat Mar 10, 2018 11:46 pm
Sherab wrote:
Sat Mar 10, 2018 11:21 pm
Malcolm wrote:
Sat Mar 10, 2018 5:18 pm
Sherab's analysis merely indicates that ultimate truth is cognition, not that it is an independent reality....
You are putting words in my mouth. That is misrepresentation. So far, I only claim that there is an ultimate and that ultimate is indescribable.

Your claim is no different than the claim of Christians, Muslims, Hindus and so on who similarly claim an ineffable absolute.
That is what you think. And you think that what you think is correct. Such hubris, and coming from one who does not wish to confront the logical incoherence of his position when pointed out. That is precisely why no progress can be made in this discussion.

Go back and re-read the thread and you will not find anywhere where I claim that there is an ineffable absolute. I repeat, I made the claim that there is an ultimate. You are equating that the ultimate I claim is equivalent to an ineffable absolute. You have been repeating this claim so many times, despite my disputing your claim each time. I am beginning to think that you are hoping that by making the claim often enough, it will stick and allow you to win the argument. That would be consistent with your unwillingness to confront the logical incoherence in your position. This is not something that I expect from someone of your standing. It is truly disappointing.
Last edited by Sherab on Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:29 pm, edited 1 time in total.

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Wayfarer
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Wayfarer » Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:28 pm

Malcolm's point is, I think, if you claim there is an ultimate then you ought to be able to say what it is. If you can't say what it is, then why call it 'an ultimate''? It is very like believing in a God, by another name.

When it comes to 'the chariot' - isn't the point that the chariot neither 'is' - to say it truly is, is eternalism - nor 'is not', to say it is not, is nihilism. The chariot exists as a consequence of conditioned origination, i.e. given these parts assembled in this way, then we designate that thing 'chariot', which has certain uses, and performs certain functions. But at the same time it doesn't have any attributes of permanence etc. So in that respect, I say we don't know what the chariot is. The chariot is just something that answers that description, works that way, and serves that purpose.

Again this is why Madhyamika is dialectical, i.e. a dialogue between two poles 'is' and 'is not'. Something becomes clear from that understanding of 'neither is nor is not'. Whereas what we're always naturally inclined to do, is to hold to one side or another. That is what makes Madhyamika dynamic, i.e. it's not a fixed view regarding 'what is', but an understanding of the conditioned nature of objects of perception and of the perceiver.
Only practice with no gaining idea ~ Suzuki Roshi

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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab » Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:38 pm

Wayfarer wrote:
Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:28 pm
Malcolm's point is, I think, if you claim there is an ultimate then you ought to be able to say what it is. If you can't say what it is, then why call it 'an ultimate''? It is very like believing in a God, by another name.
If you have read and understood my arguments in the thread, I don't think you would have made the statement "it is very like believing in a God by another name." If you do think so, then point out to me where you could reasonably come to such a conclusion.
Wayfarer wrote:
Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:28 pm
When it comes to 'the chariot' - isn't the point that the chariot neither 'is' - to say it truly is, is eternalism - nor 'is not', which is nihilism. The chariot (which can be anything, really) exists as a consequence of conditioned origination, i.e. given these parts assembled in this way, then we designate that thing 'chariot', which has certain uses, and performs certain functions. But at the same time it doesn't have any attributes of permanence etc. So in that respect, I say we don't know what the chariot is. The chariot is just something that answers that description, works that way, and serves that purpose.
The example of how a chariot is examined actually show what a conventional truth is, namely a designation made on the appearance of an object without examining what underlies the appearance.

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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab » Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:43 pm

Wayfarer wrote:
Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:28 pm
Again this is why Madhyamika is dialectical, i.e. a dialogue between two poles 'is' and 'is not'. Something becomes clear from that understanding of 'neither is nor is not'. Whereas what we're always naturally inclined to do, is to hold to one side or another. That is what makes Madhyamika dynamic, i.e. it's not a fixed view regarding 'what is', but an understanding of the conditioned nature of objects of perception and of the perceiver.
If you have understood my position in the thread, you will notice that it starts with the avoidance of the two extremes of existence (eternalism) and non-existence (nihilism).

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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Wayfarer » Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:50 pm

Sherab wrote:
Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:38 pm
Wayfarer wrote:
Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:28 pm
Malcolm's point is, I think, if you claim there is an ultimate then you ought to be able to say what it is. If you can't say what it is, then why call it 'an ultimate''? It is very like believing in a God, by another name.
If you have read and understood my arguments in the thread, I don't think you would have made the statement "it is very like believing in a God by another name." If you do think so, then point out to me where you could reasonably come to such a conclusion.
Well - there's this post:
Sherab wrote:
Sun Mar 04, 2018 10:27 pm
Therefore, when we see the word "ultimate truth", it would be reasonable to expect those words to point to the actual entity of ultimate truth.
An 'actual entity' sounds rather like a personification, an 'eternal being', does it not?

I am not tying to pick an argument with you - I am in agreement with quite a bit of what you're saying. But there's a subtle point here about reification, which is 'treating the ultimate as an entity'. That is what I think is at issue here.

Remember these lines from the Aspiration Prayer of Mahamudra:
It is not existent--even the Victorious Ones do not see it.
It is not nonexistent--it is the basis of all samsara and nirvana.
This is not a contradiction, but the middle path of unity.
May the ultimate nature of phenomena, limitless mind beyond extremes, be realised.

If one says, "This is it," there is nothing to show.
If one says, "This is not it," there is nothing to deny.
:namaste:
Only practice with no gaining idea ~ Suzuki Roshi

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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Coëmgenu » Mon Mar 12, 2018 12:46 am

Sherab wrote:
Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:38 pm
The example of how a chariot is examined actually show what a conventional truth is, namely a designation made on the appearance of an object without examining what underlies the appearance.
If I might offer my own interpretation, I would agree with the above-quoted material, but I would also say, adding, that based on my reading of that simile, a conventional truth is namely a designation made on the appearance of an object even after having examined what underlies the 'surface' appearance. But perhaps this is too ambiguous in ways I don't foresee.
佛子。如來智慧。無相智慧。無閡智慧。具足在於眾生身中。但愚癡眾生顛倒想覆。不知不見不生信心。
O, sons and daughters. The Thus-Gone's wisdom. The signless wisdom. The unobstructed wisdom. It perfectly dwells within all sentient beings’ minds. Yet in ignorance, sentient beings err and think it covered. Not knowing, not seeing, not giving rise to faith.
Āryamaitreyanāthasyottarekayānaratnagotraśāstra T1611.827b20

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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Malcolm » Mon Mar 12, 2018 12:50 am

Sherab wrote:
Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:00 pm
Malcolm wrote:
Sat Mar 10, 2018 11:46 pm
Sherab wrote:
Sat Mar 10, 2018 11:21 pm

You are putting words in my mouth. That is misrepresentation. So far, I only claim that there is an ultimate and that ultimate is indescribable.

Your claim is no different than the claim of Christians, Muslims, Hindus and so on who similarly claim an ineffable absolute.
That is what you think. And you think that what you think is correct. Such hubris, and coming from one who does not wish to confront the logical incoherence of his position when pointed out. That is precisely why no progress can be made in this discussion.

Go back and re-read the thread and you will not find anywhere where I claim that there is an ineffable absolute. I repeat, I made the claim that there is an ultimate. You are equating that the ultimate I claim is equivalent to an ineffable absolute. You have been repeating this claim so many times, despite my disputing your claim each time. I am beginning to think that you are hoping that by making the claim often enough, it will stick and allow you to win the argument. That would be consistent with your unwillingness to confront the logical incoherence in your position. This is not something that I expect from someone of your standing. It is truly disappointing.
An ineffable ultimate isn't the slightest bit different from an ineffable absolute. "Ultimate" and "absolute" are synonyms.

BTW, I guess you believe if you crow about my "logical inconherence" long enough, someone will believe you.

The long and short of it is, the only incoherence here is your position that there is some sort of ineffable, independent ultimate in Buddhism. There isn't. Emptiness is also empty.
Buddhahood in This Life
འ༔ ཨ༔ ཧ༔ ཤ༔ ས༔ མ༔


[A]nything at all that is well spoken is the word of the Buddha.

-- Ārya-adhyāśaya-sañcodana-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra

The different sūtras in accord with the emptiness
taught by the Sugata are definitive in meaning;
One can understand that all of those Dharmas in
which a sentient being, individual, or person are taught are provisional in meaning.

-- Samadhirāja Sūtra

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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Malcolm » Mon Mar 12, 2018 12:52 am

Sherab wrote:
Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:43 pm
Wayfarer wrote:
Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:28 pm
Again this is why Madhyamika is dialectical, i.e. a dialogue between two poles 'is' and 'is not'. Something becomes clear from that understanding of 'neither is nor is not'. Whereas what we're always naturally inclined to do, is to hold to one side or another. That is what makes Madhyamika dynamic, i.e. it's not a fixed view regarding 'what is', but an understanding of the conditioned nature of objects of perception and of the perceiver.
If you have understood my position in the thread, you will notice that it starts with the avoidance of the two extremes of existence (eternalism) and non-existence (nihilism).
Advaitans make precisely the same claim about brahmin as you make about your ultimate.
Buddhahood in This Life
འ༔ ཨ༔ ཧ༔ ཤ༔ ས༔ མ༔


[A]nything at all that is well spoken is the word of the Buddha.

-- Ārya-adhyāśaya-sañcodana-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra

The different sūtras in accord with the emptiness
taught by the Sugata are definitive in meaning;
One can understand that all of those Dharmas in
which a sentient being, individual, or person are taught are provisional in meaning.

-- Samadhirāja Sūtra

krodha
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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by krodha » Mon Mar 12, 2018 1:07 am

Coëmgenu wrote:
Mon Mar 12, 2018 12:46 am
Sherab wrote:
Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:38 pm
The example of how a chariot is examined actually show what a conventional truth is, namely a designation made on the appearance of an object without examining what underlies the appearance.
If I might offer my own interpretation, I would agree with the above-quoted material, but I would also say, adding, that based on my reading of that simile, a conventional truth is namely a designation made on the appearance of an object even after having examined what underlies the 'surface' appearance. But perhaps this is too ambiguous in ways I don't foresee.
Really there is no need to examine what lies beneath an appearance. Any appearance will do. For example, Sherab's position that there is merit in breaking an alleged object down into constituent particles like cells and atoms etc., is actually just further extrapolation that serves to breathe life into the fundamental perception of an entity that we are attempting to overturn in the first place.

It is better to work with direct cognition. No need to get microscopic, that just fortifies perception of svabhāva.

Microscopic break downs may have been novel long ago, but this day in age everyone learns that things are composed of smaller things, and this view is now an integral aspect of science and trends in scientific materialism which champion physicalism, realism etc. For someone who suffers from materialist inclinations it is no longer a viable method in my opinion.

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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab » Mon Mar 12, 2018 11:39 pm

Wayfarer wrote:
Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:50 pm
Well - there's this post:
Sherab wrote:
Sun Mar 04, 2018 10:27 pm
Therefore, when we see the word "ultimate truth", it would be reasonable to expect those words to point to the actual entity of ultimate truth.
An 'actual entity' sounds rather like a personification, an 'eternal being', does it not?
Then you have missed what I wrote here : https://www.dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.p ... 40#p438687
My reasoning for maintaining that there is a difference between the relative and the ultimate is simply this. If the ultimate is truly indescribable, then you cannot say that it is truly non-existent. If it is truly non-existent, then the word "non-existent" would be an accurate and exact description. If the ultimate cannot be described, then it truly cannot be described. And all we can say is what it is not and not what it is. Also, since we can say what the relative is, and since we cannot say what the ultimate is, the ultimate and the relative cannot be the same.

In brief, my view is that Buddhist ontology is simply that reality is constraint within the two extremes. Within this constraint, there is the ultimate reality and there is the relative reality. The ultimate is not deceptive but the ultimate (typo, should be relative) is. The nature of the ultimate is the nature of the relative, so one can say that ultimately, the ultimate truth is the same as the relative truth. But we cannot say that the ultimate is the relative.
"Entity" (Tibetan "ngo bo") is probably a poor choice of word because of the connotation it carried in English.
Last edited by Sherab on Mon Mar 12, 2018 11:55 pm, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab » Mon Mar 12, 2018 11:49 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Mon Mar 12, 2018 12:50 am
An ineffable ultimate isn't the slightest bit different from an ineffable absolute. "Ultimate" and "absolute" are synonyms.
I would not grant as I granted Wayfarer that you missed this part of my argument. Instead, I think you chose to ignore it:
My reasoning for maintaining that there is a difference between the relative and the ultimate is simply this. If the ultimate is truly indescribable, then you cannot say that it is truly non-existent. If it is truly non-existent, then the word "non-existent" would be an accurate and exact description. If the ultimate cannot be described, then it truly cannot be described. And all we can say is what it is not and not what it is. Also, since we can say what the relative is, and since we cannot say what the ultimate is, the ultimate and the relative cannot be the same.

In brief, my view is that Buddhist ontology is simply that reality is constraint within the two extremes. Within this constraint, there is the ultimate reality and there is the relative reality. The ultimate is not deceptive but the ultimate (typo here, should be relative) is. The nature of the ultimate is the nature of the relative, so one can say that ultimately, the ultimate truth is the same as the relative truth. But we cannot say that the ultimate is the relative.

Malcolm wrote:
Mon Mar 12, 2018 12:50 am
BTW, I guess you believe if you crow about my "logical inconherence" long enough, someone will believe you.

The long and short of it is, the only incoherence here is your position that there is some sort of ineffable, independent ultimate in Buddhism. There isn't. Emptiness is also empty.
You are wrong. Logical incoherence does not require belief. It is either right or wrong. No two way about it. You either don't understand modern logic or you chose to ignore it when it suits you.

When there is a problem in logic, it is either due to invalid logical structure or invalid premises. To resolve a problematic conclusion from a valid logical argument, you have to examine the structure and/or the premises. You have done neither.
Last edited by Sherab on Mon Mar 12, 2018 11:54 pm, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab » Mon Mar 12, 2018 11:52 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Mon Mar 12, 2018 12:52 am
Sherab wrote:
Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:43 pm
Wayfarer wrote:
Sun Mar 11, 2018 11:28 pm
Again this is why Madhyamika is dialectical, i.e. a dialogue between two poles 'is' and 'is not'. Something becomes clear from that understanding of 'neither is nor is not'. Whereas what we're always naturally inclined to do, is to hold to one side or another. That is what makes Madhyamika dynamic, i.e. it's not a fixed view regarding 'what is', but an understanding of the conditioned nature of objects of perception and of the perceiver.
If you have understood my position in the thread, you will notice that it starts with the avoidance of the two extremes of existence (eternalism) and non-existence (nihilism).
Advaitans make precisely the same claim about brahmin as you make about your ultimate.
You have not made the effort to understand what I wrote... correction, you chose to ignore my arguments and prefer to continue to make allegations based on your strawman picture of my position.

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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Malcolm » Mon Mar 12, 2018 11:57 pm

Sherab wrote:
Mon Mar 12, 2018 11:49 pm

When there is a problem in logic, it is either due to invalid logical structure or invalid premises. To resolve a problematic conclusion from a valid logical argument, you have to examine the structure and/or the premises. You have done neither.
You have not shown any logical incoherence in my position. You have merely stated it to be so.

When one does not understand the basic definitions of the system one is examining, it is difficult, as your arguments show, to build a logically coherent structure. This is why I have tried to remedy your lack of understanding of the basics of the two truths.

You think the ultimate is something independent which can be uncovered. It isn't. The only thing that is an ultimate truth in Buddhadharma is emptiness, and that ultimate truth is also merely a conventional truth.
Buddhahood in This Life
འ༔ ཨ༔ ཧ༔ ཤ༔ ས༔ མ༔


[A]nything at all that is well spoken is the word of the Buddha.

-- Ārya-adhyāśaya-sañcodana-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra

The different sūtras in accord with the emptiness
taught by the Sugata are definitive in meaning;
One can understand that all of those Dharmas in
which a sentient being, individual, or person are taught are provisional in meaning.

-- Samadhirāja Sūtra

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Re: "One Mind" in Hua Yen thought

Post by Sherab » Tue Mar 13, 2018 12:03 am

Malcolm wrote:
Mon Mar 12, 2018 11:57 pm
Sherab wrote:
Mon Mar 12, 2018 11:49 pm

When there is a problem in logic, it is either due to invalid logical structure or invalid premises. To resolve a problematic conclusion from a valid logical argument, you have to examine the structure and/or the premises. You have done neither.
You have not shown any logical incoherence in my position. You have merely stated it to be so.
Anymore more such assertions and I would begin to think that you are trolling me:
What was the logical argument that I made? You said "even ultimate truth is merely a conventional truth" Call this statement 1. You also said, "An ultimate truth is the veridical perception of a given entity, a relative truth is the non-veridical perception of a given entity. " Call this statement 2.

Statement 1 can be represented as U -> C, where U = ultimate truth and C = conventional truth
Statement 2 can be represented as U = V, R = not V, where V = veridical perception of a given entity.
Substituting 2 into 1 gives V -> not V, which is incoherent.

Anyone with an understanding of logic will tell you that the argument above is logically correct. Whether the argument is valid or not depends then on whether the premises, statements 1 & 2, are true. If we take your premises as true, than the argument is true and you have an incoherent conclusion. So one of your premises must be false. I would suggest that Statement 1 is false, namely that the ultimate truth is merely a conventional truth. I have already stated before that I thought that saying the ultimate truth is merely a conventional truth is to over negate. It is my view that the incoherence from over-negation implies the undermining of the possibility of knowing what reality is, a consequence that I tried to argue in an earlier post. In other words, when you negate the ultimate to such an extent that it reduces the ultimate to the convention, and since the convention excludes veridical perception, that veridical perception that is necessary for knowing the ultimate is excluded as well.

Refute the above argument if you can. If not, do not make wild allegations of misrepresentation of your position as it only serves to diminish your status.
From https://www.dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.p ... 00#p437956

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