I am using the term "direct experience" here as a relative term to refer to experience which is less heavily interpreted / filtered. I am leveraging this idea of "direct experience" for purposes of speaking in some meaningful way about how abstract conceptualization leads to conventionally incorrect conclusions which can then conflict with "more direct" (relatively lightly conceptualized) experience.stevie wrote: ↑Thu Jan 31, 2019 11:08 pmThat's interesting. you seem to believe that there are two kinds of conceptuality: 1. a conceptuality that is guided by a direct experience which accounts for its validity and 2. a conceptuality which is guided by itself, is therefore invalid but nevertheless does affect experience which therefore is not direct.Thundering Cloud wrote: ↑Thu Jan 31, 2019 9:39 pmThe point is that the space of concepts which are both closely tied to direct experience and also in conflict with direct experience is not well-populated. Those counterintuitive experiences you mention arise because one's intuition has been mired in concepts that are many levels removed from one's direct experience.
From my perspective the problem is that the term 'experience' does necessarily rely on meaning and therefore does rely on conceptuality which is why 1 is necessarily circular. That means there is no experience whatsoever that could be nonconceptual. The addition of 'direct' to 'experience' is therefore irrelevant.
As to 2: Conceptuality can certainly be guided by philosophical tenets and thus determine the contents of experience which is necessarily conceptual be it called 'direct' or not.
Maybe you borrowed your 'direct' from the buddhist epistemologists who are talking of 'direct perception' and 'inference' (type of conceptuality) as the two means of valid cognition. But the buddhist epistemologists are in error insofar as an utterly nonconceptual ('direct') perception wouldn't perceive anything. Why? Because in order to perceive 'something' meaning, i.e. conceptuality, is required.
It can be demonstrated that in terms of experiential predictive validity, the less built-up the conceptualization has become, the more it tends to agree with relatively direct experience. This does not actually demonstrate that the more direct conceptualizations are more correct… rather, what it shows is that the incorrectness of any given conceptualization does not become apparent until the conceptualization has grown to a fairly high degree of maturity.