Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

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Malcolm
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Malcolm » Sat Jun 02, 2018 3:34 pm

Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 3:12 pm
Malcolm wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 12:37 pm


This is quite false. Please provide a citation from Bhavaviveka, Jñānagarbha, etc., which support this absurd claim.

It's not false, Svantantrikas assert that phenomena lack true existence (true existence is existing wholly independent of conceptual thought) but they still assert inherent existence, as all schools below the Prasangika do.


It is false, and you cannot provide any citation which supports your claim from any Indian Madhyamaka work.
Great, prove me wrong then.
Since you are the one making the assertion, it is up to you to provide evidence for your claim. If you cannot, it is better for you to remain silent.

What do you mean by "nature?" Most people mean something that is intrinsic to a given thing. For example, common people assume the nature of fire is heat, the nature of water is wetness, and so on.

Bhavaviveka, etc., do not accept that things have natures. If they did, they could not be included even in Mahāyāna, let alone Madhyamaka.
Of course things have natures, otherwise you are contradicting the valid cognizers of worldly beings. Valid cognition sees that fire is hot, water is wet, and so forth. If you disagree then as Chandrakirti says, you and worldly should debate on this and we will rely upon the stronger. Things have non-inherent natures.

Are you saying nothing exists and that nothing can be validly known by worldly people (i.e., people who have not realized emptiness)?
The idea that things have natures is refuted by Nāgārjuna in the MMK, etc., Bhavaviveka, Candrakīrti, etc., in short by all Madhyamakas.

A "non-inherent nature" is a contradiction in terms.

The error of mundane, conventionally-valid perception is to believe that entities have natures, when in fact they do not, being phenomena that arise from conditions. It is quite easy to show a worldly person the contradiction in their thinking. Wetness and water are not two different things; therefore wetness is not the nature of water. Heat and fire are not two different things, therefore, heat is not the nature of fire, etc. For example, one can ask them, "Does wetness depend on water, or water on wetness?" If they claim wetness depends on water, ask them, where is there water that exists without wetness? If they claim the opposite, that water depends on wetness, ask them, where is there wetness that exists without water? If there is no wetness without water nor water without wetness, they can easily be shown that wetness is not a nature of water, but merely a name for the same entity under discussion. Thus, the assertion that wetness is the nature of water cannot survive analysis. The assertion of all other natures can be eliminated in the same way.
Last edited by Malcolm on Sat Jun 02, 2018 3:37 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Buddhahood in This Life
འ༔ ཨ༔ ཧ༔ ཤ༔ ས༔ མ༔


[A]nything at all that is well spoken is the word of the Buddha.

-- Ārya-adhyāśaya-sañcodana-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra

The different sūtras in accord with the emptiness
taught by the Sugata are definitive in meaning;
One can understand that all of those Dharmas in
which a sentient being, individual, or person are taught are provisional in meaning.

-- Samadhirāja Sūtra

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conebeckham
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by conebeckham » Sat Jun 02, 2018 3:37 pm

Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 3:12 pm

Of course things have natures, otherwise you are contradicting the valid cognizers of worldly beings. Valid cognition sees that fire is hot, water is wet, and so forth. If you disagree then as Chandrakirti says, you and worldly should debate on this and we will rely upon the stronger. Things have non-inherent natures.

Are you saying nothing exists and that nothing can be validly known by worldly people (i.e., people who have not realized emptiness)?
Worldly people's experience is not any form of Truth. "Natures" cannot exist, they are merely another conception foisted upon dependent origination. Wordly beings valid cognition is firmly conventional, and therefore false from an ontological POV. Sentient Beings are not Buddhas. There is no such thing as a non-inherent nature.
དམ་པའི་དོན་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ཆེ་བ་དང་།
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།


"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")

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Tsongkhapafan
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Tsongkhapafan » Sat Jun 02, 2018 4:39 pm

conebeckham wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 3:37 pm

Worldly people's experience is not any form of Truth. "Natures" cannot exist, they are merely another conception foisted upon dependent origination. Wordly beings valid cognition is firmly conventional, and therefore false from an ontological POV. Sentient Beings are not Buddhas. There is no such thing as a non-inherent nature.
Wow, so you deny valid cognition of any kind? Even though sentient being's perceptions are mistaken, there are relative truths and relative falsities and so we cannot say that sentient being's perceptions are wrong in all respects and that nothing they perceive is valid. If this were, true everything would be a wrong awareness and it would be impossible to attain liberation or enlightenment.

As Chandrakirti says in Guide to the Middle Way:

[VI.170] If you say that causes do not produce effects then so-called effects do not exist
And without an effect there is no reason for a cause, and they do not exist.
Since both of these are just like illusions, we are not at fault
And worldly people’s things exist.

You deny worldly people's things?.....and to think that some people call Je Tsongkhapa a nihilist!

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Tsongkhapafan
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Tsongkhapafan » Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:04 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 3:34 pm

The idea that things have natures is refuted by Nāgārjuna in the MMK, etc., Bhavaviveka, Candrakīrti, etc., in short by all Madhyamakas.

A "non-inherent nature" is a contradiction in terms.

The error of mundane, conventionally-valid perception is to believe that entities have natures, when in fact they do not, being phenomena that arise from conditions. It is quite easy to show a worldly person the contradiction in their thinking. Wetness and water are not two different things; therefore wetness is not the nature of water. Heat and fire are not two different things, therefore, heat is not the nature of fire, etc. For example, one can ask them, "Does wetness depend on water, or water on wetness?" If they claim wetness depends on water, ask them, where is there water that exists without wetness? If they claim the opposite, that water depends on wetness, ask them, where is there wetness that exists without water? If there is no wetness without water nor water without wetness, they can easily be shown that wetness is not a nature of water, but merely a name for the same entity under discussion. Thus, the assertion that wetness is the nature of water cannot survive analysis. The assertion of all other natures can be eliminated in the same way.
Conventionally things have a nature. The nature of things is a manifestation of karma.

Wetness and water can be conceptually distinguished as mere names. From a practical point of view, they are one object but they are nominally distinct.

In Gone to Lanka Sutra, Buddha says:
Conventionally things are produced,
Ultimately they have no nature.
That which is mistaken with respect to this lack of nature
Is said to be conventional with respect to reality.
This means that phenomena conventionally have an illusory nature, but ultimately they do not. Those who grasp at the illusory nature as inherently existent are wrong, but it is equally incorrect to assert that phenomena have no nature at all, conventionally.

Surely you're not denying that fire is hot and that water is wet?

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Malcolm
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Malcolm » Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:24 pm

Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 4:39 pm


As Chandrakirti says in Guide to the Middle Way:

And worldly people’s things exist.
Of this line, Candra's autocommentary states:

"Since the entities of the worldly are established without analysis, they exist, thus everything is established."

The key point here is that the entities that the worldly perceive are not analyzed, and thus in this way, they are established only prior to analysis.

But this is not an argument that conventionally valid entities possess natures.

Indeed, in in the root text, Candra states very clearly:

Likewise, entities lack a nature (rang bzhin) indeed,
but saying "existence" is shown to be the provisional meaning.


And:

The absence of a nature in phenomena
is the so-called emptiness shown by the wise.


Bhavaviveka agrees in the Blaze of Reasoning:

Once it is accepted that that entities do not arise intrinsically (rang bzhin gyis), they are termed "non-arisen." Since the truth is the absence of a nature (rang bzhin med), nothing arises intrinsically (rang bzhing gyis).
Buddhahood in This Life
འ༔ ཨ༔ ཧ༔ ཤ༔ ས༔ མ༔


[A]nything at all that is well spoken is the word of the Buddha.

-- Ārya-adhyāśaya-sañcodana-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra

The different sūtras in accord with the emptiness
taught by the Sugata are definitive in meaning;
One can understand that all of those Dharmas in
which a sentient being, individual, or person are taught are provisional in meaning.

-- Samadhirāja Sūtra

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Malcolm
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Malcolm » Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:30 pm

Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:04 pm
Malcolm wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 3:34 pm

The idea that things have natures is refuted by Nāgārjuna in the MMK, etc., Bhavaviveka, Candrakīrti, etc., in short by all Madhyamakas.

A "non-inherent nature" is a contradiction in terms.

The error of mundane, conventionally-valid perception is to believe that entities have natures, when in fact they do not, being phenomena that arise from conditions. It is quite easy to show a worldly person the contradiction in their thinking. Wetness and water are not two different things; therefore wetness is not the nature of water. Heat and fire are not two different things, therefore, heat is not the nature of fire, etc. For example, one can ask them, "Does wetness depend on water, or water on wetness?" If they claim wetness depends on water, ask them, where is there water that exists without wetness? If they claim the opposite, that water depends on wetness, ask them, where is there wetness that exists without water? If there is no wetness without water nor water without wetness, they can easily be shown that wetness is not a nature of water, but merely a name for the same entity under discussion. Thus, the assertion that wetness is the nature of water cannot survive analysis. The assertion of all other natures can be eliminated in the same way.
Conventionally things have a nature. The nature of things is a manifestation of karma.
Sloppy argument.
Wetness and water can be conceptually distinguished as mere names. From a practical point of view, they are one object but they are nominally distinct.
Glad you agree, since I said, "wetness is not a nature of water, but merely a name for the same entity under discussion."


In Gone to Lanka Sutra, Buddha says:
Conventionally things are produced,
Ultimately they have no nature.
That which is mistaken with respect to this lack of nature
Is said to be conventional with respect to reality.
It is so beautiful when opponents refute themselves with the Buddha's word.

This means that phenomena conventionally have an illusory nature, but ultimately they do not. Those who grasp at the illusory nature as inherently existent are wrong, but it is equally incorrect to assert that phenomena have no nature at all, conventionally.
All this sutra passage means is those who perceive a nature in entities are mistaken about their real nature. It is not an assertion that there are valid conventional natures.

Surely you're not denying that fire is hot and that water is wet?
Fire is hot because heat and fire are the same entity, to which you have already assented, etc. But you have not shown, nor can you show that heat is the nature of fire, or that fire is the nature of heat since such claims are completely inarticulate and do not stand up even to mundane analysis, let alone ultimate analysis.
Buddhahood in This Life
འ༔ ཨ༔ ཧ༔ ཤ༔ ས༔ མ༔


[A]nything at all that is well spoken is the word of the Buddha.

-- Ārya-adhyāśaya-sañcodana-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra

The different sūtras in accord with the emptiness
taught by the Sugata are definitive in meaning;
One can understand that all of those Dharmas in
which a sentient being, individual, or person are taught are provisional in meaning.

-- Samadhirāja Sūtra

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Tsongkhapafan
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Tsongkhapafan » Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:37 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:24 pm
Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 4:39 pm


As Chandrakirti says in Guide to the Middle Way:

And worldly people’s things exist.
Of this line, Candra's autocommentary states:

"Since the entities of the worldly are established without analysis, they exist, thus everything is established."

The key point here is that the entities that the worldly perceive are not analyzed, and thus in this way, they are established only prior to analysis.

But this is not an argument that conventionally valid entities possess natures.

Indeed, in in the root text, Candra states very clearly:

Likewise, entities lack a nature (rang bzhin) indeed,
but saying "existence" is shown to be the provisional meaning.


And:

The absence of a nature in phenomena
is the so-called emptiness shown by the wise.


Bhavaviveka agrees in the Blaze of Reasoning:

Once it is accepted that that entities do not arise intrinsically (rang bzhin gyis), they are termed "non-arisen." Since the truth is the absence of a nature (rang bzhin med), nothing arises intrinsically (rang bzhing gyis).
Lack of inherent nature, yes, lack of nature, no. Conventionally things have a nature and that nature cannot withstand analysis, of course, because it's a mere appearance to mind and does not exist inherently. It nevertheless is established by valid cognition.

I feel that you are denying any validity for conventional truth at all and this is nihilistic.

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conebeckham
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by conebeckham » Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:40 pm

Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 4:39 pm
conebeckham wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 3:37 pm

Worldly people's experience is not any form of Truth. "Natures" cannot exist, they are merely another conception foisted upon dependent origination. Wordly beings valid cognition is firmly conventional, and therefore false from an ontological POV. Sentient Beings are not Buddhas. There is no such thing as a non-inherent nature.
Wow, so you deny valid cognition of any kind? Even though sentient being's perceptions are mistaken, there are relative truths and relative falsities and so we cannot say that sentient being's perceptions are wrong in all respects and that nothing they perceive is valid. If this were, true everything would be a wrong awareness and it would be impossible to attain liberation or enlightenment.

As Chandrakirti says in Guide to the Middle Way:

[VI.170] If you say that causes do not produce effects then so-called effects do not exist
And without an effect there is no reason for a cause, and they do not exist.
Since both of these are just like illusions, we are not at fault
And worldly people’s things exist.

You deny worldly people's things?.....and to think that some people call Je Tsongkhapa a nihilist!
Who denied valid cognition or cause and effect? Not me! You assume wrongly. I merely point out that all of that is relative or conventional “truth “ which is the experience of sentient beings. These things are not established truly at all. Things appear, there are true and false seeming appearances to sentient beings depending on causes and conditions, but there is no need whatsoever to ascribe ANY ontological status to the seeming....in fact, it is prapanca in my view. Just let appearances be. No need to elaborate.
Last edited by conebeckham on Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:48 pm, edited 1 time in total.
དམ་པའི་དོན་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ཆེ་བ་དང་།
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།


"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")

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Tsongkhapafan
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Tsongkhapafan » Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:46 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:30 pm

It is so beautiful when opponents refute themselves with the Buddha's word.
Firstly, I'm not your opponent. Secondly, Buddha's words require interpretation.
All this sutra passage means is those who perceive a nature in entities are mistaken about their real nature. It is not an assertion that there are valid conventional natures.
What this sutra passage means is that those who perceive an inherent nature in phenomena are mistaken as phenomena are mere appearances inseparable from their emptiness. It doesn't deny a conventional nature.
Surely you're not denying that fire is hot and that water is wet?

Fire is hot because heat and fire are the same entity, to which you have already assented, etc. But you have not shown, nor can you show that heat is the nature of fire, or that fire is the nature of heat since such claims are completely inarticulate and do not stand up even to mundane analysis, let alone ultimate analysis.
Dude, anybody can prove that the nature of fire is hot and burning by putting their hand in it. Buddha doesn't argue with the worldly about their valid perceptions.
Last edited by Tsongkhapafan on Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:47 pm, edited 1 time in total.

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Malcolm
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Malcolm » Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:46 pm

Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:37 pm


Lack of inherent nature, yes, lack of nature, no. Conventionally things have a nature and that nature cannot withstand analysis, of course, because it's a mere appearance to mind and does not exist inherently. It nevertheless is established by valid cognition.
The term used by Candra, Bhava, etc., is rang bzhin, i.e. nature. There is no separate term in Tibetan for a nature vs. an inherent nature. Some people translate the term rang bzhin, svabhāva, as internet existence. Moreover, in English, any nature at all is inherent.
Nature, defintion 2:

2 [in singular] the basic or inherent features of something, especially when seen as characteristic of it: helping them to realize the nature of their problems | there are a lot of other documents of that nature.
• the innate or essential qualities or character of a person or animal: it's not in her nature to listen to advice | I'm not violent by nature.
Buddhahood in This Life
འ༔ ཨ༔ ཧ༔ ཤ༔ ས༔ མ༔


[A]nything at all that is well spoken is the word of the Buddha.

-- Ārya-adhyāśaya-sañcodana-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra

The different sūtras in accord with the emptiness
taught by the Sugata are definitive in meaning;
One can understand that all of those Dharmas in
which a sentient being, individual, or person are taught are provisional in meaning.

-- Samadhirāja Sūtra

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Tsongkhapafan
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Joined: Sat Jan 01, 2011 9:36 am

Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Tsongkhapafan » Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:49 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:46 pm
Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:37 pm


Lack of inherent nature, yes, lack of nature, no. Conventionally things have a nature and that nature cannot withstand analysis, of course, because it's a mere appearance to mind and does not exist inherently. It nevertheless is established by valid cognition.
The term used by Candra, Bhava, etc., is rang bzhin, i.e. nature. There is no separate term in Tibetan for a nature vs. an inherent nature. Some people translate the term rang bzhin, svabhāva, as internet existence. Moreover, in English, any nature at all is inherent.
Nature, defintion 2:

2 [in singular] the basic or inherent features of something, especially when seen as characteristic of it: helping them to realize the nature of their problems | there are a lot of other documents of that nature.
• the innate or essential qualities or character of a person or animal: it's not in her nature to listen to advice | I'm not violent by nature.
There's nothing about nature that implies that it has to be inherent. For example, emptiness is the ultimate nature of phenomena but it's not inherent or inherently existent. It's ignorance that believes that anything is inherent.
Last edited by Tsongkhapafan on Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:50 pm, edited 1 time in total.

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Malcolm
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Malcolm » Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:50 pm

Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:46 pm
Malcolm wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:30 pm

It is so beautiful when opponents refute themselves with the Buddha's word.
Firstly, I'm not your opponent. Secondly, Buddha's words require interpretation.
Of course you are my opponent. Secondly, you are interpreting the Buddha's word incorrectly, as usual.
All this sutra passage means is those who perceive a nature in entities are mistaken about their real nature. It is not an assertion that there are valid conventional natures.
What this sutra passage means is that those who perceive an inherent nature in phenomena are mistaken as phenomena are mere appearances inseparable from their emptiness. It doesn't deny a conventional nature.
All natures are inherent -- use a dictionary.

Dude, anybody can prove that the nature of fire is hot and burning by putting their hand in it.
No, they cannot prove the nature of fire is hot with such an experiment. Fire and heat are only nominally distinguishable, they cannot be distinguished as separate essences.
Buddhahood in This Life
འ༔ ཨ༔ ཧ༔ ཤ༔ ས༔ མ༔


[A]nything at all that is well spoken is the word of the Buddha.

-- Ārya-adhyāśaya-sañcodana-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra

The different sūtras in accord with the emptiness
taught by the Sugata are definitive in meaning;
One can understand that all of those Dharmas in
which a sentient being, individual, or person are taught are provisional in meaning.

-- Samadhirāja Sūtra

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Tsongkhapafan
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Joined: Sat Jan 01, 2011 9:36 am

Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Tsongkhapafan » Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:52 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:50 pm

Dude, anybody can prove that the nature of fire is hot and burning by putting their hand in it.

No, they cannot prove the nature of fire is hot with such an experiment. Fire and heat are only nominally distinguishable, they cannot be distinguished as separate essences.
You're just dealing in intellectual abstractions and denying the valid cognitions of worldly people, unlike Buddha.

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conebeckham
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by conebeckham » Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:53 pm

Let go of “inherent” which is needless elaboration, not found where you think it is found, TKF. These days there are good, plain English versions of Candra and others, you just need to find them.

Malcolm is correct regarding the English word “nature” here. The word, used in these translations in this context, implies inherence, identity, etc.
དམ་པའི་དོན་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ཆེ་བ་དང་།
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།


"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")

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Tsongkhapafan
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Tsongkhapafan » Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:56 pm

conebeckham wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:40 pm
Who denied valid cognition or cause and effect? Not me! You assume wrongly. I merely point out that all of that is relative or conventional “truth “ which is the experience of sentient beings. These things are not established truly at all. Things appear, there are true and false seeming appearances to sentient beings depending on causes and conditions, but there is no need whatsoever to ascribe ANY ontological status to the seeming....in fact, it is prapanca in my view. Just let appearances be. No need to elaborate.
Okay, great. If we let appearances be, they appear to possess their own characteristics and nature which are reliably known by worldly people.

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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by conebeckham » Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:56 pm

Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:52 pm
Malcolm wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:50 pm

Dude, anybody can prove that the nature of fire is hot and burning by putting their hand in it.

No, they cannot prove the nature of fire is hot with such an experiment. Fire and heat are only nominally distinguishable, they cannot be distinguished as separate essences.
You're just dealing in intellectual abstractions and denying the valid cognitions of worldly people, unlike Buddha.
You are just adding conceptual elaboration or prapanca to that which is directly experienced by sentient beings, unlike Candra, Nāgārjuna, Buddha, etc., who treat convention on the level of seeming and no analysis of ontological value.
དམ་པའི་དོན་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ཆེ་བ་དང་།
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།


"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")

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Tsongkhapafan
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Tsongkhapafan » Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:58 pm

conebeckham wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:53 pm
Let go of “inherent” which is needless elaboration, not found where you think it is found, TKF. These days there are good, plain English versions of Candra and others, you just need to find them.

Malcolm is correct regarding the English word “nature” here. The word, used in these translations in this context, implies inherence, identity, etc.
*sigh* definitions written by worldly people who grasp at inherent existence are going to use the word 'inherent' aren't they? These definitions are not written by holy beings. Mere appearances allows conventional phenomena (which aren't true) to have their own validly established characteristics and natures.

We can use the word 'nature' without implying that it is inherent. Is Buddha nature inherent?

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Tsongkhapafan
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Tsongkhapafan » Sat Jun 02, 2018 6:00 pm

conebeckham wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:56 pm

You are just adding conceptual elaboration or prapanca to that which is directly experienced by sentient beings, unlike Candra, Nāgārjuna, Buddha, etc., who treat convention on the level of seeming and no analysis of ontological value.
No conceptual elaboration, just valid cognition which Buddha would not disagree with.
Not all conceptions are bad you know!

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conebeckham
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by conebeckham » Sat Jun 02, 2018 6:01 pm

Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:56 pm
conebeckham wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:40 pm
Who denied valid cognition or cause and effect? Not me! You assume wrongly. I merely point out that all of that is relative or conventional “truth “ which is the experience of sentient beings. These things are not established truly at all. Things appear, there are true and false seeming appearances to sentient beings depending on causes and conditions, but there is no need whatsoever to ascribe ANY ontological status to the seeming....in fact, it is prapanca in my view. Just let appearances be. No need to elaborate.
Okay, great. If we let appearances be, they appear to possess their own characteristics and nature which are reliably known by worldly people.
No one ever said otherwise. But once any assertion is made regarding ontological status of phenomena, worldly people cling to existing phenomena, and this is incorrect, and in fact, the mistake at which Madhyamaka takes aim. Not an “inherent existence” which is somehow parsed from the phenomenon itself, but the mere phenomenon.
དམ་པའི་དོན་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ཆེ་བ་དང་།
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།


"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")

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Malcolm
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Re: Mipham: Gelug = Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Post by Malcolm » Sat Jun 02, 2018 6:04 pm

Tsongkhapafan wrote:
Sat Jun 02, 2018 5:49 pm


There's nothing about nature that implies that it has to be inherent. For example, emptiness is the ultimate nature of phenomena but it's not inherent or inherently existent. It's ignorance that believes that anything is inherent.
Then not only are you ignorant of the English language, but you are ignorant of Candrakīrti where, in the Prasannapāda, he states that the only nature is the natureless nature, emptiness.

Then, if it is asked what is this dharmatā of phenomena, it is the essence of phenomena. If it is ask what is an essence, it is a nature [or an inherent existence, rang bzhin]. If it is asked what is an inherent existence [or nature], it is emptiness. If it is asked what is emptiness, it is naturelessness [or absence of inherent existence]. If it is asked what is the absence of inherent existence [or naturelessness], it is suchness [tathāta]. If it is asked what is suchness, it is the essence of suchness that is unchanging and permanent, that is, because it is not fabricated it does not arise in all aspects and because it is not dependent, it is called the nature [or inherent existence] of fire, etc."
Last edited by Malcolm on Sat Jun 02, 2018 6:06 pm, edited 3 times in total.
Buddhahood in This Life
འ༔ ཨ༔ ཧ༔ ཤ༔ ས༔ མ༔


[A]nything at all that is well spoken is the word of the Buddha.

-- Ārya-adhyāśaya-sañcodana-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra

The different sūtras in accord with the emptiness
taught by the Sugata are definitive in meaning;
One can understand that all of those Dharmas in
which a sentient being, individual, or person are taught are provisional in meaning.

-- Samadhirāja Sūtra

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